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Abstract 
This doctoral thesis represents an investigation into financial fraud in online banking 
and card payment systems in the UK and China, involving network security, online 
financial transactions, internet fraud, card payment systems and individuals’ 
perception of and behaviours towards electronic environments. In contrast to previous 
studies, the research questions were tackled by survey questionnaires both in the UK 
and China, with a particular interest in fraud and attempted fraud.  
 
The main findings from the UK respondents were that those with higher IT skill and 
younger respondents are more likely to be defrauded on the internet.  Certain types of 
online activities are associated with higher risks of fraud, these being internet banking; 
online shopping and media downloading. Furthermore, four predictors (internet 
banking, online education services, downloading media and length of debit card usage) 
provided significant effects in the logistic regression model to explain fraud 
occurrence in the UK. 
 
Based on the data collected in China, younger respondents were more likely to have 
higher general IT skill and higher educational qualifications.  However, online 
shopping was the only online activity which was significantly correlated to fraud 
occurrence. Finally, two predictors (frequency of usage of online shopping and 
number of debit cards) were selected in the logistic regression model to explain fraud 
occurrence in China. 
 
 
Key words: 
Financial transactions, internet fraud, online payment, credit card, debit card, network 
security, internet banking, online shopping, customers’ satisfaction, cyber crimes. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the introduction to the thesis ‘an investigation of financial fraud in 
online banking and card payment systems in the UK and China’. In this introductory 
chapter, we address the key questions of interest, explain why they are important, 
provide a roadmap of the structure of the dissertation and give a brief overview of the 
main conclusions.  
 
1.2 How secure are electronic transactions systems and how 
secure do people perceive them to be? 
Electronic transactions systems designed for use by customers / consumers cover a 
variety of channels including point of sale (POS), internet banking, internet credit card 
payments and even settlements partially involving telephone instructions such as 
‘card-not-present’ payments. There are two key sides to the problem.  On the one hand, 
we are interested in how secure these systems are from a technical point of view – ie 
how do these systems operate? What are their vulnerabilities, and how are these 
exploited?  On the other hand, there is the question of consumer confidence – ie how 
happy are customers / consumers to use the systems, given that they do not understand 
them other than superficially, even though they might be quite adept at operating them?  
A third question, which we reflect on in the conclusions, is how sustainable are some 
of these transactions systems? Who will win the battle for control? Will the fraudsters 
eventually make some of the media, such as the internet, unsafe and unusable for 
financial transactions, or will the systems experts in the banks and credit card 
companies eliminate electronic fraud? Alternatively, will there continue to be an 
uneasy equilibrium with the balance swinging between the fraudsters on one occasion 
and the systems experts on the other? This last scenario may even be the best outcome 
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for fraudsters, because if they eradicate the internet as a medium for financial 
transactions, they will remove their means of exploiting it. 
 
According to a popular article in the Sunday Express (Abbott 23/08/2009, p7), more 
than one in 10 of Britain’s 20 million online shoppers has either parted with money on 
a bogus website or knows someone who has. Although this is not to be regarded as a 
rigorous scientific study, the general message is consistent with the survey data we 
collected in the UK, where about 21% of the respondents had experienced internet 
fraud involving various types of online financial transaction. According to the latest 
survey conducted in 2009 by APACS, the UK Payment Association, the fraud losses 
involving the internet and bank cards have kept increasing in the last three years 
(Fraud the facts, 2009), and as the diagram below shows, the loss in the UK alone 
reached £609.9 million pounds in 2008.  This is clearly a very serious problem, and 
one which we try to analyse in this thesis. 
 
 
(source: (APACS 2009)) 
Figure 1.1 Plastic card losses on UK-issued cards 1998-2008 
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1.3 Overview of previous research 
Some of the previous studies of online transactions have focused on the customers’ 
general behaviours and attitudes from a marketing research perspective, for example, 
individuals’ responses to innovations in IT; customers’ adoption of online shopping 
and acceptance of internet banking. Many studies were trying to explain the difference 
between individuals who accept online services such as internet shopping, e-banking 
etc and those who reject them, primarily to assist with marketing strategy and building 
customers’ relationships. Particular aspects of interest were: 
(a) factual investigations into individuals’ usage of e-transactions, and  
(b) internet demographics and psychology, as a logical extension of the findings in (a), 
to provide understanding of the slow adoption of online financial transaction media 
such as e-banking. For example, Howcroft, et al, (2002) studied demographic 
characteristics of respondents including gender, age, annual income, level of 
education and ownership of financial products. As a by-product of this line of enquiry, 
researchers were trying to develop strategies that would attract customers to online 
products and services.  
 
Another line of research into online financial transaction systems has involved 
detailed analysis of the computer science and IT technology in areas such as network 
construction, internet protocols and data security. This area is complex and only fully 
understood by specialists who are expert in computer science. Nevertheless, this is an 
important part of the picture and in chapter 2 there is a discussion of the data 
transmission protocols, network security and the systems that embody these to provide 
an overall picture of technical aspects of electronic transactions systems and their 
weaknesses. The core literatures in this area deal with:  
(a) the characteristics of the internet and data transmission introducing the basic 
characteristics of the internet including publicity, anonymity, diversity, non-
geographical limitation, digitalized environment etc (Tzenga et al. 2005), together 
with the process of data transmission on the internet using SSL protocol (Onyszko 
2006).  
(b) different schemes of fraud on the internet, as defined by the Criminal Division,U.S. 
Department of Justice, and 
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(c) attacks from the internet, such as those listed by Whitman and Mattord (2003) who 
addressed fifteen types of attacks used to compromise information systems.  
 
The literature on online transactions combines elements of both the aspects described 
above – ie customer facing issues and the technicalities as described above – as these 
are both essential ingredients of the whole picture.  This literature goes on to look at 
some of the broader issues, and can be divided into various themes as follows:  
(a) the framework of the online financial transaction explained using the diagrams of 
transaction flow by Visa -(VISA) Visa: process diagrams (2006);  
(b) fraudulent schemes targeting bank cards such as those shown by figures, tables and 
diagrams from APACS (2006; 2007).  
(c) internet crime worldwide including black market transactions on the internet, as 
illustrated by Greenemier, L. and Hoover, N. (12 Feb 2007) and IC3 2006 Internet 
Crime Report in USA (2006) and Hong Kong 2006 findings (KPMG HK 2006).  
 
It is this latter area that is the main focus of this thesis. A major gap in the literature is 
individuals’ attitudes to fraud, and also investigation of the factors which might make 
them vulnerable to fraud. Individuals who have experienced real fraud have had little 
attention in the literature and have not been studied in detail. One of the main 
purposes of this dissertation is to help to fill this gap, and surveys in the UK and China 
were undertaken for this purpose.  The UK was chosen on the basis of being a mature 
‘western’ style economy; China on the basis of being the largest of the emergent 
economies.  These countries have both similarities and significant differences in their 
legal systems as applied to electronic transactions, particularly in relation to the 
consequences of fraud, as explored in chapter 3.  The differences have consequences 
for the degree of customer satisfaction with the response to fraud as found when 
comparing the survey data for the two countries in chapter 9. 
 
1.4 Overview of the structure of the dissertation 
There are ten chapters in this thesis: Chapter 1 introduces the research questions, the 
importance of the study, the gaps in the literature that the thesis attempts to fill, and an 
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overview of the whole thesis; Chapter 2, 3 and 4 contain a review of the relevant 
literature, with chapter 2 concentrating on the technicalities of electronic transactions 
and the systems in which they are embedded, chapter 3 discussing the legal 
environments of the US, UK, EU and China.  Chapter 4 is concerned with the 
literature that relates to the customer’s use of the various electronic transaction media 
and the activities and impact of fraudsters. Chapter 5 discusses the possibilities of 
different research methods that could be applied to my study and explains the 
approaches used for data collection and analysis. Chapter 6 details the processes of the 
data collection and statistical analysis of the data collected in the UK; Chapter 7 
introduces the development of the banking system and financial industry in China, 
covering financial policy, market environment, the characteristics of customers, 
society culture and other topics; Chapter 8 addresses the field work, including the 
sample selection and data collection in China and the results obtained; Chapter 9 
compares the findings from the UK and China, using statistical testing to investigate 
the significance of the differences found; Chapter 10 contains the conclusions, 
summarizing the findings of this study and providing ideas about future directions of 
research.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
The findings of this thesis are presented in the concluding chapter together with 
reflections on the future research and the sustainability of the various forms of 
financial transaction. In terms of the surveys, there were reassuring consistencies 
between the findings in the UK and in China. However, there were also some key 
differences – such as the lower incidence of actual fraud in China data but also the 
lower level of satisfaction with the banks handling of the situation when fraud did 
occur.  Are electronic transactions systems sustainable into the future? It is an open 
question, with some procedures more vulnerable than others. A discussion of this is 
provided in the concluding chapter.  
 
The main findings from the survey questionnaires conducted in the UK and China 
were that younger respondents are more likely to have higher general IT skill; 
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respondents with higher IT skill are more likely to be defrauded on the internet; 
respondents with higher qualifications are more likely to have higher IT skill; younger 
respondents are more likely to be defrauded on the internet. Also, certain types of 
online activities are associated with higher risks of fraud, particularly online shopping 
and media downloading (but not online gaming). Furthermore, four predictors (usage 
of internet banking, usage of online education services, and usage of downloading 
media and length of debit card usage) provided significant effects in the logistic 
regression model to predict fraud occurrence in the UK. 
 
Based on the data collected in China, we found that younger respondents are more 
likely to have higher general IT skill; respondents with higher qualification are more 
likely to have higher IT skill. However, online shopping was discovered as the only 
online activity which was significantly correlated with fraud occurrence. Finally, two 
predictors (frequency of usage of online shopping and number of debit cards) 
provided significant effects in the logistic regression model to predict fraud 
occurrence in China. 
 24 
Chapter 2 Security and Fraud in Electronic and 
Online Environment 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a discussion of the way that electronic and 
internet security systems are set up and the vulnerabilities that they are subject to.  
This is crucial to understanding the environment in which electronic financial 
transactions take place and the problems that are faced in combating fraudsters who 
are becoming increasingly sophisticated. The following chapter extends this 
discussion into the legal environment surrounding online and automated financial 
transactions by looking at the financial flows involved in online transactions and card 
payments.  
2.2 Network technology and security 
2.2.1 Evolution of the Internet 
In contrast to the physical world which has lots of unchangeable limits, the internet is 
an open space, which offers greater freedom for people to communicate. The internet 
was developed mainly in the US in the 1970s using the new technique of ‘packet 
switching’ (a term coined by British Scientist Donald Davis) and it was still unknown 
to the general public in 1990 (Baker 2002/2).  At the end of 1990, a revolution took 
place in CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research, where another 
British scientist, Tim Berners-Lee, combined the internet’s Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) with hypertext and created the world’s first-ever web site (CERN). 
The objective was to create a single information network to help CERN physicists 
share all the computer-stored information at the laboratory (CERN).  
 
By the year 2000, the internet had millions of users throughout the world (Baker 
2002/2).  According to the figures from the CIA in 2005, there were 37.6 million 
people who used the internet in the UK alone (CIA 2005). For many people the 
internet has become part of their daily life. We depend on the internet more and more 
not only to contact family, friends and colleagues, but also to search and exchange all 
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kinds of information without geographic limitation, subject only to comprehension of 
the language or graphic indicators used.  As most websites are written in English, 
the internet has become one of the most important drivers for the adoption of English 
as an international language.  
 
First of all, we look at the characteristics of internet including its strengths and 
weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages particularly with financial transactions in 
mind. The characteristics of the internet are shown as below (Tzenga et al. 2005): 
 (1) Publicity: over the internet, there is no need to know a users’ identity, 
location or application programmes. Each user can send or receive data or information 
through the internet. 
 (2) Anonymity: we may occasionally obtain the user’s IP address while 
sending or receiving data, but we are unable to get other information about the user, 
unless some special approaches are taken. 
 (3) Diversity: anyone can, in any form, develop or do anything because the 
internet is public so that the information contained in the internet is quite diverse. 
 (4) Non-geographical limitation: internet users come from all over the world 
without being affected by geographical differences and  are able to communicate with 
one another from anywhere at anytime. 
 (5) Digitalized environment: any information transfer over the internet is by 
means of a digital file, so obtaining or copying or it is a straightforward task 
encryption coding might be required to read it. 
 
As a medium the internet lets people communicate to each other in a real time with 
low cost and high efficiency. The sheer diversity of information makes the internet the 
richest source for any information available. The digitalized environment creates a 
virtual space for internet users and inspires people’s imagination without limits. 
Unfortunately, while people are overwhelmed by the advantages and possibilities of 
the internet, it is not without problems as a medium for both social interactions and 
financial transactions. 
 
The internet was designed for openness and simplicity (Gralla 2006,p9). That is to say 
that online information is supposed to be sent back and forth easily and totally open to 
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anyone. Anyone who knows a little technical knowledge can take advantage of the 
internet for his own purpose and this could involve criminal activity. In contrast to 
more traditional channels of communication, the internet makes it easy for anyone to 
hide his true identity or even pose as someone else (Gralla 2006,p9).  For example, it 
is very common and easy to register an e-mail account using fake personal 
information, such as name, gender, age, address etc. As opposed to a postal address, 
an email address is only a virtual code for one user and it doesn’t necessarily convey 
any clue of physical existence or identification. You can’t be sure who a person is 
from their email addresses, nor where they come from, nor can you be sure if this is 
the same person you contacted minutes before. In the cyber world, neither 
identification nor location can be determined with certainty. 
 
2.2.2 Data transmission on the internet (general protocols) 
The security of data transmission on the internet becomes more and more important 
because of the rapid growth of internet users using the medium for business and 
financial transactions as well as more general communications.  For financial services 
in particular, security on the internet becomes the key factor for each party involved in 
the online transaction.   
 
On the internet, data transmission not only relies on the hardware connection, but also 
depends on the various protocols for data transmission, such as TCP/IP, SSL etc. In 
computing, a protocol is a convention or standard that controls or enables the 
connection, communication, and data transfer between two computing endpoints. 
These protocols break up every piece of information and message into pieces called 
packets, deliver those packets to the coded destinations, and then reassemble the 
packets into their original form after they have been delivered so the receiving 
computer can view and use them (Gralla 2006,p9). TCP is the Transmission Control 
Protocol and IP is the Internet Protocol. TCP breaks up information into packets and 
reassembles the packets at the receivers’ end. IP is responsible for ensuring the 
packets are sent to the right destination (Gralla 2006,p9). 
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Figure 2.1 shows the process of the preparation of data to be sent on the internet. The 
application data in this diagram refers to a message to be transmitted to another user.  
The content of this message consists of data, which are first divided into Record 
Protocol Units.  These are then compressed and encrypted, using the public key to 
encrypt the data in order to ensure secure transmission on the internet. The original 
message is now in the form of a series of packets, which are ready for secure 
transmission.  When these packets reach the client terminal, they are decrypted to the 
original message by using the private key which is offered by the server. The main 
function of SSL (Secure Socket Layer) is authenticating the client and server to each 
other; ensuring data integrity and securing data privacy (Onyszko 2006). 
 
(source: (Onyszko 2006)) 
Figure 2.1 Creating a packet under SSL record protocol  
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“The SSL protocol was originally developed by Netscape, to ensure security of data 
transported and routed through HTTP, LDAP or POP3 application layers. SSL is 
designed to make use of TCP as a communication layer to provide a reliable end-to-
end secure and authenticated connection between two points over a network (for 
example between the service client and the server)” (Onyszko 2006).  TCP/IP is the 
basic protocol for data transmission on the internet. SSL is the senior protocol which 
supports the use of standard key encryption technologies. This is illustrated 
diagrammatically in Figure 2.2 below:  
 
(source: (Onyszko 2006)) 
Figure 2.2 SSL between application protocols and TCP/IP  
 
Hagel and Brown (2001) on the other hand divide the web service into three layers 
consisting of the application service layer, the service grid layer, and the standards and 
protocols layer. Ratnasingam (2002) summarised the characteristics of the three layers 
as follows: 
1. Top layer – application service. Web services run on any application platform 
as long as it has a web server connected to the internet. 
2. Middle layer – service grid. The service grid layer provides four types of 
utilities: 
• service management utilities (including provisioning, monitoring, ensuring 
quality of service, synchronization and conflict resolution); 
• resource knowledge management utilities (including directories, brokers, 
registries, repositories and data transformation); 
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• transport management utilities (including message queuing, filtering, metering, 
monitoring, routing and resource orchestration); and 
• shared utilities (including security, auditing and assessment of third party 
performance, billing and payment). 
3. Bottom layer – software standards and communication protocols. Software 
standards include: 
• WSDL to describe the Web service; 
• UDDI to advertise, syndicate as a central organization for registering, finding 
and using Web services; 
• Web services flow language (WSFL) to define work flows; 
• XML to format data exchange and description; and 
• Communication protocols (including SOAP to communicate that is for calling 
Web services, HTTP and TCP/IP). 
In security terms, it is apparent from the explanations above that the bottom layer is 
fundamental in that it deals with basic coded security such as SSL, whereas the middle 
layer contains security software such as firewalls which is subject to change and 
development. Both layers have susceptibilities to security problems.    
  
2.2.3 Vulnerabilities of protocols 
SSL seemed good enough to ensure that data transmission online was safe from a 
technical perspective. But in practice, its vulnerability affects tens of thousands of 
sites. In 2004, the researchers of Netcraft (Bekker 2004) noted that the key 
vulnerability of SSL is stack overflow in the Private Communications Technology, or 
PCT, protocol. PCT is a proprietary protocol developed by Microsoft and Visa 
International as an alternative to Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 2.0. SSL 3.0 has made 
obsolete both PCT 1.0 and SSL 2.0.  PCT is enabled by default in Windows 2000 and 
Windows NT 4.0. Windows Server 2003 has SSL 3.0 enabled and PCT disabled by 
default.  
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Although Microsoft keeps releasing new patches in order to fix the security problems, 
many customers will not be patched for weeks or months. According to the March 
Secure Server Survey by Netcraft in 2004 (Bekker 2004), more than 132,000 web-
facing SSL servers were running either Windows 2000 or Windows NT4. When the 
network researchers are still in the discussion of vulnerability of SSL, the criminals 
already have started to try new fraud schemes on the internet with more advanced 
tricks. The X-Force security researchers at Internet Security System (ISS) stated: “the 
SSL is so often used for secure data transmissions involving confidential or financial 
information that hackers will aggressively target any vulnerability given the high-
value nature of websites protected by SSL” (Bekker 2004). 
When Microsoft fixed two remote code execution vulnerabilities in Powerpoint, 
researchers mentioned that this flaw is particularly dangerous because it doesn’t 
require any user interaction and could allow an attacker to gain complete control over 
the targeted system, giving them the ability to alter or delete data and create new user 
accounts with full privileges (Espiner 2009).   
When people realize the importance of internet security they are normally willing to 
have an SSL connection to encrypt all information flows with the internet. Even 
unsophisticated users are learning never to click on links or attachments in unfamiliar 
emails because of the increased publicity given to internet security in the general 
media (kranky 2006). While customers seek protection from up-to-date software and 
new protocols, cyber criminals also look for the vulnerabilities and weakness of 
internet security systems. As phishing emails become less effective, cyber criminals 
are turning to a relatively new and frightening method, so called SSL-evading Trojans 
(kranky 2006). The real danger of these Trojans is that they don’t break the encryption 
at all which means the encryption connection remains complete while the fraudsters 
enter the user’s accounts.  
These Trojans are using three main methods: the first one is called “Bogus SSL”, 
which can find financial websites in the browser cache and create fake local pages 
(kranky 2006). When users try to log on to the real website, the Trojans divert users to 
the fake webpage and capture their logon information. Then users will be diverted 
back to the real website and therefore users don’t notice anything wrong.  
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The second method is called “password-grabbing scheme”. When financial websites 
want to identify the online users, they usually show some graphics and random 
numbers on the webpage and ask users to enter these. In this situation, the Trojans can 
take snapshots of the part of the screen and send them back to the hacker (kranky 
2006).  
The third method that Trojans can use is to bypass any existing authentication after a 
users’ PC has been infected. Once the Trojans are on a user’s machine, they can wait 
for any chance patiently. When the users log in to their online accounts successfully, 
the Trojans can initiate payments or transfers to anywhere by creating hidden browser 
windows to make transactions (kranky 2006). This fraud is very difficult for financial 
websites to detect because the transaction is being done from an authorized user using 
successfully logged on websites.  
Defenses against intrusions need to be in place and to be updated constantly. Internet 
experts and internet criminals continuously compete against each other but at the same 
time they inspire and encourage each other. To a large extent, the development of 
internet security technology is the outcome of a secret war between two totally 
opposite powers.  
 
2.2.4 Encryption and decryption 
Given the importance of data encryption for preserving the security of online 
communications and transactions, it is appropriate at this point to outline the 
mechanisms and techniques for data encryption and to assess their rôle particularly in 
guarding against fraud. 
 
2.2.4.1 Secret key encryption; 
Secret key encryption, also known as symmetric cryptography, uses a single key for 
both encryption and decryption. In the following diagrams we can see the process of 
message sending from A to B. After the encryption, A sends out the message. On the 
other side, B only gets the correct message from A if B decrypts the message 
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successfully. This symmetric cryptography approach has a number of weaknesses, 
including: 
 
1. The key used to encrypt message is the same one to decrypt the message. 
2. There is no authentication check in the whole process, which means A has no idea 
if the message is received by B and B isn’t sure the message is sent by A. 
3. When A and B communicate for the first time, it may not be convenient to 
exchange the key, for example if one or other is in an insecure environment. 
 
 
A                                                                                                                                  B 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Secret key encryption 
 
In addition, data transmission will not be secure if the key is lost or stolen. If someone 
gets the key illegally, he can send or receive any message which is not supposed to be 
sent or received by him.  
 
2.2.4.2 Public key encryption; 
Public key cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptography, is a form of 
cryptography in which a user has a pair of cryptographic keys - a public key and a 
private key. The private key is kept secret, while the public key may be widely 
distributed. The keys are related mathematically, but the private key cannot be 
practically derived from the public key. A message encrypted with the public key can 
be decrypted only with the corresponding private key. 
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A                                                                                                                                  B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Public key encryption 
 
The diagram above explains how the public key encryption works. A (sender) uses 
two different keys to encrypt the message because keys are working in pairs. One is 
A’s private key which is to reassure B (receiver) the message is sent by A, not anyone 
else. The other key used to encrypt the message is B’s public key, which is to reassure 
the message is decrypted by B, not anyone else. The data encryption and 
authentication check can therefore be done at the same time in asymmetric 
cryptography. The other advantage of public key cryptography is the convenience of 
exchanging public keys when contact is first made. We can use the communication 
established by A and B to explain this point. A (sender) sends its public key to B first 
for example. Then B (receiver) uses A’s public key to encrypt its own public key and 
send back to A. A will use its private key to decrypt B’s public key. Once two parties 
get each other’s public key, the communication channel is set up successfully. 
 
2.2.5 Internet fraud schemes 
“Internet Fraud” refers generally to any type of fraud scheme that uses one or more 
components of the internet (e. g chat rooms, emails or website) to present fraudulent 
solicitations to prospective victims, to conduct fraudulent transactions, to transmit the 
proceeds of fraud to financial institutions or to others connected with the scheme 
(Criminal Division,U.S. Department of Justice).  A list of fifteen types of attacks 
made through the internet is provided by Whitman and Mattord (2003,p64), which are 
briefly explained in the following passages. 
  
Text 
Msg. 
Encryption 
Msg. 
transmitted on 
the internet 
Decryption 
Text 
Msg. 
A’s private key A’s public key 
B’s public key B’s private key 
 34 
(1) Malicious code 
Virus, worms and Trojan horses are categorized in this type of attack. This attack 
programme is intent to steal or destroy information.  
(2) Hoaxes 
A real virus attached to a disguised massage which looks like from a legitimate source 
can fool users very easily. The damage will be done to everyone when users distribute 
the message to their friends and colleague.  
(3) Back door  
A back door attack is to have a programme (such as a key logging programming) 
installed on a computer.  Then the programme sends out passwords to remote users so 
that the users can control and access the system. 
(4) Password crack, (5) Brute force and (6) Dictionary 
These three attacks focus on computing the password by guessing, using combinations 
and applying algorithms.  
(7) Denial-of-Service (DOS) and Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS) 
In a DOS attack, the attackers send out so many requests to the target that it results in 
a system crash or failure.  A DDOS is an attack which against the target by controlling 
a group of computers at the same time but in different location. 
(8) Spoofing 
Spoofing is a technique used to gain unauthorized access to computers, whereby the 
intruder sends messages to a computer with an IP address indicating that the message 
is coming from a trusted host.  
(9) Man-in-the-middle 
In the well-known man-in-the-middle or TCP hijacking attack, attacker sniffs packets 
from the network, modifies them, and inserts them back into the network. If this attack 
happens in the process of encryption key exchange, it causes worse damage. When 
sender and receiver exchange their encryption keys online, the attacker cut into the 
communication and get the packets from both sides. That is to say, the attacker 
becomes invisible and eavesdrop everything from both sender and receiver. 
(10) Spam 
Spam is called junk mail sometimes, but the spam attack is connected with Phishing 
emails which try to deceive users releasing sensitive information including personal 
and financial information.  
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(11) Mail bombing 
Another DOS attack which uses a large number of emails to overwhelm the target’s 
web-server system. 
(12) Sniffers 
A sniffer programme shows all the data going by, including passwords and the data 
inside of files, such as word-processing documents and screens full of sensitive data 
from application. 
(13) Social Engineering 
Within the context of information security, social engineering is the process of using 
social skills to convince people to reveal access credentials or other valuable 
information to the attacker.    
(14) Buffer overflow 
When the buffer overflows, the attacker can make the target system execute 
instructions, or the attacker can take advantage of some other unintended consequence 
of the failure. 
(15) Timing attack 
Timing attack allows a web designer to create a malicious form of cookie to store on 
the client’s system which allows the designer to collect information on access to 
password protected sites.  
 
However, not all of these are useful for financial fraud, some being aimed at 
disruption of service or for other mischievous purposes.  Internet fraud usually 
involves activities such as E-mail phishing, online auction and retail schemes, 
business opportunity schemes, identity theft and fraud, online investment schemes and 
credit/debit card fraud. 
 
2.2.5.1 Phishing attack and spam emails 
Phishing is the name given to the practice of sending e-mails at random, purporting to 
come from a genuine company operating on the Internet, in an attempt to trick 
customers of that company into disclosing information at a bogus website operated by 
fraudsters (APACS 2006). Phishing emails usually persuade customers to update their 
personal or account information by clicking links contained in emails. Once customers 
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click the links provide by phishing emails, they will be diverted to a malicious 
webpage which looks exactly the same as the original one. When customers update 
their information online, they never notice they are providing anything to criminals. 
Phishing attacks normally target customers rather than banks because banks systems 
are much more difficult to break. However, there were 14,156 phishing incidents 
targeted against UK banks and building societies in 2006 compared to 1,713 in 2005 
(APACS, 2007). The big increase suggests that criminals see the activity as profitable 
and are becoming more sophisticated and specialized in their approach.  
 
The figure on the next page shows the number of phishing attacks to internet users by 
month in 2005 and 2006 in the UK. We can see the number of phishing attacks 
increased from 18 in January to 353 in December in 2005 while from 606 to 1513 in 
2006. It is worth mentioning that one single phishing attack could send out millions of 
emails. January 2005 had the least number of monthly phishing attacks for that year 
(18), but even this low number could still generate a large number of phishing emails. 
The total monetary loss would be considerable if, say, 1 in 1,000 people responded 
and released their personal or account information. 
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(source: APACS (2007)) 
Figure 2.5 Number of phishing incidents by month in 2005 and 2006 
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Let us have a look at profit made by spam emails according to the research results 
from (Pasquinucci 2007/2): imagine sending one million UCE (unsolicited 
commercial email) messages (this is a low number) of which only 10% arrive in the 
inboxes of recipients and 90% are blocked by anti-spam filters. Suppose that out of 
100,000 messages delivered; only 0.1% led to an economic transaction. Each 
transaction is worth US$10 (again a low number). The gross profit for the UCE 
amounts to US$1000.  
 
A typical operation of UCE involves three steps and characters. The vendor is the 
originator of the crime, who employs a UCE professional who performs two tasks: 
preparing the message (in such a manner that its true source is disguised) and selecting 
the list of recipients.  These tasks can be delicate and technically difficult. Then there 
is the deliverer, likely to be a highly technical organization with the means to send out 
emails without being caught, often based in Eastern Europe or Asia. 
 
With the increase in security awareness of internet users, phishing emails have 
become increasingly more sophisticated than before, with criminals refining their 
fraudulent schemes to keep capturing their victims. According to the 2006 Canadian 
Government report on Phishing, attacks can be divided into the following different 
types, 
 
(1) Spear Phishing, which is described a highly targeted attack. This attack targets 
selected groups of recipients who share the same experience of some products, 
financial service and memberships. Just like standard Phishing emails, the message 
seems to be sent by a very trusted source. For example, an employer or a colleague 
who would be likely to send an e-mail message to everyone or a select group in the 
company (e.g., the head of human resources or a computer systems administrator) 
(Binational Working Group October 2006). Some criminals collect background 
information and try to personalize a phishing attack to a certain group of internet users, 
which increases the possibility of success.  
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(2) Redirection, whereby fraudsters use the technique to cause internet users to 
download malicious code into their computers unknowingly. Normally if users type a 
web address into a browser, the computer will direct users to the correct website. If 
the user’s computer has been secretly infected by malicious code, the computer will be 
controlled by the malicious code and will direct the user to a phishing website, which 
is likely to resemble the original website that the user intended to browse.  
 
(3) Keylogging or backdoor. Once the computer has installed the malicious codes, the 
keylogger will start to work automatically when internet users conduct online 
financial operations. When internet users try to log into their accounts by entering 
usernames and passwords, keyloggers begin to record the users’ keystrokes, 
recognising the data used as the username and password and sending this information 
back to the fraudsters online. With this information, the fraudster can empty victims’ 
accounts in few minutes. Even worse, fraudsters can remotely control victims’ 
computers to do online transactions– referred to as a ‘backdoor’ operation. Sometimes 
the user who reports his doubts that his account has been illegally controlled is less 
likely to be believed at first because the financial institutions trace the transaction 
record back to that user’s computer.  
 
(4) Vishing or voice phishing, can work in two ways. One version is that customers 
receive phishing emails as usual indicating a problem with online accounts. Instead of 
providing a link in the email, it provides a telephone number and asks customers to 
call back to sort out the problem. When customers call back, they will be required to 
enter their account number and password by using the telephone keypad following the 
instruction given by a fake call centre. The other version is that fraudsters call 
customers directly and tell them to update or secure their account information 
immediately. Sometimes, fraudsters leave a voice message on customers’ answer 
machines asking them to call the number provided. When customers call back, the 
person who answers pretends to be a customer service officer working in a call centre, 
who then asks for sensitive account information.  
 
Voice phishing is easier to carry out than other attacks. Using simple software, 
criminals can set up an automated customer service line which sounds and feels as 
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professional as the ones used in most large firms. It is generally accepted that 
telephone banking makes customers feel more comfortable and reliable than internet 
banking. We call our bank very often to check the balance, transfer fund, pay bills, 
change billing address and etc. Sometimes, banks call customers to verify 
identification and offer advice on personal finance management. We are confident 
users of telephone banking because we know the whole process: how to enter account 
number, how to identify ourselves, how to choose service we need by press keypad. 
But we ignore an important issue: how do we know whom we are talking to on the 
phone - whether we are talking to the real bank staff or to someone else?  
 
2.2.5.2 Trojan horses attacks 
A Trojan, as is suggested by its name, is very good at disguising itself so that a user 
may never notice that their computer has been infected. For example, a person thinks 
he is downloading some software from the internet, but in fact, a Trojan hides in the 
software being downloaded. This explains where the Trojans gets the name, from the 
mythological Trojan horse that appeared to be a gift to the people of Troy but in fact 
contained a detachment of the Greek army, crouching in its belly and waiting until 
nightfall to come out and sack the city (Gralla 2006,p67). 
 
Computers don’t show any signs of Trojan infection. But Trojans allow attackers to 
take over computers remotely. One type of Trojan steals usernames, passwords and 
credit card information, and then sends them back to attackers automatically. Another 
type of Trojan, called a downloader, downloads malicious software and spyware to 
individuals’ computers. Some Trojans, such as Back Orifice 2000, lie dormant until 
they are contacted by intruders (Gralla 2006,p67). 
  
2.2.5.3 Worms and viruses 
Worms are programmes designed to infect networks such as the internet by replicating 
themselves across different networks (Gralla 2006,p67). Viruses are malicious 
programmes that invade a user’s computer causing many different types of damage, 
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such as deleting data files, erasing programmes or even destroying everything on a 
hard disk (Gralla 2006,p67).  
 
The transmission mechanism is as follows.  A worm arrives in people’s email boxes 
disguising as a normal attachment. When the recipient opens the attachment, the worm 
is activated and begins searching the email software, particularly the address book. 
Worms will replicate themselves and send out disguised emails to the names on the 
mail list without the knowledge of the user. For the recipients of the emails, worms 
will do the same: infect machines, replicate and send out worm emails. Just like a 
snowball, the level of infection increases very quickly in a short time. Internet servers 
are not able to deal with the huge traffic of emails, some servers crash and systems fail.  
Alternatively, worms can provide a mechanism for distributing phishing emails. 
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Figure 2.6 How worms attack from emails
If the recipient open 
the attachment 
The worm springs to 
work 
The worm does no 
damage 
Check for Outlook on 
the computers 
Outlook 
yes 
Outlook 
no 
Worm arrives in 
email boxes as an 
attachment 
If the recipient doesn’t 
open the attachment 
Worms replicate themselves and 
send out to names in the Outlook 
list disguising them as before 
Can’t do any 
damage 
 43 
 
In contrast to worms, which are designed to infect networks, viruses generally are 
malicious programmes designed to invade an individual’s computer. Internet users can 
get a virus in many ways, including by opening an email, running an infected 
programme, downloading infected software or opening a document (such as a word 
document) that is infected with the virus (Gralla 2006,p67). After infecting a machine, 
the virus hides inside itself without any signs unless detected by virus checker, which 
normally checks files at the time of download (if applicable) or through system 
scanning. The virus will be activated when users run the infected programmes. 
Sometimes the first thing the virus does is infect other programmes on the user’s hard 
disk by copying itself into them (Gralla 2006,p67). Viruses can cause much damage to 
computers and data by deleting and changing system files.   
 
2.2.5.4 Instant messaging pests 
Instant messaging is very popular means of communication on the internet because it 
is in real time, as opposed to emails. Using specific software, such as AOL instant 
messenger, MSN messenger, Yahoo messenger etc, we can communicate with anyone 
who uses the same software on the internet. According to the security firm IMlogic, 
AOL instant messenger, MSN messenger, Yahoo messenger each send more than one 
billion messages per day (Gralla 2006,p67).  
 
Instant messaging has become a target for criminals. IMlog says that in 2005, instant 
messaging threats increased by 1,693% over 2004, with a total of more than 2,400 
individual threats (Gralla 2006,p67).  In the 12 months since September 2004, there 
was a greater than 2000% increase in the number of viruses reported that attack instant 
message and peer-to-peer networks (BBC 2005). Unfortunately, many users do not 
notice the massive growth in instant messaging pests. Fraudsters keep attacking 
vulnerable users using instant messaging techniques.  
 
It is well known that files can be sent and received directly using instant messaging 
programmes on the internet. That is to say, spyware, virus or malicious code also can 
be sent out by instant messaging. Even some pests can send themselves via file 
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transfer automatically without knowledge of users. An example is W32.Funner worm, 
which can send a copy of itself by direct file transfer to everyone on the contact list of 
an infected computer. Like other types of worm we discussed in the former section, it 
looks into the name list of an instant messenger programme as soon as it infects the 
computer successfully.  
 
2.2.5.5 Wi-Fi security 
Development of network technology changes the way we access the internet, with an 
increasing number of people connecting wirelessly. The cost of setting up a wireless 
network is much cheaper than a wired one. More important, a wireless network is very 
convenient for users because anyone who is in range can access it, although they 
might need to know the appropriate WEP code in the case of closed networks. Such 
networks can also be used when we travel around, such as in airports, train stations 
and cafes etc.  
 
The wireless technology is called Wi-Fi, which is an open technology. A wireless 
router broadcasts its presence to any device with a Wi-Fi adapter within its range, and 
if the router is unprotected, anyone who wants to can connect to it and use the network 
(Gralla 2006,p91). The very nature of Wi-Fi technology brings convenient access to 
anyone, including intruders.  
 
A ‘war driver’ is the name given to a common type of Wi-Fi intruder. This person 
uses software to search unprotected wireless networks by driving in the cities and 
residential areas. Intruders can use antennas to catch many signals and networks. 
When war drivers target a home network, they are generally looking for personal 
information, while war drivers will steal business information when they break into a 
business network. Besides stealing information and privacy, intruders can use the 
network they break into for illegal operations, such as sending spam emails, attacking 
databases, spreading viruses etc.  
 
Wi-Fi hotspots provide another way to get internet access using a wireless network. 
Each hotspot needs its own connection to the internet, so that people who connect to 
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the hotspot can in turn connect to the internet (Gralla 2006,p91). When a person uses a 
hotspot in the airport, his laptop is vulnerable to others who use the same hotspot 
because all of them are on the same network and need to share its bandwidth. For 
example, if a person turns on file sharing on his machine when he uses a hotspot, other 
users of the same hotspot may be able to break into and steal data from its hard disk.  
 
Criminals can plant spyware and Trojans on other peoples’ machine at the same 
hotspot which allows hackers to control computers remotely for illegal activities. At 
the same hotspot, fraudsters can capture the packets sent and received by anyone. 
These packets might contain personal information such as username, password, bank 
account numbers etc.  
 
‘Evil twin hack’ is another type of Wi-Fi attack. In an evil twin hack, a hacker creates 
a twin of an existing hotspot to lure people into logging in to his hotspot rather than 
the real thing (Gralla 2006,p91). The hacker finds a popular hotspot and sets up a 
duplicate hotspot. In order to ensure users connect to the duplicate hotspot, hackers 
can add extra strength to his signal. Because of its stronger signal, users’ laptops will 
connect to the duplicate hotspot automatically. Also, the hacker may jam the signals 
of real hotspot, ensuring that someone will connect to his hotspot instead of to the real 
thing (Gralla 2006,p91).  
 
After users connect to the duplicate hotspot, hackers might take control of the machine, 
stealing personal and financial information. For example, the hacker can set up a fake 
login page to ask for a user’s credit card number to make the payment required to buy 
time on the hotspot.  
 
2.2.5.6 Browser weaknesses 
Since the web browser is the working platform for financial internet transactions, it is 
no surprise that it is a target for fraudsters. Gralla (2006,p91) suggested three reasons 
to explain why browser-based attacks are on the increase: (1) the security level of the 
web browser is low and easily broken; (2) the web browser is the only means for 
individuals to surf on the internet and to make financial transactions online; (3) 
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hackers can attack the computer system through browser-based attack, for example 
Internet Explorer is tied into windows operating system directly and therefore 
provides a means of compromising the operating system.  
 
One of the most common kinds of attack is called a buffer overflow attack, in which 
hackers write code that downloads from a website and floods a specific area of 
memory with so much data that it overflows into a nearby area of memory (Gralla 
2006,p91). The malicious code hiding in the data flow can damage the computer and 
steal sensitive information. Another type of browser attack is called a drive-by 
download in which a malicious file including Trojans and spyware is downloaded and 
installed using the browser without the user’s knowledge (Gralla 2006,p91).  
 
2.2.5.7 Webjacking (internet hijacking)  
By definition, the term “hijacking” refers to the seizure of a moving vehicle by use of 
force, especially to reach an alternate destination (McGillivray, Lieske Jul 2001). 
Webjacking, also known as internet hijacking, refers to the seizure of a domain name 
to force web traffic to an alternate web site location (McGillivray, Lieske Jul 2001).  
 
With web design software, website and web pages are very easy to copy in a short 
time, especially as logos can be captured easily. Customers are not likely to find out 
whether the website is authentic or not because fraudsters copy the original website in 
entirety from the logo to the colour of the text. Nike.com was webjacked in June 2000 
and customers who typed www.nike.com in their web browers were automatically 
directed to a web site in Scotland maintained by a group called S-11and hosted by 
Firstnet On-line Ltd  (Harrison 2000). In this web jacking, both Nike and Firstnet On-
line Ltd were victims. Nike lost its reputation and potential customers while Firstnet 
On-line Ltd was unable to serve its legitimate customers because its server was 
overloaded by redirected traffic (Harrison 2000). According to the Federal Trade 
Commission, page-jacking affects about 2% of the pages on the web (Pereira 1999; 
Pitofsky 1998). 
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2.2.5.8 Fraudulent online auction and retail schemes 
Online auction and retail schemes induce their victims to send money for products 
selling online. After successful payment, promised products will either never be 
delivered or will be replaced by less valuable items such as counterfeit goods.  
 
2.2.5.9 Business opportunity/"Work-at-Home" schemes online 
This scheme is not a new one. It used to appear on the newspapers and magazines 
years ago. Fraudsters take advantage of the internet to advertise fake business 
opportunities that promise earnings of thousands of pounds/dollars a week or month 
working from their own home. Normally the fraudsters ask the respondent for their 
bank account details, ostensibly to transfer sales or commission proceeds into it, but 
the reality is that if the fraudsters get this information money will be speedily 
withdrawn from the recipient’s bank account. Sometimes this type of scheme is 
referred to as a ‘money mule’. 
 
2.2.5.10 Investment schemes online 
Sometimes online investment scheme frauds are referred to as "pump-and-dump" 
schemes or alternatively ‘ramping’. Just like the business opportunity discussed above, 
online investment schemes use the internet to spread fake information to manipulate 
the market. For example, fraudsters can claim to be a company selling its stock, or 
they send out fake information to persuade online investors to buy a certain stock 
which they already hold. After the price increases, the fraudsters sell the shares 
making profits from the price difference. 
 
2.2.5.11 Identity theft and fraud 
Identity theft does not have to be connected to the internet but the internet can be a 
very efficient means of obtaining an individual’s personal information and using it, for 
example to apply for credit cards, loans and also purchasing products using the stolen 
 48 
identity. We will look at this scheme in detail when we discuss credit card transactions 
subsequently. 
 
2.2.5.12 Credit/debit card fraud 
Since the day that online shopping was introduced, plastic cards have provided an 
important means of payment because cash cannot be used on the internet. Bank card 
usage is therefore a prime target of internet fraudsters, particularly as it is difficult to 
provide a really secure system for internet card payment. There are different types of 
card fraud, such as lost and stolen card fraud, counterfeit card fraud (skimming), card-
not-present fraud, mail-order non-receipt fraud and identity theft.  These are discussed 
in more details in section 4.3 of chapter 4. 
 
2.3 Online financial transactions 
2.3.1 Two-way authentication in online banking 
In making an online financial transaction, the first step is to be able to recognize and 
secure the identification of each party to the transaction. Where possible, financial 
institutions now use a two-factor authentication procedure to establish identity, 
privileges and secure the online financial environment. Here are the differences 
between the traditional password authentication and two-factor authentication.  
Table 2.1 Two-way authentication 
 How many factors do we need? What are the factors? 
Traditional 
password 
authentication 
Only one factor Password only 
Two-factor 
authentication (T-
FA) 
Two factors 
Something you know (a password) 
and 
Something you have (a physical device) 
or 
Something you are (biometric info.) 
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Although traditional password authentication did reduce the incidence of identity theft, 
two-factor authentication is believed to be much more effective.  It is important 
component of the two factor procedure that the second factor relates to either a 
physical device or biometric information.  If the second factor were to be of the same 
type as the first, this would not be considered two-factor authentication.  
However, increasing levels of protection and security for customers, such as using 
complicated long digit passwords, changing password frequently, asking more than 
one question to confirm identification, would lower customer confidence. 
Complicated security systems drive customers away if there is no good balance 
between convenience and security. Online financial transactions are designed to 
reduce cost for banks and increase confidence for customers at the same time. If the 
customers are put off, they will just go back to branch banking, a system they have 
been used to for many years.  
 
Some banks have started to try two-factor authentication for online banking, including 
some Hong Kong banks and the Bank of America.  With 2.7 million internet banking 
customers, Hong Kong became one of the first places amongst the developed financial 
markets to establish clear regulations requiring all banks and customers to use two-
factor authentication in online banking, together with digital certificates, SMS-based 
one-time passwords and security token-based one-time passwords (Banks move 
towards two-factor authentication. July 2005).  
 
With 13 million online customers, the Bank of America adopted a different approach.  
Customers of the Bank of America pick an image, write a brief phrase and select three 
challenge questions (Banks move towards two-factor authentication. July 2005). This 
method not only lets the bank check customers’ identification, but also lets customers 
check if they are dealing with the bank’s authentic website. Customers can ask the 
bank to show the images and phrases they registered while banks can ask customers to 
answer challenge questions. The following webpage shows an image and a brief 
phrase selected by customers at the first registration (Banks move towards two-factor 
authentication. July 2005): 
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Figure 2.7 Two-factor authentication adopted by the Bank of America 
 
Vance, J. (Jun 5, 2006) noted this is more secure than traditional password 
authentication because it relies on what you know (your password) plus other things 
you know (answers to questions). At a cost of about $1 per user per year, the solution 
should easily pay for itself with reduced fraud (Vance Jun 5, 2006). 
 
2.3.2 The black market 
On 17th, January 2007 (Greenemier, Hoover 12 Feb 2007), retailer TJX disclosed that 
the computer systems storing customers’ data had been broken into. The intrusion 
involved systems that handled credit card, debit card, cheque (check) and return 
transactions for T.J. Maxx, Marshalls, HomeGoods and A.J. Wright stores in the U.S. 
and Puerto Rico, and also the Winners and HomeSense stores in Canada. TJX said 
that the exposed data covered 2003 and the period from mid-May through December 
2006 (Joris 18 Jan 2007).  The hackers were successful in selling some of this 
information on the black market. 
 
Hacking into large company databases can be extremely lucrative.  The online black 
market offers all kinds of illegal products and services, the following being a typical 
price list from online black market in the US in 2007 (Greenemier, Hoover 12 Feb 
2007): 
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Table 2.2 The price list from online black market 
Trojan programme to steal online account information $980--- 4,900 
Credit card number with PIN $490 
Billing data including account number, address, social security 
number, home address and birth date 
$78---294 
Driver’s license $147 
Birth certificate $147 
Social security card $98 
Credit card number with security code and expiration date $6---24 
PayPal account log on and password $6 
 
With the attractive profits from online black market, more and more hackers conduct 
well organised fraudulent schemes and use online payment systems to do trades. One 
of the direct approaches taken by hackers is called ‘Ransom Scams’, in which 
criminals break into company’s system and encrypt data using malicious programmes 
and then demand money to provide the decryption. Similar scams using direct 
approach are not very common because they require a direct connection between the 
victims and the fraudsters – clearly this poses a high risk. A more common way for 
hackers to make money is by selling stolen data on the black market.  
 
Listed in the table above, we can find all kinds of data for sale on the online black 
market, such as Credit card number with PIN, Billing data including account number, 
address, social security number, home address and birth date. General speaking, credit 
card information is sold in bulk because any card could be cancelled or ‘hotlisted’ 
(Greenemier, Hoover 12 Feb 2007). Although prices listed on the website are different 
and often depend on the quality of the data, basic card information can go for as low 
as $1 a card (Greenemier, Hoover 12 Feb 2007).  
 
Specific, members only websites exist for fraudsters to trade. Registered members of 
the website use peer-to-peer payment system just like selling and buying on E-bay. 
The average life expectancy for such sites is about six months and they need to reroute 
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to a new server to escape law enforcement (Greenemier, Hoover 12 Feb 2007). 
Criminals split large transactions into small ones to avoid the attention of banks.  
 
Another commodity offered on the online black market is malicious software 
including viruses, worms and Trojans. According to Raimund Genes, a flaw in 
Microsoft’s new Windows Vista operating system was found for sale on a Romanian 
website forum for $50,000 in December 2006 (Greenemier, Hoover 12 Feb 2007). 
Criminals target and discover vulnerabilities and weaknesses of operating systems, 
software and any IT products. High price motivates more and more criminals, for 
example security vulnerabilities were selling last year for as much as $20,000 to 
$30,000 each on the internet (Greenemier, Hoover 12 Feb 2007). Unfortunately, there 
is little law enforcement to stop people finding security vulnerabilities. 
 
2.4 Internet crime worldwide   
2.4.1 United States 
In the US, various agencies have been created in response to internet fraud. For 
example, “The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), which began operation on 
May 8, 2000, as the Internet Fraud Complaint Center was established as a partnership 
between the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) to serve as a vehicle to receive, develop, and refer criminal 
complaints regarding the rapidly expanding arena of cyber crime” (IC3 2006). 
Complaints can be submitted mainly on the website of IC3. After the submission of 
complaint, the information is recorded and categorized, then forward to the related or 
regulatory agency. The following charts will help us understand the current status of 
internet crime in US. 
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(source: (IC3 2006)) 
Figure 2.8 Yearly Comparison of Complaints Received Via the IC3 Website  
 
From January 1, 2005- December 31, 2005, IC3 received 231,493 complaints online 
which is an 11.6% increase over 2004, when 207,449 complaints were received (IC3 
2005). Additionally, we can find out that complaint submissions have increased 
annually from 2002 to 2005 in the chart above. The number of complaints in an 
average month was 19,291 in 2005 (IC3 2005).  
 
 
(source: (IC3 2006)) 
Figure 2.9 Yearly Dollar Loss of Referred Complaints (in millions)  
 
The total loss of fraud in 2005 was $183.12 million and it was significantly greater 
than 2004 which reported a total loss of $68.14 million. This result was due to a 
number of cases in 2005 which reported losses in the millions of dollars (IC3 2005). 
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(source: (IC3 2005)) 
Figure 2.10 Percentage of referrals by monetary loss  
 
 
Twenty four percent (23.6%) of these complaints involved losses of less than $100, 
and (43.0%) reported a loss between $100 and $1,000 (IC3, Internet Crime Report, 
2005). That is to say, 66.6% of these cases involved a loss of less than $1,000. About 
a third of the complainants reported high dollar losses, with 25.6% indicating a loss 
between $1,000 and $5,000 and only 7.8% indicating a loss greater than $5,000 (IC3, 
Internet Crime Report, 2005). With extremely low cost and high efficiency, criminals 
can net many victims in couple of minutes by sending phishing emails.  
 
For the criminals in cyber space, criminals usually chose e-mails and websites to 
contact their victims. Electronic mail (E-mail) and web pages were the two primary 
mechanisms by which the fraudulent contact took place. In all, 73.2% of complaints 
reported that they had e-mail contact with the perpetrator and 16.5% had contact 
through a web page (IC3 2005).  
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2005 0.30% 0.80% 1.80% 2.00% 4.50% 16.50% 73.20%
2006 4.00% 1.50% 2.40% 10.30% 17.70% 36.00% 73.90%
Fax In person Chat Room Physical Mail Phone Webpage E-mail
 
(source: IC3 (2005, 2006)) 
Figure 2.11 Contact methods used for fraud 
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The following pie charts also show the gender difference of perpetrators and age 
demographic of complainants. In the following figure, 75.2% perpetrators were male 
and 24.8% were female. 
 
 
(source: (IC3 2006)) 
Figure 2.12 Gender of perpetrators  
 
 
Six age groups were shown in the following figure: under 20 (3.8%); 20-29 (23.7%); 
30-39 (24.3%); 40-49 (24.0%); 50-59 (16.8%) and 60 and over (7.4%). 
 
 
(source: (IC3 2006)) 
Figure 2.13 Age demographic of complainants  
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(source: (IC3 2006)) 
Figure 2.14 Top ten countries—complainant  
 
Table 2.3 Top ten countries – complainants (as used in Figure 2.14) 
1. United States 90.70% 
2. Canada 2.40% 
3. United Kingdom 1.10% 
4. Australia 0.70% 
5. India 0.30% 
6. Germany 0.18% 
7. Singapore 0.18% 
8. France 0.17% 
9. Netherlands 0.15% 
10. Italy 0.13% 
 
 
2.4.2 Asia (China mainland and Hong Kong) 
In China, internet banking services first emerged on the mainland in 1999 (Lee, Kim 
2010). In the following five years, more than 20 banks in China began to offer online 
financial transaction services. Internet banking was accepted gradually by customers 
in the beginning but is now in widespread use. As expected, criminals exploit the 
vulnerabilities and weakness of online financial transaction systems. The figures in the 
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following table came from a survey result concerning the perception of the impact of 
online vulnerability conducted in 2006. This survey focused on the past fraud 
experience of private sector organisations of different sizes and showed the extent to 
which the respondents perceived the threats of computer related fraud both in the 
China mainland and in Hong Kong. 
 
Table 2.4 Perceptions Relating to Electronic commerce and computer-related fraud in Hong 
Kong and China  
(source: KPMG HK (2006)) 
Area China mainland Hong Kong 
Unauthorised manipulation of 
computer data 
35% 37% 
Unauthorised computer programme 
change 
29% 41% 
Internet banking fraud 19% 47% 
 
• 35% and 37% of the respondents believed that unauthorised 
manipulation of computer data would create great risks to their 
organisations in mainland China and Hong Kong respectively; 
• 29% and 41% of the respondents believed that unauthorised computer 
programme change would create great risks to their organisations in 
mainland China and Hong Kong respectively; 
• 19% and 47% of the respondents believed that internet banking fraud 
would create great risks to their organisations in mainland China and 
Hong Kong respectively; 
In Hong Kong, IT technology crime is commonly known as technology crime or 
computer crime. There are different types of criminal activities: Hacking 
(Unauthorized access, access with criminal intent); Internet Fraud; Bogus Websites 
and Internet Banking fraud. Some are traditional crimes committed through the 
internet, some use computers to commit crime whilst some crimes are targeting 
against computer system. The following table was found on the website of Hong Kong 
Police Force and illustrated the figures of Technology Crime from 2000 to 2004: 
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Table 2.5 Technology Crime Statistics in Hong Kong  
(source: Hong Kong Police Force ( 2006)) 
Title of Offence 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Unauthorized Access to Computer by 
telecommunication 
275 33 26 47 11 
Access to Computer with Criminal 
Dishonest Intent 
- 81 138 356 329 
Criminal Damage 15 27 16 16 11 
Obtaining Property by Deception 29 32 45 86 105 
Obtaining Services by Deception - 33 19 17 15 
Thefts (E-banking related) 0 8 6 8 19 
Others* 49 21 22 58 70 
Total 368 235 272 588 560 
*Others include traditional offences such as criminal intimidation, using a false instrument etc. 
 
For offence called “e-banking related”, the figure in 2004 increased more than double 
size of the figure in 2003. These figures explained that internet crime is still at its 
early stage in Hong Kong. Compared to UK and USA, the loss and damage caused by 
technology crimes is relatively small but will undoubtedly increase if preventative 
action is not taken.  
 
2.5 Online retailers 
A survey by ‘Computer Fraud and Security’ in 2007 showed that 64% of British-
based E-commerce retailers had been defrauded, claiming that online retailers were 
losing £580 million per year in the UK from cyberfraud (Online retailers in UK lose 
£580 million to fraud. 2007).  Caunter (2001) estimated that in 2001, of the 27 billion 
credit card transactions worldwide, 2%, or 540 million of these transactions took place 
on the internet.  Statistics indicate that e-commerce fraud is 10 to 20 times more likely 
than in face-to-face transactions, with some research claiming fraud rates as high as 5-
10% such as experienced by Expedia. Internet fraud is easier to conduct and harder to 
detect than in face-to-face transactions. Without the physical environment that has 
provided the background for transactions for generations, people become more 
vulnerable and abandon common sense on the internet, a virtual society.  
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Online merchants have already taken measures to detect online fraud using security 
software. Repeated attempts to purchase on the same card number, delivery addresses 
that differ from the card billing address and the use of anonymous e-mail accounts are 
parameters that can be set to alert retailers to the possibility of fraud; limits on the 
value of transactions made during certain hours of the day and at the weekend when 
fraud is more likely to occur can be specified, as can blocks on transactions from 
countries with which the merchant does not wish to trade (Wilcox, P. 2000).  
 
Visa international launched a website to assist merchants to protect and store data. 
Merchants can get an evaluation of their level of security through Visa’s website by 
completing a questionnaire. But John Pescatore, an analyst with the Gartner Group, 
explained that the Visa programme would not be very helpful to Visa merchants 
because Visa International requires merchants to upgrade their security without 
reducing Visa transaction fees or chargeback rates on fraudulent transactions (Gengler 
2000). This practice would benefit customers and card issuers but not merchants, who 
might have to invest lot of money to upgrade their security. If Visa were to reduce 
their transaction fees or chargeback rates, merchants would be more motivated to 
upgrade their security.  
 
2.6 Customers perception 
2.6.1 Customers’ adoption of online financial transaction 
In the previous studies on the adoption of online transaction systems, many factors 
have been analyzed and tested to try to understand the slow rate of adoption.  
Howcroft et al. (2002) studied the demographic characteristics of respondents 
including gender, age, annual income, level of education, ownership of financial 
products and compared the results with national average for the UK. The result shows 
that middle age groups (between 35-54 years old) who have higher income and a 
higher possession rate of information technology products are very likely to adopt 
internet banking. For these relatively high profile customers, the time saving and 
convenience of internet banking is attractive. In addition they can afford to use up-to-
date security software and latest IT products to provide secure online banking at home. 
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Besides the demographic characteristics of customers, many studies have focused on 
customers’ attitudes to and behaviour towards the adoption of online financial services. 
Black N.J. et al(2001) conducted a qualitative study that employed Roger’s model 
(Rogers 1962) to analyze customers’ adoption decisions, but perceived risk was added 
to the model as an extra construct to capture the degree of security relative to other 
banking channels. This was found to be significant, confirming the results of other 
studies which indicate that customers are concerned with online security, particularly 
of online banking (Jayawardhena, Foley 2000; Rotchanakitumnuai, Speece 2003). 
Similarly, a survey was conducted to acquire data from customers who were not 
internet banking users, the results indicating that “lack of adequate security” was 
more highly weighted than any other factor Gerrard, P. et al (2006).  
 
From the figures of different customer groups released by APACS on 24th August 
2007, the biggest increase in adoption of online banking in the five years to 2006 is 
from the over-55 age group. The five-year growth statistics for online banking show 
that the number of adults in the UK using online banking has increased by 174 per 
cent from 6.2 million in 2001 to 17.0 million in 2006, including a 350 per cent 
increase in usage amongst the over 55s (Politics.co.uk 24/08/2007).  
 
Table 2.6 Internet banking users in various age groups 
(Source from Politics.co.uk (24/08/2007)) 
 2006 2001 Change 
People using online banking 17.0 m 6.2 m +174% 
16-24 1.8 m 0.8 m +125% 
25-34 4.1 m 2.1 m +95% 
35-44 4.2 m 1.4 m +200% 
45-54 3.1 m 1.1 m +182% 
55-64 2.1 m 0.4 m +425% 
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65+ 1.5 m 0.4 m +275% 
People using telephone banking 15.7 m 11.5 m +37% 
People shopping online 28.3 m 11.0 m +157% 
Purchase per online shopper £ 24.0 £ 8.4 +186% 
 
 
Also, we can see a great increase in the population of online shopping in 2006, which 
is 157% higher than in 2001. While the debit card payment is more popular than credit 
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card payment on the high street, credit cards are more widely used on the internet, 
with 252 million transactions last year - an increase of 29 per cent on the 2005 figure 
(APACS 2007). Customers may well choose to use credit cards on the internet 
because of the increased protection credit cards offer, such as AVC (address 
verification check), Visa and Master card verification etc and insurance against faulty 
goods or fraudulent transactions. Since most credit card providers use neural network 
software, which track spending patterns and monitor unusual activity on accounts, the 
largest recent losses are with debit cards (Jerving 2007).  
 
Neural network software records spending patterns and builds a specific profile of 
each account. For example, how much money customers spend every month on 
average; whether customer go shopping usually in workdays or weekends, whether 
transactions are normally made in the morning, afternoon or at night; where common 
purchases take place, eg on the high street or on the internet, etc. With a spending 
profile generated for each customer, neural network software examines each 
transaction request and assesses its authentication. If the transaction is suspicious, 
credit card providers will contact customers immediately to ask for further 
confirmation or wait for them to call to provide authentication.  
 
2.6.2 Public awareness and perception of biometrics 
In information technology, biometric authentication refers to technologies that 
measure and analyzes human physical and behavioral characteristics for 
authentication purposes. Examples of physical (or physiological or biometric) 
characteristics include fingerprints, eye retinas and irises, facial patterns and hand 
measurements, while examples of mostly behavioral characteristics include signature, 
gait and typing patterns. Worried about growth of internet fraud, people are seeking a 
unique way to identify themselves. Biometric data are attached to each individual 
physically since someone is born and it is like secret code for each person.  
 
The earliest public awareness of biometric data is probably the use of fingerprints to 
solve crimes.  More recently, biometric technology can be found on certain electronic 
devices such as laptops, PCs, alarm and security systems. In addition, many people 
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will already have been exposed to them in contexts such as air travel and immigration 
(Furnell, Evangelatos 2007/1). For the majority people who have no actual 
experiences of using biometric detecting equipment, it’s not clear that they are ready 
or not for this new technology at the time of writing (2009/2010).  
 
Furnell, S. and Evangelatos, K. (2007/1) conducted a survey on the use of biometric 
information both by post and online in 2006. The majority of responses came from 
females (57%) and 81% of the overall respondents were aged under 30 which means 
the respondents were part of the generation that grew up with information technology. 
When respondents were asked whether or not they were satisfied with the current 
technology to fight theft (online banking and ATM withdrawals), 45% of the 
respondents said ‘no’ while 26% said ‘yes’ and the rest were not sure (Furnell, 
Evangelatos 2007/1). It is clear that respondents had less faith in the then current 
technology used for authentication. In another study (Consumers losing trust in online 
banking: Survey. 2007/2), 52% of respondents said they were “less likely” to sign-up 
for online banking and more than half of respondents (58%) also believe that banks 
should have stricter authentication controls for telephone banking.  Biometric data 
have the potential to provide a solution to some of these concerns. 
 
2.6.3 Internet psychology (strangers’ talk on the train) 
The internet provides a special psychological environment for users that is quite 
different from the physical world. McKenna, G. et al (2002) suggest four factors to 
explain the differences between internet interaction and face-to-face interaction: 1. 
greater anonymity; 2. the diminution of the importance of physical appearance; 3. 
greater control over the time and pace of interactions; 4. the case of finding similar 
others. Online customers, who are trying to manage their finances on the internet, are 
attracted mostly by convenience and independence provided by internet.  
 
People can easily keep their anonymity, which on one level can be seen as a protection 
for everyone but on another level is a licence for deception. We can use fake address 
and name, even personal information to get an email account, to register in a chat 
room, etc. Greater anonymity seems to protect everyone’s privacy on the internet. But 
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hiding everyone’s identity means there is no authentic or real information on the 
internet which is dangerous for everyone. From this aspect, internet becomes a place 
full of assumptions, imaginations, uncertainties even lies.  
 
Greater anonymity misleads internet users to believe that they are safe and protected 
on the internet. At the same time, people are very likely to ignore ‘strangers-on-a-train 
phenomenon’. When two strangers meet on the train, they talk to each other and 
disclose some personal information because they think they will never meet again or 
there is a slight chance they meet again. A similar perception also happens on the 
internet. Online users don’t show their physical appearances to each other when they 
are chatting on the internet. Joinson (2001) suggests that computer-mediated 
communications and general internet-based behaviour contain high levels of self-
disclosure. People are more likely to disclose personal information on the internet than 
in face-to-face interaction.  
 
Ignoring the potential threats coming from the internet and underestimating the harm 
causing by someone hidden, people are caught out by criminals much easier than in 
the real world. For example, if someone approaches you in the street offering a big 
amount of money if you let him to use your account to make a money transfer, most of 
us would become suspicious and walk away. But the result might be different when 
the same story turns up on the internet. Internet users still reply to Phishing emails, 
such as 419 or Nigeria fraud in which fraudsters asked for help in transferring billions 
of dollars out of the country into an individual’s personal account, for a sizeable fee.  
Those that responded with their bank account details found that money was removed 
from their accounts rather than paid into them.  
 
2.6.4 Detecting deception on the internet (vulnerabilities of people) 
Deception describes the conflict between two parties: a deceiver and a target. Theory 
of deception states that individuals detect deception by noticing and interpreting 
anomalies in their environment in light of the goals and capability for action that they 
ascribe to others with whom they interact (Grazioli 2004). During the process of the 
 65 
detecting deception, individuals seek clues of deception by comparing new 
information with knowledge and experiences they already have.  
In 2004 an experiment was carried out by Grazioli, S. (2004)in an American 
university involving 80 MBA students. These participants were recruited from MBAs 
specialising in information technology and had been using the internet for about four 
and a half years. The researcher built a fake website which was virtually identical to 
one selling used laptops. The participants were asked to buy a used laptop for their 
friend on the internet. They were given either the real website or the fake website at 
random. If they got suspicious about the website,  they were instructed not to place an 
order. Otherwise, they would place an order online for their friends.  
The result of the experiment is shown in the following table:  
Table 2.7 The experiment of fake website 
(Data source from Grazioli, S. (2004)) 
 Fake website (40 participants) Real website (40 participants) 
Think its fake 12 30% 13 32.5% 
Think its real 22 55% 15 37.5% 
undecided 6 15% 12 30% 
   
 
With other statistics figures coming from the experiment, Grazioli, S. (2004) 
suggested that as a group (i.e., as an average) these subjects cannot discriminate 
between the genuine and the fake site. The participants in the experiment are well 
educated and professional. Most of them have had online shopping experiences before. 
Unfortunately, the results discovered they are still poor at detecting deceptions on the 
internet.  
For other online users, who might be less educated and less experienced on the 
internet, it seems impossible for them to detect deception and recognize fake 
information on the internet. Although researchers set some clues on the fake website 
to remind participants to be alert, these clues are very different from the clues we are 
used to in the physical world to check authentication. The types of checks that might 
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be regarded as ‘common sense’ in the real world are not so easy to apply in the cyber 
world.  
 
2.7 Conclusions 
The internet has changed the way we do business forever. In the physical world, 
criminals can only target certain areas of commerce, such as warehouses, outlets and 
offices. They can’t control or change the whole business organization in every detail. 
But in the online environment, criminals can pose as authentic owners and pose a 
much greater threat to merchants and customers. Cyber criminals not only steal money 
and information from customers but can also ruin the reputation of online merchants. 
Compared to fraud schemes using the telephone and post, online fraud is more 
effective and cost effective. Anyone who accesses the internet could become a 
potential victim.  
 
The central question at the heart of this dissertation, as outlined in chapter 1 (section 
1.3) is to explore both the susceptibilities and the attitudes of individuals to electronic 
fraud in relation the statistical data, the surveys undertaken in this study, the 
robustness of the electronic systems and the responsiveness and ‘user friendliness’ of 
the financial institutions in matters such as compensation and willingness to help. 
 
As is evident from section 2.6, previous academic studies in these areas are thin on the 
ground, with most of the attention being directed at the attitudes of consumers to 
internet banking rather than to fraud and no studies dealing directly with actual cases 
of fraud.  It is this gap in the literature which this study aims to address. 
 
This chapter focused on generic issues related to IT technology, network security, 
online transaction environment and customers’ perception. The next chapter focuses 
on the legal environment surrounding online and automated financial transactions.  
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Chapter 3 Legal Environment Surrounding On-
line and Automated Financial Transactions  
3.1 Introduction 
The full legal framework covering credit card and on-line financial transactions is 
extensive as it covers the actions of the counterparties and intermediaries (eg Visa, 
Mastercard), banking and other financial regulation (such as usury restrictions where 
applicable, eg in Arkansas and Louisiana), fiscal arrangements (which explain why 
many US credit card companies are based in the state of Delaware), freedom of 
information, company law, contract law, bankruptcy law and elements of international 
law.  The type of legal system also has a bearing on the way that the law evolves, 
particularly in response to innovative financial structures and processes.  This is 
particularly apparent in the differences between the dual legal systems of the US and 
the UK, where statute law is supplemented by case law, compared to the codified 
system of countries such as China where new situations have to be treated in the 
context of statute law alone.  
 
In this chapter, we start by looking at the financial flows involved in online 
transactions and card payments, and proceed to look at the legal issues that surround 
these. In the case of UK and US law, we explore some legal cases which illustrate the 
exposures and obligations of the parties to the transactions. We then explore some of 
the differences that exist in China, where in general the system is less favourable to 
private individuals who have suffered fraud.   
 
3.2 Financial flows to online transaction counterparties 
Generally speaking, there are four main parties involved in online financial 
transactions: banks or credit card companies, online merchants, financial 
intermediaries or clearing organisations (such as Visa) and online customers. Figure 
3.1 shows the effective financial flows between these three parties (note that the 
financial intermediaries, which act as clearing organisations, are not shown):  
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Figure 3.1 Financial flows to online transaction counterparties 
 
Credit card companies derive their income in roughly equal measure from the 
merchant charge made to the seller and from the interest from customers who do not 
pay off their full balance on a monthly basis.  Both banks and credit card companies 
rely on the high interest rates charged to customers. This high level of interest 
compensates for total fraudulent transactions, as can be inferred from the spectrum of 
credit card interest rates on offer in the UK, where ‘credit builder’ cards issued to high 
risk customers currently attract an interest rate of around 40% p.a. whereas platinum 
cards for low risk customers have rates less than half this.  
 
In the authorisation process for a particular transaction, the approving party (the credit 
card company or bank) can make two types of error, ie:  
1) They reject an online transaction when it is good (type I error); 
2) They accept an online transaction when it is fraudulent (type II error) 
 
The loss and profit from 1) and 2) are significantly different. When 1) happens, they 
might lose interest (averaging 2-6%) from customers (ie from those who would not 
have paid off their credit card balance) and they lose the merchants’ fee (typically 2-
6%).  When 2) happens, they lose almost all the value of the transaction because they 
have to refund full payment (94-98%) to the customer but only make profit from the 
merchants’ fee (2-6%).  However, if the merchant has not followed proper verification 
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procedures or is responsible for the failed transaction the full cost may be borne by the 
merchant. As with any risk sharing arrangement there may be a rôle for a financial 
intermediary such as an insurance company, a view that was echoed by professionals 
working in the financial sector in China. For debit card transactions, there is a direct 
link to the cardholder’s bank account when payment is made.  This guarantees that 
there are sufficient funds available to settle the transaction, even though the 
transaction might be contested by the account holder if the transaction proves to be 
fraudulent. 
 
3.3 Legal framework 
 
From the point of view of fraud, in the US and Europe as a general rule the legal 
framework is angled towards benefitting the consumer in that it provides the 
individual considerable protection against unauthorised transactions.  However, in 
China the extent of exposure is more dependent on the terms of the credit card 
agreement between the individual and the credit card company. 
 
3.3.1 USA 
The following figure shows the payment card industry features, in particular 
displaying the interrelationship between consumers and merchants in the United States: 
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(source: (Morse, Raval, 2008)) 
Figure 3.2 Payment Card Industry Features 
 
Besides the benefits to each party provided by card payments / transactions, the risks 
concerning information security and fraudulent transactions affect the development of 
card payment systems. Unauthorized charges usually are caused by illegal access to 
customers’ data including personal and financial information. Fraudulent cases 
involving lost and stolen cards, counterfeit card and card-not-present transactions 
would damage customers’ confidence if the losses involved were experienced only by 
the consumer.  
 
As applied by the payment card industry in United States (Morse, Raval, 2008), the 
consumer side of the trust equation has been addressed quite early (in 1970’s) in the 
history of credit cards through legislation favouring card holders by limiting their 
liability for unauthorised charges.  For example, ‘zero liability’ policies, have been 
used to protect consumers’ trust and encourage them to use card payment systems. 
Essentially, under the USA system, the merchants have to bear the costs caused by 
unauthorised transactions respectively in (1) losses of goods / services; (2) charge 
back plus additional fees and penalties.  
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Furthermore, as discussed by R. Steennot (2008), the United States Truth in Lending 
Act (1968) applies to credit cards and contains a liability regime which is very 
favourable for the card holder. In other words, original card holders will not be held 
liable for the fraudulent transactions as long as they notified the financial 
organizations. For fraudulent transactions that occurred before notification, the card 
holder’s liability is limited to $50. In practice many issuers will waive this small 
amount and simply write off the fraudulent transactions from the customer's account. 
Defrauded customers would get a full refund provided they signed a confidentiality 
document as required by the banks.  
 
Unfortunately, not each case is settled to the customer’s satisfaction. On 7th Feb 2005, 
a Miami business sued Bank of America for over $90,000 (Finextra, 2005), due to an 
illegal transaction on the company’s online banking account by Latvian 
cybercriminals. According to the report, $20,000 had been withdrawn by the criminals 
before the account was suspended. Experts called in to investigate the fraud found that 
the ‘key logging’ Trojan was on the businessman’s computer and not on the Bank of 
America’s system.  The bank refused to take responsibility for the loss on the grounds 
that its systems were not hacked into and that all appropriate measures had been taken 
to complete the transfer. 
 
Although this case suggests that banks might have started to become less generous in 
compensating defrauded customers, it is important to bear in mind that this fraud 
involved online banking and not credit card transactions.  Banks do well out of credit 
cards because of the merchant fee and the high interest rates charged.  Any action that 
reduced the confidence of actual or potential customers would harm the business, so it 
makes sense to absorb losses from credit card fraud provided they are not excessive.  
On the other hand, it might be argued that there is little in the way of incremental 
profit that can be made from internet banking except for longer term efficiency gains, 
so it is not surprising perhaps that the banks might be somewhat less willing to 
provide compensation for internet banking fraud.  
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An example of the customer friendly attitude of credit card companies to consumers is 
provided by American Express, whose ‘Fraud Protection Guarantee’ (American 
Express, 2010) is explained as follows:  
‘If you’re unlucky enough to be a victim of fraud, it’s our job to take care of it. You 
won't be held responsible for fraudulent charges, as long as you have taken reasonable 
care with your account details and PIN. So you can relax and spend securely, 
anywhere in the world.  The moment we are alerted to a fraud, our team will work to 
resolve any issues as soon as possible and return your account to normal. For example, 
we'll credit your account in full and arrange a replacement Card with a new and secure 
Card number.” 
 
Finally it should be noted that the US is working hard to combat organised internet 
banking fraud.  As reported on 30th Sep 2010, ‘A federal crackdown on automated 
clearing house and wire fraud has produced 37 arrests (McGlasson, 2010) of a money 
mule operation, part of what law enforcement is calling a sophisticated bank fraud 
scheme that used malware to siphon off millions of dollars from U.S. bank accounts’. 
As explained by Preet Bharara, the Manhattan U.S. Attorney, the criminals targeted 
businesses and other entities using a malware known as the "Zeus Trojan," (a type of 
keylogger malware that is designed to steal banking credentials). The penalties 
imposed were severe, involving prison sentences of up to 30 years and fines of 
$1,000,000. This investigation demonstrated the effectiveness of cooperation between 
the NYPD, FBI and the Secret Service.  
 
3.3.2 UK 
In essence, the legal environment in the UK is not dissimilar to that in the US 
although there have been some well documented court cases concerned with mis-
selling as discussed below.   
 
One immediate similarity is in the efforts made to investigate internet fraud.  Similar 
to the ‘37 arrests - case’ in USA, a group of 19 hackers who committed online fraud in 
the UK was tracked down by UK police on 29th Sep 2010. It is alleged that a gang of 
Eastern Europeans made £2 million a month from online accounts by stealing victims’ 
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log-in details using sophisticated software (the Zeus Trojan programme, as used in the 
US case mentioned above) which can be bought for just £300 over the internet. The 
detectives believed that the fraudsters made £6 million in just three months1.  Martin 
Muirhead, chairman of the Virtual Task Force, said: 'This is an excellent example of 
how to bring to bear the resources and expertise of multiple agencies and public / 
private organisations in the UK. This is pioneering work led by the Metropolitan 
Police Service.”  This reference is to a special unit the Metropolitan Police set up in 
2009 (the Police Central e-crime Unit, PCeU) to execute the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) e-crime strategy.  Although there are questions as to the 
adequacy of the funding of this unit, it has clearly been successful in a number of 
instances, such as the one mentioned above. It liaises closely with the National Cyber 
Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA) based in Pittsburgh USA particularly in 
tackling international e-crime2. 
 
On 1st April 2007, the 2006 Fraud Act came into force.  This stipulated that banks and 
financial institutions should now become the first point of contact for cheque, plastic 
card and online fraud offences rather than the police. This passed the responsibility for 
collecting fraudulent information to these financial institutions which were then 
required to pass this on to the police. Critics of the law change focused on the lack of 
investigative criminal experience of the bank staff and the real possibility that banks 
involved in misconduct would hide the true facts and also might wish to hide the true 
extent of any fraudulent activity. 
  
In terms of the willingness of UK banks to reimburse fraudulent transactions, it is 
difficult to draw hard and fast comparisons with the US.  However, rule no.6 of the 
NatWest online banking terms and conditions (Natwest Online Banking) states: 
‘Where a transaction on the account is confirmed by use of the Security Details and 
the Service but you subsequently show that the transaction was not authorised by you, 
you will not be liable for that transaction provided you have kept your Security Details 
secret, you have acted with reasonable care and in accordance with these Terms and 
                                                 
1 Gill, C. 2010.  Hi-tech crime police quiz 19 people over internet bank scam that netted hackers up to 
£20m from British accounts, (accessed on 06/10/2010)  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1316022/Nineteen-arrested-online-bank-raid-netted-20m.html 
2 http://www.met.police.uk/pceu/national_crime_programme.html  (accessed on 22/12/2010) 
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Conditions, and you have not acted fraudulently. Whether this would have resulted in 
the customer being reimbursed if a similar situation arose to the Bank of America case 
discussed in the last section is open to question, but superficially it would seem that 
NatWest is prepared to offer the customer more protection provided they adhere to the 
terms and conditions (the moral hazard implications of this are discussed on page 177).  
One of the people interviewed in the fraud study in this dissertation described how, 
after experiencing a fraud, they were interviewed by NatWest customer officers by 
phone, which was followed by the receipt of a mailing in the form of a personal 
declaration, following completion of which the fraudulent transaction was written off.  
 
One further aspect of the legal environment in the UK is the number of court cases 
that have arisen on the basis of claims of mis-selling, particularly of PPI (Payment 
Protection Insurance).  In October 2009, the Financial Services Authority ordered the 
reopening of around 185,000 rejected PPI mis-selling cases, following a County Court 
ruling in favour of Lynne Thorius, who had a £8,686 debt quashed on the basis of a 
mis-sold PPI policy.  Other actions have been brought on the basis that credit card 
companies failed to abide by the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (subsequently replaced by 
the CCA 2006) on the basis that terms and conditions were not adequately stipulated.  
Although there have been some successes (eg Yates vs MBNA 2009) in general the 
courts are not very sympathetic to consumers avoiding their debt responsibilities on 
the basis of technicalities. 
 
Finally it should be mentioned that there are now prescribed limits on some charges to 
customers following minor breaches of the terms and conditions.  For example, the 
maximum fee for a late payment is £12.  Before this limit was imposed, some cards 
charged over twice this amount. 
 
3.3.3 EU 
In order to modernise the payment systems and encourage the community trades 
among the member countries in European Union, from the 27th January, 1997 
(Mercado-Kierkegaard, 2007), the European Parliament passed a series of Directives 
to promote cross-border transfers, credit card payment and electronic commerce.  
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The latest Directive proposed by the European commission is also called the New 
Legal Framework. A few highlights were listed by Sylvia Mercado-Kierkegaard 
(2007), for example, the geographic scope is set to cover payments in any currency 
and it is proposed to open up the market to further competition, for example from the 
non-banking sector.   
 
A set of rights and obligations of service users and providers have been established, 
including, for example, the description of the provider’s obligations in the following 
terms: the payment service provider is obliged to ensure the security of its payment 
verification instrument, to refrain from sending unsolicited payment verification 
instruments and to provide the user with an appropriate means to make a notification 
of loss, theft or misappropriation and with the means to prove he has made such 
notification (Article 47) (Mercado-Kierkegaard, 2007).  
 
Compared to the limited liability of $50 in the United States, the European Directive 
on payment services applies a limited liability of 150 euros to cardholders in dealing 
with fraudulent transactions which occurred before the card-holder notified the 
provider, unless the card holder had acted fraudulently or been proved to be negligent 
(Steennot, 2008).  
  
 
3.3.4 China 
As the biggest emerging market in recent decades, the financial industry in China, in 
particular the development of modern financial products and services, is still at the 
infancy stage. For example, the regulation of the credit card service which is in use 
currently was established in 1999 (Yang, 2010).  From 1999 till now, the development 
of the credit card industry has been through two turning points, from early stage to 
booming period. Because the relevant legislation concerning e-transactions and card 
payments is quite fragmented and out-of-date, there is no consistency in the way that 
financial organizations and banks deal with disputes.  
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As learnt from the interviews with senior mangers inside the financial industry in 
China, the banks apply different standards in dealing with fraudulent transactions, in 
particular in the case of the required notification period (e.g. within 24 hours, 48 hours 
or 72 hours after the fraudulent transaction occurred), and the different levels of 
limited liability and different standards of data protection. It pays to read the credit 
card agreements carefully.  As noted on page 257 (chapter 8), within the notification 
period there is a strong likelihood that the individual will be compensated, but beyond 
this period the matter is a question for negotiation between the customer and the bank.  
Little evidence could be found where the notification period had been legally tested. 
 
As discussed by H.F.Shi (2009), defrauded customers are not only advised to report 
any suspicious transaction or incidents to their banks in the first instance, but also to 
contact local police force as soon as possible. Basically, the punishment for card fraud 
offences is the same as for theft offences in China, e.g. Police would accept the 
fraudulent case and start the legal process if the monetary loss involved had reached 
RMB 1000 (about £100). Unfortunately, it is difficult to estimate the real loss caused 
by card fraud because the consequential loss of personal banking information can 
seriously aggravate the problem, so arguably the punishment should take this into 
account rather than the problem just being treated as simple theft.  
 
On the other hand, as supported by the data analysis in the later chapters, banks in 
China are much less supportive to customers than the banks in western countries when 
dealing with fraud cases. An unsatisfied respondent mentioned that he had to collect 
crucial evidence (including CCTV footage) by himself in order to get a full refund 
from his bank.  Further details of types of fraudulent transactions in China are given in 
chapter 7, section 7.2.4. 
 
The lack of standardisation in dealing with fraudulent cases is exemplified in the 
differing terms and conditions attaching to credit cards in China. To investigate this, 
terms and conditions were obtained for five of the leading Chinese financial 
institutions, including the big four state owned banks.  These were analysed to 
determine the degree of clarity attaching to five different categories, namely ‘general 
conditions’, ‘fees and charges’, ‘card use’, ‘liability of cardholder’ and ‘fraud and 
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protection’.  The overview is presented in the following table (note that NC denotes 
‘not clear’ and E denotes ‘explicit’).  
 
Table 3.1 Clarity of credit card terms and conditions 
 BOC ICBC ABOC CCB CMB 
General conditions NC E NC E E 
Fees and charges NC E NC E E 
Card use E E E E E 
Liability of cardholder NC E NC E E 
Fraud and protection NC NC NC E E 
BOC (Bank of China); ICBC (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China); ABOC 
(Agricultural Bank of China); CCB (China Construction Bank);  
CMB (China Merchants bank). 
NC= not clear; E= explicit. 
 
From the ‘Liability of cardholder’ row in the table above, we found that three of the 
five banks gave clear instructions requiring their customers to protect their personal 
information and sensitive banking details from others, e.g. ‘do not release PIN or 
password to a third party’; ‘do not lend bank cards to anybody else’. The other two 
banks did not provide detailed instructions, a typical case being ABOC, for which the 
printed version of the terms and conditions barely reaches two pages, and these 
contain very limited information.  
 
In the ‘fraud and protection’ row, only two banks emphasise that customers should 
directly report any suspicious transaction to the bank service hotline. Also, those two 
banks promise that customers would get full support from the banks in dealing with 
credit card fraud if the customers reach all the requirements in the terms and 
conditions. The other three banks do not mention much information about fraud and 
protection in the printed version of the terms and conditions. As we discussed in 
chapter 7, the current situation of credit card services in China is neither standardized 
nor, in many cases, clearly stated.  The inexperienced financial organizations are still 
trying to seek practical and effective ways of doing business with immature 
consumers. Were the incidence of financial fraud not low, then the lack of clarity 
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could provide a chaotic situation with considerable amounts of litigation involved in 
sorting out where liability should fall in the event of fraud.  If the experience of the 
Western economies is any guide, then fraudulent activity is set to increase and the 
Chinese institutions would be well advised to clarify the legal basis of credit and debit 
card liability. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Both western financial organizations and emerging markets in Asia are facing similar 
challenges regarding financial fraud, in particular involving card payments and e-
transactions. However, against this background, electronic transactions still represent 
the future because of their low cost, speed, convenience and high efficiency.  
 
Although it might be assumed that the banks and credit card companies aim to 
eliminate all fraud, the cost of achieving this is likely to be prohibitive (even assuming 
that such a goal is achievable).  This raises the question of the extent to which, at any 
one point in time, there is an equilibrium level of fraud which equates the marginal 
loss from fraud against the marginal cost of prevention.  In other words, is there (in a 
financial sense) a level of fraud that is acceptable a particular bank or credit card 
company, and if so, how is it determined?   
 
On a similar note, but at the macro level, there is the question of how far the legal 
system should favour the individual over the financial organisation, and to what extent 
the financial organisation should be regulated to provide a service that it deemed to be 
fair to all parties, rather than relying on the free market to do this job?  On the 
international level, because the use of credit cards and online financial transactions 
transcends national boundaries, it is important that there is a basic level of uniformity 
otherwise this could lead to serious difficulties both in terms of settling transactions 
and in terms of resolving disputes. Although transnational organisations such as Visa, 
Maestro and Mastercard do transcend these boundaries, there is still some way to go 
to achieve a level playing field both in terms of legal uniformity and in terms of 
regulation. 
 
 79 
Chapter 4 Bank Cards Transactions 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds on the online security issues raised in the previous chapter but is focused 
particularly on the issues surrounding credit and debit card transactions, which form the basis 
for the fieldwork in chapters 6 and 8.   
 
4.2 Credit & debit card transactions 
4.2.1 Overview 
Credit cards have many advantages (Ritzer 1995,p4).  On the one hand they can be used to 
increase consumers’ spending power in the short-term, but in addition they provide 
tremendous convenience in that we can use credit cards 24/7 to purchase products we want 
by mail, telephone or internet; they can be used for cross-border transactions while cash 
cannot; they generate a transaction record that can help consumers in disputes with merchants; 
they provide a ‘draw-down’ facility in which interest is only paid on the outstanding balance 
(unlike a loan, where interest is fixed for the term) and they can help consumers to go through 
temporary financial difficulties, etc. Furthermore, it is easier to get a credit card than a 
personal loan, which involves lots of paperwork and interviews with banks. Customers can 
pay off a credit card balance at any time, while a personal loan has a fixed term for 
repayment, and early pay-off might incur an extra charge.  
 
Compared to cash, credit cards are very convenient and safe to carry (Ritzer 1995,p4), and 
might help to reduce crimes directly against individuals. However, online fraud is a different 
matter – online credit card fraud involves intelligent criminal gangs and IT technologies. 
With the internet, fraudsters can potentially defraud many victims at low cost.  
 
With plastic cards increasing in popularity, card fraud losses have increased considerably 
since 1996, growing from £97.1 million in 1996 to £439.4 million in 2005. From 2004 to 
2005, the loss decreased by 13% because of the widespread use of Chip and PIN in the UK 
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(APACS 2006; APACS 2007).  These reported losses are a combination of ‘card present’ and 
‘card-not-present’ transactions. To a large extent, Chip and PIN has eliminated ‘card-present’ 
fraud, except where cards are presented in a jurisdiction where Chip-and-PIN is not used (e.g. 
USA).
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(source: APACS (2007)) 
Figure 4.1 Plastic card fraud losses on UK-issued cards 1996-2006 
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Figure 4.2 Change of percentage of plastic card fraud losses on UK-issued cards 1996-2006 
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The following figures show the plastic card losses split by different types of 
fraudulent transactions in 1995 and 2006 (APACS 2007). 
Plastic card losses split by type in 1995
Lost/stolen, 72%
Mail non-receipt, 11%
Counterfeit, 9%
Card-not-present, 6%
Card ID theft, 2%
Lost/stolen
Mail non-receipt
Counterfeit
Card-not-present
Card ID theft
 
(Source: APACS (2006)) 
Figure 4.3 Plastic card losses split by type in 1995  
 
Card fraud losses split by type in 2006
Lost/stolen, 16%
Mail non-receipt, 4%
Counterfeit, 23%Card-not-present, 50%
Card ID theft, 7%
Lost/stolen
Mail non-receipt
Counterfeit
Card-not-present
Card ID theft
(Source: APACS (2007)) 
Figure 4.4 Card fraud losses split by type in 2006  
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Table 4.1 Different types of plastic card losses 
 (Source: APACS (2006; 2007)) 
 
4.2.2 Visa process online 
In this section we look more closely at the online purchasing environment to examine 
the vulnerabilities in each stage of the process.  Figure 4.5 depicts the transaction 
flows involved in online purchases using a VISA credit card, together with each party 
involved in the transaction. Stage (1), (2), (3) and (4) describes how online 
transactions work using the example of online shopping. Stage (5), (6) and (7) 
describes the traditional card payment process which is sometimes described as a 
“Brick and Mortar” transaction. 
 
The key feature of online financial transactions is that the whole transaction process 
can be conducted online using information technology without involving any staff 
from the branch. The obvious advantages for customers to use online financial 
services are: more convenient service access and provision, time saving, faster service 
response and personal circumstances (Walker, Johnson 2006). Besides these 
advantages for customers, banks also enjoy great benefits in offering internet banking, 
such as reduced costs and increased revenue growth from a potentially enhanced 
customer base. A survey conducted by Booz, Allen and Hamilton (Nehmzow 1996) 
showed that different banking channels have significantly different costs. Compared 
to the main delivery channels, online transaction costs are estimated to be only about 
1% of branch banking costs.  
 
Percentage (%) 
Different types of plastic card losses 
1995 2006 change 
Lost/stolen 72% 16% -56% 
Mail non-receipt 11% 4% -7% 
Counterfeit 9% 23% 14% 
Card-not-present 6% 50% 44% 
Card ID theft 2% 7% 5% 
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(source : VISA) 
Figure 4.5 Visa transaction flow 
 
(1) Cardholder visits a merchant site and selects "buy." 
(2) The merchant plug-in queries the directory for account participation.  
(3) The issuer prompts for a password or chip card insertion, validates the password, 
calculates CAVV (Cardholder Authentication Verification Value (Authorize.Net), 
digitally signs response for merchant, and transmits a copy to the receipt manager.  
(4) The merchant verifies the cardholder's signature, and sends an Authorization 
Request with Authentication Data (ECI(Merchant Account Blog), CAVV, and XIO) 
to the acquirer. 
(5) The acquirer formats BASE II(BASE II) message with the ECI value, CAVV, and 
XIO.  
(6) VIP (Visa Integrated Payment Platform) verifies CAVV, sets codes, and forwards 
to the issuer. 
(7) The issuer authorizes the transaction and returns the response. 
 
For more accurate description, payment processing on the internet is similar to the 
payment made offline. But there is one significant characteristic of online transaction: 
the card is not presented to the merchants on the internet. This characteristic makes 
online transaction very vulnerable to internet crime. Card-not-present (CNP) fraud 
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involves the use of stolen card details in the non face-to-face transactions either on the 
internet, by phone or by mail order (APACS 2006). It has been the largest type of card 
fraud in the UK for the past three years which caused the total loss of £183.2m in 
2005 (up 21%). Because neither the card nor the cardholder is present when the 
transaction takes place, the difficulties in stopping this type of fraud hinges on three 
factors: for online businesses, the merchants are unable to check if the card is genuine.  
Without a signature or PIN, the merchants cannot satisfy the requisite verification 
procedures to ensure that they will be paid by the credit card company (irrespective of 
whether or not the person making the transaction is genuine or not).  For card issuers, 
they cannot guarantee that the card information entered online is provided by the 
genuine cardholder.   
 
 
(source: VISA) 
Figure 4.6 Visa secure commerce 
 
Visa Secure Commerce(VISA) includes a series of initiatives:  
o Is the cardholder authentic? (Payer Authentication Zero Liability)  
o Is the card authentic? (Risk Identification Service and CVV2 
o How are the merchants being supported? (Acquirer Monitoring)  
o Is the card information secure with the merchant? (Visa Top 10 Security 
Requirements) 
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o How is security evaluated and enforced? (Cardholder Information Security 
Program) 
o Is the customer information correct? (Address Verification Service) 
o How is the account being protected? (Cardholder Risk Identification Service)  
o How do issuers know if an applicant is a good risk? (Issuer’s Clearinghouse) 
 
But for internet fraud, traditional password authentication on card not present 
transactions resulted in a sustained high level of fraud losses, estimated at £117.1 
million in 2005 and £117.0 million in 2004 (APACS 2006). Customers need to 
provide their card information to affect a purchase on the internet. If the card is stolen, 
criminals have all the information required to make a transaction (ie the card number, 
security number, expiry date and card holder’s name) because all the information is 
printed clearly on the card.  
 
For the AVS/CSC(CardPaymentInfo), an automated cardholder address verification 
and card security code system is available for businesses that accept card-not-present 
transactions. This system allows merchants to verify the billing address of a 
cardholder and cross-check the security code when a transaction takes place without 
physical appearance of the card and cardholder (as the billing address does not appear 
on the card mere possession of the card does not provide all the information required 
to make a transaction). These checks provide additional information to protect both 
merchants and original card holders from fraud. Merchants can find out the suspicious 
orders in advance and stop the transaction on time.  The assurance given by this 
system is potentially greater where the customer’s delivery and billing addresses 
coincide. 
 
4.3 Credit and debit card fraud 
4.3.1 Overview 
The following table gives an overview of the extent of fraudulent plastic card 
transactions for UK issued cards for the period 1997 to 2006.  The only fraud to have 
grown at a spectacular rate throughout this period is card-not-present fraud. Other 
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frauds have had a period of growth followed by a period of decline as new 
technologies or procedures have been introduced to combat the fraud.  The following 
sections look at each of the types of fraud to analyse both the activity and the steps 
that have been taken to try to control it. 
Table 4.2 Annual plastic card fraud losses on UK-issued cards 1997-2006 
(Source: APACS (2007)) 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Lost/stolen  
This type of fraud used to account for the largest losses of all types of card fraud. It 
mostly took place in shops without Chip and PIN equipment before the cardholders 
had reported the loss of the card. Before the introduction of Chip and PIN, merchants 
only relied on the signature of customers to check identification. It was very easy for 
criminals to forge the signature because the original signature had already been signed 
on the back of the card. Fortunately, lost/stolen card fraud has reduced 52% following 
the introduction of the Chip and PIN system (APACS 2007). 
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(source: APACS (2007)) 
Figure 4.7 Lost / stolen fraud losses on UK-issued cards 1996-2006 
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Figure 4.8 Change of percentage of Lost / stolen fraud losses on UK-issued cards 1996-2006      
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4.3.3 Mail non-receipt 
This type of fraud involves postal systems, such as post office, postman and mail 
boxes.  Those who steal from the postal system are lured by the fact that on any given 
day 500,000 unsigned credit cards are in the mail (Ritzer 1995,p86). Particularly at 
risk for this type of fraud are properties with communal letterboxes, such as flats and 
students halls of residents (APACS 2007). Alternatively, post-office insiders might 
collude with organized gangs to steal credit cards passing through the postal system. 
To combat this, a system of activation was introduced in 2005 requiring cards to be 
activated either by phone or online before they can be used, involving the cardholder 
giving the correct answer to various security questions.  As can be seen from Figure 
4.9 and Figure 4.10, this procedure had a dramatic effect on fraud from non-receipt of 
credit cards. 
 
 
 92 
10
12.5 12
14.6
17.7
26.8
37.1
45.1
72.9
40
15.4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
£ Million
Year
Mail non-receipt fraud losses on UK-issued cards from 1996 to 2006
Fraud losses
Fraud losses 10 12.5 12 14.6 17.7 26.8 37.1 45.1 72.9 40 15.4
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 
(source: APACS (2007)) 
Figure 4.9 Mail non-receipt fraud losses on UK-issued cards from 1996-2006
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Figure 4.10 Change of percentage of Mail non-receipt fraud losses on UK-issued cards from 1996-2006 
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4.3.4 Counterfeit 
Counterfeit card fraud occurs when an illegal copy of a genuine credit or debit card is 
made. Traditional bank cards carry account information using a magnetic stripe on the 
back, which can be copied electronically easily. Most counterfeit fraud involves 
skimming, which occurs when a corrupt employee copies the magnetic stripe of a 
customer’s card electronically before handing it back, then sells the information to 
fraudsters to make clone cards. The introduction of chip technology has made this 
much more difficult to do, although in non-Chip-and-PIN environments, magnetic 
strip information might be sufficient to effect a transaction. This is well illustrated in 
Table 4.3 which shows the fraud losses from the cloning of UK cards to be declining 
in the UK (-8% in 2005/6) but increasing abroad (+51% in 2005/6). 
 
Table 4.3 Counterfeit card fraud losses in the UK and abroad 2004-2006 
(Source from APACS (APACS 2007)) 
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(source: APACS (2007)) 
Figure 4.11  Counterfeit card fraud losses in the UK 1996-2006
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Figure 4.12 Change of percentage of Counterfeit card fraud losses in the UK 1996-2006 
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4.3.5 Card-not-present 
Card-not-present (CNP) fraud involves the use of stolen card details in non face-to-
face transactions either on the Internet, by phone or by mail order.  It has been the 
largest type of card fraud in the UK for the past three years (APACS 2007). This fraud 
takes place when criminals steal authentic card details and use them to make purchase 
over the internet. The original card holders might not notice anything until they check 
their bank or credit card statements subsequently, or they are contacted by a 
suspicious credit card provider. 
 
Compared to other types of fraud, card-not-present fraud is difficult to discover 
because neither the card nor the cardholder is visible to the vendor when the 
transaction happens. Online merchants are unable to check both the authentication of 
the card and the card holder to determine if they are genuine. Similarly, banks are 
unable to recognize whether the transaction is legitimate or not.  Pattern of use checks 
have been introduced by most credit card issuers and more recently secure systems 
have been introduced such as Paypal and credit card verification procedures.  These 
include NatWest Secure, MBNA Secure etc which require additional personal 
information to be required before a payment is processed.  Banks are increasingly 
refusing card-not-present payments unless backed up with secure verification. Legal 
aspects of UK compensation are discussed in section 3.3.2. 
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Figure 4.13  Card-not-present fraud losses on UK-issued cards 1996-2006  
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Figure 4.14 Change of percentage of Card-not-present fraud losses on UK-issued cards 1996-2006 
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4.3.6 Card ID theft 
Even though a credit card remains safely in one’s possession, fraud may still occur. 
For example, criminals can get card details by stealing bank statement or by a bin 
raids. Alternatively, criminals can co-operate with corrupt employees, such as hotel 
receptionists, store clerks and bank staff.  For criminals with a high level of technical 
expertise, there is the possibility of attacking merchants’ databases to get card 
information belonging to millions of customers. This information can be used for a 
variety of purposes, including card-not-present fraud, card cloning or sale of 
information on the Black Market – or possibly the issue of a new credit card to the 
fraudsters (Ritzer 1995,p89).  
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Figure 4.15 Card ID theft on UK-issued cards 1996-2006 
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Figure 4.16 Change of percentage of Card ID theft on UK-issued cards 1996-2006 
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4.3.7 Chip & PIN (definition, usage and vulnerability) 
Chip and PIN has already been mentioned in the previous sections and the effect it 
had on reducing card-present fraud was noted.  In this section we look more closely at 
the detail of the system and some of the problems associated with it. 
 
Chip and PIN has changed the way we pay for ‘card present’ transactions in Europe 
but has still to be adopted in some major countries such as the US. Chip and PIN has 
been referred to as the biggest change in the means of payment since decimalization 
thirty-five years ago Anderson, R. et al (2006). In 1996, EMV (Europay international, 
MasterCard international and Visa international) created technology standards to 
enable the global introduction of Chip and PIN (Penn 2005). In the UK, from 1997 to 
2003, several public trials were done in different locations. After years’ preparation 
spent on the agreement between banks and retailers to shift the liability, before 
January 2006 more than 127 million Chip and PIN cards were issued and 80% of 
shops installed Chip and PIN equipment (2006). After 14 February 2006, more than 
99.5% of all ‘card present’ transactions were verified by PIN, which reduced card 
fraud loss for the year 2006 by £65 million (2006).  
 
The chip is a small piece of metal embedded in the card which stores card information 
in a form that is more secure than magnetic strip and is much harder to be cloned. As 
suggested by Search Security UK (Whatis.com 2008), a security-specific information 
resource for IT professionals in the UK, the card reader or POS can access the account 
information stored in the chip as soon as the Chip-and-PIN card is inserted. The PIN 
number (4-digit in the UK while 6-digit in China) entered by the card holder is 
checked against the information stored on the card. The transaction will be proved if 
the information matches. 
 
UK is a leading country in adoption of Chip and PIN worldwide. Except for against 
fraud, there is a liability shift which benefits financial organizations. If a payment is 
fraudulent, liability for the fraud will go to issuers or acquirers and acquirer will pass 
the liability back to the merchant, if the merchant is not Chip and PIN enabled (Penn 
2005). Here is the liability coming into force worldwide as following (Penn 2005): 
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Table 4.4 The proposed timeline of Chip-and-PIN application 
01/01/2005 Europe 
01/01/2006 CEMEA, Asia-Pacific, Latin America 
01/01/2007 Rest of world 
01/04/2010 Canada but not USA 
 
More advanced Chip and PIN scheme called EMV, nearly all European countries are 
expected to implement EMV Chip and PIN over the next five years (Penn 2005). But 
in North America, things are totally different. USA is the country most resistant to 
adopt Chip and PIN (Penn 2005). The interesting point is that American banks are not 
as keen as European banks to shift liability to merchants and customers. For example, 
electronic banking is governed by ‘Regulation E’ which places the default liability 
squarely with the bank in the USA (Anderson et al. 2006). When disputes arisen in a 
transaction, banks either pay up or prove the fraud directly. Under the ‘Regulation E’, 
banks are willing to install security equipments and take other protective measures in 
USA.  
 
On the other hand, weaknesses of Chip and PIN are emerging slowly. Firstly, both 
banks and merchants need to invest a large amount of money to install Chip and PIN 
system including software, hardware and staff training. For customers, we have to 
remember more and more numbers in daily life. If we have three cards in purse, we 
have to remember three four-digital pins because we are suggested to use different 
PIN for each card for security reasons.   
 
At the moment in the UK, debit cards and credit cards are still keeping the mag-strip 
on the back of cards which still take the risk of being cloned. If we get rid of the mag-
strip completely, cards issued in the UK can not be used in other countries. On the 
contrary, tourists will have problems to make payment in the UK using cards issued in 
their countries. Even in the UK, some merchants still reject to install Chip and PIN 
equipment and customers have to sign at the check out in a traditional way.  
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Some people say Chip and PIN changed the way we pay successfully and beat card 
fraud efficiently. Others think Chip and PIN doesn’t sort out problems indeed and it is 
falling apart to some extent.  The current challenge we face focus on the card-not-
present fraud including transactions by internet, mail and telephone. Barclays, claims 
to be the first in the UK to offer a card based solution to cut online fraud, which in 
turn eliminates the need for tedious pass codes and memorable words (Barclays' smart 
approach to online fraud targets 0.5m customers. 2007/4). By the end of this year, 
more than half million customers will receive free Pins entry card readers. This is the 
latest security protection provided by Barclays’. Last year it offered free anti-virus 
software to its online banking customers (Barclays' smart approach to online fraud 
targets 0.5m customers. 2007/4).  
 
4.4 Summary 
Despite the problems of controlling fraud, the number of online banking customers in 
the UK more than doubled between 2002 and 2006 to 16.9 million, with almost half of 
internet users now banking online (Barclays' smart approach to online fraud targets 
0.5m customers. 2007/4).   This is despite a growing total of aggregate plastic card 
fraud which might be expected to erode confidence in the system. Analysis of the 
individual types of fraudulent activity shows an interesting picture, with a growth in a 
particular fraud being countered by a new technology that reduces the possibilities for 
fraudulent gain – a good example being the introduction of Chip and PIN in 2005 on 
card-present (or face-to-face) fraud.  The area that seems to be most out of control is 
‘card-not-present’ fraud, which has shown a persistent year-on-year growth 
throughout the 1997 to 2006 period. 
 
The next chapter deals with the methodology of the field work which looks at the 
experience and perception of individuals. 
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Chapter 5 Methodology and Research Design 
5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we are discussing the methodology and research design of my study, 
concentrating in particular on the following aspects: (i) the philosophical 
underpinnings (interpretivist versus positivist), (ii) the quantitative and qualitative 
research approaches employed, (iii) the non-parametric statistical methodology used, 
and finally the data collection methods and data analysis methods adopted.  
5.2. Interpretivist or positivist 
Natural science as a rule adopts quantitative methods and follows the positivist 
approach, whereas social science tends to concentrate on qualitative methods and 
employs an interpretive approach. Positivist researchers believe that there is a reality 
existing out there and it is possible to quantify the reality. Researchers posit 
hypotheses and test these using appropriate data to determine whether or not they are 
supportable. It is important that the research activities don’t change or influence the 
reality which is being studied.  
 
The interpretive researchers doubt if there are fixed ‘rules’ out there and maintain that 
it is impossible to quantify the real world even it were to exist. They focus on 
understanding of the immediate problem in context instead of attempting to discover a 
general truth.  For interpretive researchers, research activities (including the presence 
of researchers) can change or influence the phenomenon which is being studied. In the 
field of social science, a particular challenge is posed by the fact that the researcher is 
a member of society and is involved in the research environment, making neutral 
observation very difficult.  
 
According to the statements made by William and Baiche (2001, p203), Auguste 
Comet, the nineteenth century French Philosopher, was the first to maintain that 
society could be analysed empirically just like other subjects of scientific inquiry. 
Since then, positivist social researchers have often applied the methodologies of 
natural science to the social sciences and have established well founded procedures of 
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analysis and interpretation (for example in the field of econometrics). Both positivist 
and interpretivist approaches are currently in use in the social science field. 
 
The research methodology of this study relies on the positivist more than the 
interpretivist approaches because we are looking to establish general facts by testing 
hypotheses (such as those contained within the questions in the questionnaire) and 
using statistical methods. The overall research issue we focus on is the security of 
electronic financial transactions and internet fraud both in the UK and China – this 
thesis is an investigation into the various components of this problem. The key 
questions are the following: what types of internet fraud are related to electronic 
financial transactions; how serious is the effect caused by internet fraud; who are the 
individuals or organisations involved in the various aspects of the problem, and how 
can the risks of the internet fraud and online financial transactions be reduced?  
5.3. Quantitative or qualitative research 
As discussed in the previous section, quantitative research methods are generally 
associated with the positivist approach, while qualitative research methods are 
commonly associated with the interpretivist approach. The following table shows the 
main differences between quantitative and qualitative research methods (Bryman, Bell 
2003, p302):  
Table 5.1 The contrast of quantitative and qualitative research 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Numbers Words 
Point of view of researcher Points of view of participants 
Research distant Research close 
Theory testing Theory emergent 
Static Process 
Structured Unstructured 
Generalization Contextual understanding 
Hard, reliable data Rich, deep data 
Macro Micro 
Behaviour Meaning 
Artificial settings Natural settings 
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For example, numbers or words. Quantitative research focuses on numbers and 
usually applies mathematics and statistics to test hypotheses and to explain research 
results. Qualitative research on the other hand pays more attention to words (ie 
descriptive analysis). Words are used to present the analysis of social phenomena 
instead of numerical measurement. Bryman and Bell (2003, p302) stated: 
‘Quantitative researchers typically bring a set of concepts to bear on the research 
instruments being employed, so that theoretical work precedes the collection of data, 
whereas in qualitative research concepts and theoretical elaboration emerge out of 
data collection’.   
 
5.4. Parametric and Non-parametric statistics 
Parametric tests use the actual data values and the test itself specifies certain 
conditions about the parameters of the population from which the research sample was 
drawn (Siegel 1956). Non-parametric tests generally use a proxy for the actual data 
values (such as rank ordering) and make assumptions about the distribution of these 
proxy variables rather than the actual values of the distribution from which the sample 
was drawn.  Non-parametric tests can be particularly useful where there are non-
regularities in the distribution of data (eg large non-representative outliers) or where 
the distribution of the data is not known.  
 
The reason for choosing non-parametric statistical tests in this study is because the 
assumptions required by parametric statistical test are violated due to characteristics of 
the data set, which will be discussed in detail in the following section. Siegel (1956, 
p31) listed the advantages of non-parametric statistics as follows:  
 
(1)  The accuracy of the probability statement does not depend on the shape of the 
population, although some nonparametric tests may assume identity of shape of two or 
more population distributions, and some others assume symmetrical population 
distributions. 
(2)  If sample size as small as N=6 are used, there is no alternative to using a 
nonparametric statistical test unless the nature of the population distribution is known 
exactly. 
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(3) There are suitable nonparametric statistical tests for treating samples made up of 
observations from several different populations. 
(4)  Nonparametric statistical tests are available to treat data which are inherently in 
ranks as well as data whose seemingly numerical scores have the strength of ranks.  
(5)  Nonparametric methods are available to treat data which are simply classificatory, 
i.e., are measured in a nominal scale. 
(6)  Nonparametric statistical tests are typically much easier to learn and to apply than 
are parametric tests. 
 
5.4.1 Differences between variables  
Healey (1993, p3) defined: ‘a variable is any trait that can change values from case to 
case and the causes are called independent variables and the ‘effects’ or result 
variables are called dependent variables’. Interestingly, any given variable can be 
measured at more than one level (Kendrick 2005, p39). For example, the variable 
“age” can be measured as an exact number in a numerical format like 20, 32, 49, but 
we can also rank the  variable “age” into groups and give them a ranking, eg: rank (1): 
18 - 26,; rank (2): 27- 35; rank (3): 36-44.  
 
Categorical variables are those variables for which data are gathered in response 
categories that have been set up or predetermined by the researcher (Kendrick 2005, 
p39).  Researchers have categorised possible answers in advance and respondents only 
need to tick proper category containing their answers. The categories of variables need 
to cover all possibilities of the answers but not overlap with each other. Consequently, 
respondents can only find and choose one category which fits in their answers to the 
questions.  
 
Now we look at two different types of categorical variables: nominal and ordinal. One 
example of nominal variable is “gender”, which is measured in the categories of male 
and female. There is no rank order for these two categories and either of them can be 
rank 1 or 2. Ordinal variables are measured by categories which have hierarchy and 
order. For example, we use five scales to measure attitudes: strongly disagree; 
disagree; neither disagree nor agree; agree; strongly agree.  
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5.4.2 Non-parametric Tests 
Most non-parametric tests work on the data which use higher score to label higher 
rank. Then the analysis is carried out with ranks instead of actual data used widely in 
parametric tests. Now we have a look at two popular tests below that were used in this 
study: 
 
(1) Chi-square 
Chi-square test is a non-parametric test and probably the most frequently used 
hypothesis test in the social sciences (Healey 1993, p254). Generally speaking, we 
need to set a null hypothesis under the assumption that the variables are independent. 
If we find little difference between the expected and observed frequencies, we would 
see no reason to reject the null hypothesis. On the other hand, if we are able to find 
statistically significant differences between the expected and observed frequencies, we 
would reject null hypothesis. As with all statistical tests, there is a chance that the null 
hypothesis might be rejected when it is actually correct (type I error) – this probability 
is captured in the level of significance, α, which is often set at 5%. 
 
(2) Logistic analysis 
Field, A. (2000, p164) gives the following definition ‘logistic regression is multiple-
regression but with an outcome variable that is a categorical dichotomy, and predictor 
variables that are continuous or categorical’. In this study, the dependent variable 
(outcome variable) has only two values, either ‘fraud’ (1) or ‘no fraud’ (0).  This is 
regressed on a number of independent variables, such as age, gender and IT skills to 
gauge their influence in explaining the occurrence of fraudulent transactions online. 
Also, logistic analysis allows us to discover, through significance tests on the 
estimated coefficients, whether a certain variable has more significant performance 
than others, e.g. gender is playing a more effect role to explain the occurrence of 
fraudulent transactions on the internet. 
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5.5. Data collection methods 
Various data collection methods were used depending on the nature of the research 
being carried out.  It is common to combine more than one data collection methods to 
support the research results. We choose self-completion questionnaire and semi-
structured interview as data collection methods. Data set collected by survey 
questionnaire were analysed quantitatively using SPSS and transcripts recorded 
qualitatively by semi-structured interview were used as additional evidence for this 
research.  
 
5.5.1 Semi-structured interview 
Bryman and Bell (2003) offered the following statements about semi-structured 
interview: ‘the research has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered 
(referred to as an interview guide), but the questions may not follow on exactly in the 
way outlined on the schedule and the questions not included in the guide may be 
asked’. In brief, the semi-structured interview is a flexible process based on the real-
time interaction between interviewer and interviewee.  
 
The ideal interviewees are the people who have experience of working in the financial 
industry both in the UK and China. We are expecting that they would like to share 
some information about the latest technology / policies / actions related to online 
financial transactions / internet fraud.  
 
5.5.2 Self-completion questionnaire 
The self-completion questionnaire is designed for respondents to read instruction and 
answer all the questions at their own pace.  Bryman and Bell (2003, p141) also stated: 
“because there is no interviewer in the administration of the self-completion 
questionnaire, the research instrument has to be especially easy to follow and its 
questions have to be particularly easy to answer’. 
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The top advantages of the self-completion questionnaire are that it is cheaper to 
administer; easier to administer and is convenient for participants. But the main 
disadvantages of the self-completion questionnaire are the strong possibilities of 
missing data and lower response rates. 
 
Several tips are provided by Bryman and Bell (2003, p146-150), eg: (1) Do not cramp 
the presentation; (2) provide a clear presentation; (3) use vertical or horizontal closed 
answers (4) provide clear instructions about how to respond; (5) keep the questions 
and answers together. 
 
There are no golden rules for questionnaire design and what we can do is to improve 
questions and make them work better. However, adapted and suggested by Churchil 
and Gilbert (2002, p315) a well recommended procedure for developing a 
questionnaire consisted of nine steps:  
 
Table 5.2 Procedure for developing a questionnaire 
Step 1 Specify what information will be sought 
  
Step 2 Determine type of questionnaire and method of administration 
  
Step3 Determine content of individual questions 
  
Step4 Determine form of response to each question 
  
Step5 Determine wording of each question 
  
Step6 Determine sequence of question 
  
Step7 Determine physical characteristics of questionnaire 
  
Step8 Re-examine steps 1-7 and revise if necessary 
  
Step9 Pre-test questionnaire and revise if necessary 
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Step 1: Specify what information will be sought 
In the very first step, researchers can use potential hypotheses as a checklist to 
determine what information will be collected and specify the research purpose. 
 
Step 2: Determine type of questionnaire and method of administration 
In the second step, we can decide whether to choose open-end questions or fixed 
options. Considering the cost and efficiency of administration, we opt to conduct the 
questionnaire study by post.  
 
Step 3: Determine the content of individual questions 
Based on the previous two steps, we can look at the content of the questionnaire at this 
stage and make further discussions, e.g. whether or not the content of questions is 
clear and applicable; whether or not the format of questions is clearly and efficient; if 
there any ethical issues involved. 
 
Step 4: Determine the form of response to each question 
Responses will be various relying on the different formats of questions used. Usually 
speaking, the open-ended questions can generate insightful replies using the 
respondent’s own form of expression. But fixed-alternative questions make data 
recording and analysis convenient and efficient.  
 
Step 5: Determine the wording of each question 
It is crucial to choose the exact words / phrases to present questions to avoid 
ambiguity and misunderstanding. A few basic principles suggested by Churchill and 
Iacobucci (2002, p337-344) are: ‘use simple words; avoid ambiguous word and 
questions; avoid leading questions; avoid implicit alternatives; avoid implicit 
assumptions; avoid generalizations and estimates and avoid double-barrelled 
questions’.  
 
Step 6: Determine the sequence of question 
Again, there is no certain rule to apply for the sequence of questions. Some surveys 
start with general questions, e.g. gender; age; education etc. Others would like to 
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begin with the key questions immediately, e.g. attitudes to internet banking; usage of 
online financial transactions etc.  
 
Step 7: Determine physical characteristics of questionnaire 
Presentation of survey questionnaire is crucial, in particular for mail questionnaires 
which need to be persuasive and attractive for a reasonable response rate and data 
quality. Also, the size of survey questionnaire is important. Generally speaking, small 
size works better than big size. However, there is no clear definition of ‘small’ and 
‘big’.   
 
Step 8: Re-examination and revision of the questionnaire & Step 9: Pre-test the 
questionnaire 
Use either peer-review or a small-scale trial as a test run to examine how a survey 
questionnaire performs in a relatively real environment. If the trial results are not close 
to expectations or throw up problems of misinterpretation or ambiguity, the 
researchers still have chance to improve the questionnaire and to make corrections.   
 
5.6. Data analysis methods 
SPSS for Windows is the most widely used package of computer software for doing 
quantitative analysis. SPSS was used to analyse the data collected using the postal 
survey questionnaire.   
 
5.7. Research framework and hypotheses 
In this section, we have a look at the framework model of my study and hypotheses. 
The framework is to show the structure of the study and the linkages between four 
sections of the survey questionnaire: basic financial information; IT usage information; 
personal information and optional section. Then the research hypotheses of my study 
are explained in relation to each section of the survey questionnaire. 
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5.7.1The framework of the study 
This framework explains the main aspects of this study and structure of the survey 
questionnaire used for data collection. The detailed discussion about the questionnaire 
is in the following section. In brief, we start to investigate and observe the fraud 
occurrence from four approaches: (1) basic financial information; (2) IT usage 
information; (3) personal information and (4) optional section to be competed only by 
defrauded individuals. In Figure 5.1, black arrows show the direction of predictions. 
The red arrows stand for the assumed connection between four approaches. 
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Figure 5.1 The framework of the study 
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5.7.2 Research hypothesis 
Potential hypotheses are categorised into different groups based on the structure of the 
questionnaire. The individual hypotheses are based on reasonable prior belief, but 
there is no reason for them to be entirely consistent with each other – the data analysis 
will show which are supported and which are not.  Prior work by Smith (2006) and 
Howcroft (2002) in related areas forms a basis for some of the hypotheses as indicated 
below. 
 
(1) Hypotheses relating to Basic financial information.  Similar hypotheses are to be 
found in Smith (2006) in his study of security issues associated with online banking. 
• Customers who have more credit / debit cards are more likely to be defrauded; 
• Customers who have longer history of usage of credit / debit cards are more 
likely to be defrauded. 
The first hypothesis is self-evident between when comparing a response of zero and 
one, given that you cannot be defrauded if you do not have a card.  However, those 
with a high number of cards could be more security conscious and so this effect could 
provide a counter leading to little significance overall.  Similarly, the second 
hypothesis would appear to be self-evident but again there could be confounding 
effects. 
 
(2) IT usage information 
• Younger individuals are more confident with their IT skills; 
• Individuals with higher qualifications are more confident with their IT skills 
(similar to Smith 2006); 
• Customers who are more confident on their IT skills are more likely to be 
defrauded; 
• Customers who use certain online activities are more likely to be defrauded; 
Age and qualifications are standard items of demographic information used in these 
studies (eg in both Smith 2006 and Howcroft 2002).  The third hypothesis in this 
group could go either way, depending on whether confidence is derived from 
ignorance or real appreciation of the dangers. 
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(3) Personal information 
• Female customers are more likely to be defrauded than male customers; 
• Aged customers are at less risk of financial fraud; 
• Customers with higher qualification are less likely to be defrauded; 
 
Demographic characteristics including gender, age, annual income, level of education 
and ownership of financial products are investigated in Howcroft et al (2002) in their 
investigation of the adoption of home based banking in the UK.   
 
(4) Section dealing with actual cases of fraud 
This section contains a further analysis of fraudulent cases to obtain more information 
about how and why these occurred and what action was taken by the various parties 
involved. 
 
It is this latter area that is of particular interest. A major gap in the literature is 
individuals’ attitudes to fraud and investigation of the factors which might make them 
vulnerable to fraud. Individuals who have experienced real fraud have had little 
attention in the literature and have not been studied in detail. One of the main 
purposes of this dissertation is to help to fill this gap which is why surveys in the UK 
and China were undertaken for this purpose. 
 
5.8. Questionnaire design 
5.8.1 Overview 
Questionnaires in the literature, such as Howcroft (2002), Smith (2006) and 
Muthitacharoen (2006), group their questionnaires into sections, with the first 
containing a fair amount of demographic information so that the responses can be 
analysed in relation to such factors as age, education etc.  A similar approach has been 
adopted in this thesis.  The discussion of the previous chapters has raised a number of 
issues in relation to factors influencing electronic financial transactions and also the 
relative security of debit and credit cards.  Of particular interest is any information 
that can be obtained about those individuals who have suffered actual financial fraud.  
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With this in mind, the questionnaire has been divided into four sections: (1) basic 
financial information; (2) IT usage information; (3) personal information; (4) a 
specific section for respondents who have experienced actual financial fraud.  For the 
former three sections (1), (2) and (3), we focus on the individuals’ basic information 
such as personal financial behaviours, IT skills and personal backgrounds. Those three 
sections are applicable for every respondent / household. The last part of the 
questionnaire, section (4) is designed for respondents who have suffered from actual 
financial fraud. In brief, section (4) asks for the information of any particular fraud 
cases.  
 
Both in the covering letter of the questionnaire and the end of the section (3), we give 
clear instructions for this questionnaire and highlight the guides for the section (4) in 
particular. We expect to get replies from both respondents who have experienced 
financial fraud and who have not. The section (4) aims to collect detailed information 
about actual fraudulent cases. It starts from the fact / description of the fraudulent case 
by asking the money loss involved in; where / when / how the fraud occurred; 
following questions on payment methods / schemes used.  Finally it deals with the 
customers’ perception / satisfaction / awareness.  
 
Both open and closed end questions are used in the questionnaire. For many questions 
with multiple options, extra space is reserved for respondents to write down their own 
statements. In particular, we put an optional question at the end of section (3) asking 
whether respondents would like to be contacted at their convenience, such as by phone, 
by post, by email or in person. The purpose is to invite respondents who are really 
interested in this study and willing to share specific information for future research.  
 
5.8.2 Discussion of questions 
As discussed in the last section, questions we are interested in are helping to profile 
individuals’ financial behaviours and gather information about fraudulent cases. The 
starting point for the design of the questionnaire was the research done by Grazioli 
and Jarvenpaa (2000 July), who discussed deception and trust between online 
shoppers and merchants by examining consumers’ evaluation of a real commercial 
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website and a fraudulent one. However, it only covered a certain type of online fraud: 
malicious webpage / internet hijacking. Also, Smith, A.D. (2006) discussed the 
security and comfort issues of online banking and A. Muthitacharoen et al (2006/7) 
addressed on online customers and sales channels strategies. However this 
questionnaire we designed extends previous studies in several important dimensions to 
make further contributions in the following aspects: 
 
(1) Coverage of questions 
24 ungrouped questions were used in the research of Smith, A.D. (2006) while 16 
questions grouped into 5 sections were in the research of A. Muthitacharoen et al 
((2006/7). For our study, 44 questions were asked and grouped into 4 sections: 17 
questions are about personal financial behaviours, 6 are used to investigate IT usage, 7 
are about personal information and 14 are used to gather information on actual 
financial fraud cases. The questionnaire has a wider coverage and clearer presentation 
than others.  
 
(2) Completion of options  
When question is asked for age, only four options were provided by Smith, A.D. 
(2006): 18-24, 25-36, 37-48 and 49+. The intervals between these four categories are 
different to each other which might cause problems to data analysis. Especially for the 
age group 49+ that makes information overloaded. Age group 49+ included too many 
age levels and missed valuable information. For example, 50-year and 70-year usually 
have different financial behaviours because of the big gap between two generations 
including social environment, education level, IT skills, banking system and life styles. 
The Age question we are using provided 7 options with the same interval for 
respondents: <=20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 61-70, >71.  
 
Also, question 4 addressed by Smith, A.D. (2006) focused on the highest level of 
education provided options as following: High School, Some College, Bachelors 
degree, Master Degree and Higher Level. It was lack of precise definition for those 
different education levels, such as ‘Some College’, which would make respondents 
confused and put the individuals’ trust at the risk.  
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Similar, Question 10 from Smith, A.D. (2006), when respondents were asked what 
they do when they access their accounts there were only 3 alternative answers 
provided: 1. pay bills, 2. check balances/ verify transactions and 3. all of the above. 
The option 2 was actually mixed two different activities: check balances and verify 
transactions. It would be helpful if these two were put into two separate answers 
instead of the one combination. Besides, still plenty of other reasons of accessing bank 
accounts were ignored. Differently, we use 10 different financial activities to describe 
personal finance appropriately: cash withdrawal, order cheque book, change PIN, 
money transfer, cash deposit, balance checking, change address, personal investment, 
regular payments (e.g. bills) and mortgage/ loan services.  
 
(3) Design of questions  
The way to ask and present questions is critical because mail / email survey doesn’t 
involve any face to face interactions and direct explanations. It is suggested that 
questions and answers are made easy to understand and that research and professional 
terms are avoided. In the questionnaire of A. Muthitacharoen et al (2006/7), a 7-scale 
instrument was used to measure the preference level of product, transaction cost, 
social interaction, risk and attitude. Besides too many words being used to describe 
each scale, such as 1= brick and mortar store is much more favourable, 2= brick and 
mortar store is more favourable, 3= brick and mortal store is slightly more favourable, 
4= neutral, 5= internet store is slightly more favourable, 6= internet store is more 
favourable and 7= internet store is much more favourable (Muthitacharoen et al. 
2006/7).  
 
11 out of 16 questions were presented using short professional terms without any 
further explanations like product availability, product variety, overall social 
experience etc. instead of completed questions in the questionnaire of A. 
Muthitacharoen et al (2006/7). For example, question 1: product availability, which 
would be much clearer and easier to be understood by respondents if it was a 
completed question like ‘which store has a better product availability, internet store or 
brick and mortal store? Another example is question 4: product price, it could be 
converted into a question like ‘considering the product price, do you prefer internet 
store or brick and mortar store?’ 
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(4) Questions working in pairs 
One of the consistency checks used in the questionnaire is the use of paired questions 
in which there is a logical relation between the pattern of the answers to two different 
questions.  For example, in question 1.7: ‘how many different personal banking 
channels have you been using?’ respondents are requested to tick whatever options are 
appropriate: branch banking, postal banking, internet banking, telephone banking 
(staff involved) and auto telephone banking (e.g. action line).  
 
The next question, 1.8 is: ‘how long have you been using different banking channels?’ 
The options of banking channels are the same as in question 1.7 but this time the 
question is asking for exact numbers in years. Then question 1.9 asks for the 
frequency of usage of different personal banking channels: ‘how often do you use 
different banking channels per month?’.  Consistency requires that it is the same 
banking channels that are filled in for each of these questions. 
 
Clearly, question 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9 are relevant to each other focusing on individuals’ 
usage of personal banking channels from particular aspects. If the respondent made a 
mistake by missing certain options in question 1.7, we can find out by checking 
answers to questions 1.8 and 1.9. For example, a respondent used branching banking 
and internet banking but missed to tick the option of internet banking in question 1.7. 
In question 1.8 we found that branch banking has been used for 10 years and internet 
banking for 3 years. Also in question 1.9, we found that the same respondent uses 
branch banking 4 times a month and internet banking 10 times a month. After 
checking all these three relevant questions, we are assured that this respondent did use 
internet banking but forgot to tick it in question 1.7. Questions working in pairs help 
guarantee the completion of the data. Otherwise, we have to use missing value to deal 
with similar situation which would cause information lost of data.  
 
The potential disadvantages of questions working in pairs are that extra workload will 
be incurred in analysing the data, the length of the questionnaire will be increased and 
there might be unforeseen ambiguities that were not apparent at the design stage of the 
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questionnaire.  In the latter case, inconsistencies in the responses should highlight any 
specific problems.  
 
(1) Extra workload showed at the data coding and data entry steps. For instance, more 
than one question asking for individuals’ usage of different banking channels, 
consequently, we need different codes / variables for each question. More questions 
also mean more data to be entered into SPSS date set for further statistical analysis.  
 
(2) Increase the length of questionnaire. As discussed in section 5.9.2, a few tips about 
how to improve response rates to postal questionnaires. For example, a shorter 
questionnaire is generally getting better response rate then a longer one. Supported by 
the pre-test survey we conducted locally, the questions working in pairs did not cause 
confusions or difficulties to the respondents and response rate.  
 
(5) Open ended questions 
Different from A. Muthitacharoen et al (2006/7) and Smith, A. D. (2006), open ended 
questions were used in the questionnaire of our study to collect further information 
which may not be provided by fixed options. Particularly, in the section 4 which is 
exclusive to respondents who have experienced financial fraud. Blank space in this 
section provides options to respondents who like to describe fraudulent cases in their 
own ways. Also, for respondents who experienced financial fraud more than once, 
they need extra space to put details of each fraudulent case. In section 2, few open 
ended questions were used to describe online activities and IT training experiences 
because it is impossible to lay out all possible online activities and training 
programmes. On the other hand, too many options and words would make respondents 
confused and bored. We only listed the most popular options and leave a blank for 
respondents to fill in any others.  
 
(6) Richness of information 
The questionnaire was used for our study focusing the financial fraud in particular 
online financial transactions. With three compulsory sections 1, 2, 3 and an optional 
section 4, we can collect information from both individuals who have and have not 
experienced financial fraud using the same questionnaire. We run different tests to do 
 124 
data analysis for reliable results based on the richness of the data and the variety of 
variables (dependent and independent). 
 
(7) Anonymity of questionnaire 
Different from surveys using a mailing list, our study is completely anonymous. All 
the questionnaires were sent out randomly without any mailing list with names and 
addresses. Also, we emphasized the anonymity of our study in the covering letter and 
assured respondents that they could not be traced. For our case, it is believed that 
anonymity helped to increase the response rate considerably.  
 
With increasing awareness of identify fraud, a posted questionnaire with correct name 
and address or even an email address are very likely to make an individual worried 
and uncomfortable. Although, we leave some space for respondents to leave their 
contacts if they are happy to be contacted for further research, it’s completely 
voluntary.  
 
5.9. Sample selection / response rate 
In this section, we discuss the sample selection and response rate in the UK. Due to a 
different social environment in China, we revise the data collection methods slightly 
and explain in detail in the chapter 8 data collection and analysis in China.  
 
5.9.1 Sample selection 
The location chosen for taking a survey sample is another important issue for data 
collection. The response rate of a mail survey in particular will depend on the 
demography of an area. We are not only interested in the number of the people who 
live in an area but also the characteristics of these residents in a certain area.   
 
Loughborough, the biggest town in Leicestershire, as stated in Charnwood 
Community Profile (Charnwood Council 2005), 18.5% of the population are aged 
under 16 years while 17.4% are of pension age; there are 60,472 households in 
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Borough with an average household size of 2.42 persons; 82.8% of the working age 
population in Charnwood are economically active and the average household income 
in the Borough is £31.234.   
 
According to the population estimated in 2004, the population of Loughborough is 
57,560 (Charnwood Council 2005) plus over 12,000 students studying and living here 
at the university terms. Loughborough University can be dated to 1909 when a small 
technical institute was established by local county council. After decades of 
development and transformation, Loughborough University has been rewarded as the 
University of the Year 2008(Loughborough University). Generally speaking, younger 
consumers are more familiar with bank cards system because they are more interested 
in new IT products and more willing to involve in technique innovations than aged 
consumers.  
 
The other reason that Loughborough was chosen is that the East Midlands has been 
the place with the highest increase of plastic card fraud between 2004 and 2007, 
according to the APACS (2008). According to the table below, plastic card fraud 
losses increased 52% in the East midlands in 2007, although as stated by APACS, the 
apparently big increase of fraud loss in East Midlands might due to the location of 
retailing head offices instead of exact location of fraud taking place, because the 
retailing head offices are in charge of communicating with APACS and reporting 
figures of fraud losses accordingly.  
 
Table 5.3 Plastic card fraud losses on UK issued cards split by UK region 2004-2007 
(All figures in £ million) 
Region 2004 2005 2006 2007 +/- change 2007 
South East £238.2 £207.3 £176.6 £178.7 +1% 
North West £40.2 £33.2 £35.7 £35.8 0% 
West Midlands £24.2 £20.3 £17.2 £24.4 +42% 
Yorkshire and Humberside £24.3 £27.3 £27.2 £24.1 -11% 
East Midlands £30.8 £23.8 £15.0 £22.8 +52% 
South West £12.7 £11.3 £9.7 £11.8 +22% 
Scotland £16.7 £13.9 £9.9 £11.5 +16% 
North East £8.1 £7.3 £6.8 £7.8 +15% 
Wales £7.3 £5.2 £5.7 £5.3 -7% 
East Anglia £8.7 £6.2 £5.4 £4.8 -11% 
Northern Ireland £1.1 £0.8 £0.7 £0.7 0% 
UK total £412.3 £356.6 £309.9 £327.6 +6% 
Fraud Abroad £92.5 £82.8 £117.1 £207.6 +77% 
Total all UK cards £504.8 £439.4 £427.0 £535.2 +25% 
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The sample used for this study consisted of local residents whose address had been 
chosen randomly. Several areas / streets in Loughborough were selected, covering 
areas with different family income levels; education / degree etc. In this study we are 
using street A, B, C and D standing for the real locations and post codes to preserve 
anonymity as promised in the covering letter. We considered each household as an 
individual case and sent out one copy of the questionnaire. The following table, 
compiled from Loughborough on-line data summarizes the characteristics of streets 
(Upmystreet) which were chosen for the survey:  
 
Table 5.4 Background of various areas in Loughborough 
 
The delivery time chosen was very early mornings over weekends in order to assure 
that questionnaires would stand a better chance to be noticed and filled during 
relaxing weekends.  
 
5.9.2 Response rate 
As we discussed in the section of data collection methods, one of the limitations of 
using a self-completion questionnaire, particularly by mail survey, is the lower 
response rate. A low response rate might result in the risk of bias on both data and 
findings. Bryman (2003, p136) mentioned that many published articles report very 
low response rate of studies compared to an ideal around 50 per cent suggested by 
some authorities. Because of low cost and easy administration, a mail questionnaire is 
still a very popular technique for data collection in social science. Bryman (2003) 
gave the following tips to improve response rates to postal questionnaires: 
 
Highlights Street A Street B Street C Street D 
Family income Very high Medium Medium High 
Interest in current affairs Very high Medium High High 
Housing-with mortgage Medium High Low High 
Education / degree Very high Medium High High 
Couples with children High High Low High 
Have satellite TV Low Medium Low Medium 
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(1) Write a good covering letter. Several points have been addressed in my covering 
letter to introduce myself and my organisation; explain the importance of my study; 
guarantee the confidentiality of data.  
(2) Enclose a stamped addressed envelope. We attached a printed freepost reply 
envelope with each questionnaire which can bring convenience to respondents and 
keep research cost low.  
(3) Follow up and reminders. Generally speaking, follow-up or reminder is a very 
helpful solution to increase response rate, but it is not practical in this study because 
we are doing a completely anonymous survey to protect the respondents.  We hoped 
also that this anonymity would increase the response rate. 
(4) Shorter is better. As discussed in previous section, there is no clear definition for 
short or long questionnaire. To our understanding, if questionnaires target the suitable 
individuals and keep them interested in the topic, relatively long questionnaires will 
still work reasonably.  
(5) Instructions and layout. We put an introduction to the questionnaire and clear 
instructions in the covering letter. For each question, we put a brief guide in small 
print after the question mark, such as, tick/ circle as appropriate. For the first two 
pages of the questionnaire, we left more space between questions to set up an easy 
start, leaving less space on subsequent pages at which point the individuals will have 
become more involved in the survey.   
 
Apart from the steps we discussed above, there are two more aspects that need to be 
addressed to improve the response rate: firstly, the connection with local community, 
which is very helpful to increase response rate in my study. Having been a university 
town for decades, there has been a strong bond between university and local 
community in Loughborough in aspects of education experience, diverse careers and 
business opportunities. Residents are more familiar with university and more willing 
to become involved in an interesting research project.  
 
Secondly, the research project should be interesting, advanced and practical. This 
project is about online financial transactions and financial fraud, which are raising 
more and more issues in modern daily life. Whether having experienced financial 
fraud or not, individuals are undoubtedly vulnerable to financial organizations, 
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merchants and criminals. In this case, individuals are keen to find out more about 
financial fraud in order to protect themselves.  
 
5.10 Conclusion  
In this chapter, we addressed the research methods used in this study. Also we explain 
the design of the survey questionnaire in detail based on the framework of my study. 
The sections about sample selection in China are in chapter 8 and the questionnaires in 
both English and Chinese can be found in the appendix. In the next chapter, the data 
analysis and SPSS results based on the data collected in the UK are analysed and 
discussed.  
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Chapter 6 UK Data Analysis and Summary 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we are focusing on the SPSS analysis results using data collected in 
the UK.  
 
6.2 Data collection 
6.2.1 Overview 
A pre-test survey was carried out to a sample of 200 households in the Loughborough 
area.  59 replies were received and the responses were analysed carefully for signs of 
difficulty and ambiguity, and also to gauge where there might be some omissions.  
Following this exercise a few changes were made to the questionnaire in response to 
comments received.  For example, question 1.13 was: ‘Do you pay off your credit 
card every month?  To the permitted responses of Yes and No was added ‘Sometimes’.  
Three questions about passwords were also added and the covering letter was changed 
to explain more precisely the purpose of the study.  Following this exercise the main 
survey was carried out. During two consecutive weekends, 1200 copies of survey 
were sent out randomly in residential area in Loughborough. In the following 6 weeks, 
271 valid replies and 13 partially completed replies were received, giving a response 
rate of 22.6 %. All the replies were examined manually and data were entered into 
SPSS for analysis.  
 
6.2.2 Data collection bias 
Both in sampling and response, it is possible that data collection and analysis will be 
effected by bias leading to misleading results. Two potential biases that need to be 
considered are selection bias and response bias.  
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Selection bias occurs when sample is taken from a particular subset of the population 
with different characteristics to the population as a whole. To detect the selection bias, 
we can compare the summary statistics of the selected sample with those of the 
population as a whole (if known), or, if not known, take a sample from another part of 
the population and compare. The ideal solution to selection bias is to get more 
samples from different parts of the population.  
 
Response bias refers to the tendency for there to be a higher response rates from 
individuals who have strong views, or have one particular view. To detect the 
response bias, we can compare the summary statistics from those who responded with 
the statistics from the population or with the statistics of those who did not respond. 
The ideal solution to the response bias is to increase the response rate, e.g. survey 
follow-up or reminder, which is not applicable in this study because of the required 
confidentiality and anonymity of the survey.  
 
To test for selection bias we ideally need to know the characteristics of all individuals 
in the sample of 1,200.  However, we only have the information from those who 
responded.  A test on respondents only will conflate both selection bias and response 
bias, but nevertheless it is worth carrying out to test for bias generally.  We could 
carry out the tests on any item of data for which there is population information, but 
we will illustrate with qualification data.  For the respondents, 62.4% held a Bachelor 
degrees / Professional qualifications and further degrees. The national statistics show 
41.5% of young people aged 18-30 going to university to study full time in 2003 
(Walker, Zhu 2003).  To test our sample against the national statistics we take as the 
null hypothesis H0 that the population from which our sample is drawn has a mean of 
p=0.415, with an alternate hypothesis that it is higher. The standard error based on a 
binomial model with a sample size of 271 is calculated at 0.02993, the difference 
between 0.624 and 0.415 therefore representing 6.98 standard errors indicating that at 
all conventional levels of significance the population to which our respondents belong 
has a mean that is significantly higher than 0.415, or 41.5%.  As the characteristics of 
the individuals in the full sample are not known, the extent to which this due to either 
selection or response bias cannot be answered.  However, it is likely that selection bias 
is the major component. 
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Does this matter? It is contended that it does not, on the basis that we needed to carry 
out the survey in a location where the residents were more likely to have internet 
access because the study is about the financial transactions occurring on the internet. 
As suggested by Internet Access 2008, adults under 70 in the UK who had a degree 
equivalent qualification were most likely to have access to the internet in their home, 
at 93 per cent  (UK National Statistics 2008). In short, people who have had better 
education are more likely to access to the internet at home. Considering the increase 
of educated population nationwide and proved connection between education and 
internet access at home, we would like to say that neither selection nor response bias 
is of any real consequence in this study.  
  
6.3 Data Analysis-Summary (N=271) 
In this section we select a key variable and then look at its relationship with other 
variables in the same grouping, these groupings being IT skills, age, gender, highest 
qualification, education background, usage of credit cards, usage of debit cards and 
usage of online activities.  For example, in the section below, ‘IT skills’ is selected as 
the main variable. After looking at its distribution amongst the respondents, its 
relationship to age, then gender, being defrauded and highest qualification is 
investigated. 
 
As an initial step, we show below descriptive statistics of two variables: age and 
gender. 
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Table 6.1 Age * gender Crosstabulation (UK) 
 
   gender 
   male female Total 
Count 1 1 2 
% within age 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within gender .7% .8% .7% 
<20years 
% of Total .4% .4% .7% 
Count 6 16 22 
% within age 27.3% 72.7% 100.0% 
% within gender 4.2% 12.5% 8.1% 
21-30years 
% of Total 2.2% 5.9% 8.1% 
Count 9 23 32 
% within age 28.1% 71.9% 100.0% 
% within gender 6.3% 18.0% 11.8% 
31-40years 
% of Total 3.3% 8.5% 11.8% 
Count 26 31 57 
% within age 45.6% 54.4% 100.0% 
% within gender 18.2% 24.2% 21.0% 
41-50years 
% of Total 9.6% 11.4% 21.0% 
Count 24 24 48 
% within age 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within gender 16.8% 18.8% 17.7% 
51-60years 
% of Total 8.9% 8.9% 17.7% 
Count 31 19 50 
% within age 62.0% 38.0% 100.0% 
% within gender 21.7% 14.8% 18.5% 
61-70years 
% of Total 11.4% 7.0% 18.5% 
Count 46 14 60 
% within age 76.7% 23.3% 100.0% 
% within gender 32.2% 10.9% 22.1% 
>71years 
% of Total 17.0% 5.2% 22.1% 
Count 143 128 271 
% within age 52.8% 47.2% 100.0% 
% within gender 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
age 
Total 
% of Total 52.8% 47.2% 100.0% 
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(1) Scores of the general IT skills 
The susceptibility to internet fraud might be expected to increase with the IT ability of 
the user at least up to the point where the user becomes more adept at applying 
protective measures.  We provided seven options (from 1=very poor to 7=excellent) 
for the respondents to score their general IT skills. 78 out of 271 (28.8%) respondents 
scored their general IT skills ‘average’. 20.7% and 19.6% respondents scored ‘good’ 
and ‘very good’. 25.1% respondents admitted that the score of their IT skills was 
below the ‘average’ and ticked the categories labelled ‘very poor’, ‘poor’ and ‘not 
good’.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Overview of score of general IT skills 
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(1.1) General IT skills and different age groups 
We split the variable ‘general IT skills’ into the different age groups, which have been 
categorised in the survey question as: <20 year; 21-30 years; 31-40 years; 41-50 years; 
51-60 years; 61-70 years and >71 years.  
 
Besides indication from the figure that aged respondents are less confident with their 
IT skills, a Chi-square test supported the hypothesis that older people are likely to see 
themselves as having lower IT skills, the correlation being negative (-0.601) and 
significant (0.000).   
 
Figure 6.2 Age vs. self-assessed IT skills 
 
(1.2) General IT skills and gender groups 
As showed by the figure of the general IT skills score split by gender, we discovered 
that there is no big difference among the 6 out of 7 categories to describe ‘the score of 
the general IT skills’. Only one category labeled ‘very poor’ IT skill showed any 
gender difference: male respondents who scored their IT skill as ‘very poor’ were 
twice as numerous as female.  
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As stated by the Internet Crime Report 2006, male customers are more likely to be 
victims of online fraud than female in the US3. However, based on our survey data, we 
found that there is no significant gender difference in relation to self-assessed general 
IT skills at the 5% significance level.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Gender vs. self-assessed IT skills 
 
(1.3) Score of the general IT skill and fraud occurrence 
Most instances of fraud were experienced by the respondents who were confident with 
their general IT skills. The most prominent green bars in the graph below were in the 
categories describing the individual’s general IT skills as ‘average’, ‘good’ and ‘very 
good’.  
                                                 
3 Internet Crime Report 2006, http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2006_IC3Report.pdf (accessed 
29-03-2010) 
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Figure 6.4 Fraud occurrence or not vs. self-assessed IT skills 
 
The Chi-square results were consistent with this, indicating a significant positive 
relationship (sig value=0.011/ correlation value= 0.168) exists between general IT 
skill and fraud occurrence. In brief, people who perceive themselves to have better 
general IT skills are more likely to be defrauded on the internet.  
 
The positive relationship between the general IT skill and fraud occurrence can be 
viewed in a number of different ways. Firstly, the scores given by respondents were 
based on self-evaluation and the answer was mainly based on the confidence of the 
respondents. Inevitably, some respondents could over estimate their IT skills. A 
second possible explanation is that we can not blame IT technology or IT skills for all 
fraudulent cases. As we discussed the different fraud schemes in the chapter 2 and 4, 
many schemes are not dependent on technology failure but are due to individuals’ 
carelessness, or malicious actions by others.  For example, individuals don’t report 
lost-and-stolen bank cards to their banks on time; banks’ customers reply to phishing 
emails releasing their personal information and banking details; bank cards details are 
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recorded by malicious cashiers and sold to criminals in the black market.  A third 
explanation is that individuals with good IT skills are more likely to engage in on-line 
activities, thereby exposing themselves more to possible fraudulent activity. 
 
(1.4) Score of the general IT skill and the highest qualification 
Not surprisingly, the score of the general IT skill is related to the highest qualification. 
When we look at the purple and yellow bars which stand for BSC/ BA and further 
degrees (e.g. MSc / PhD) in the graph below, the top three purple and yellow bars fell 
into the categories ‘average’, ‘good’ and ‘very good’. It indicated that respondents 
who have higher qualifications are more confident with their general IT skills.  
 
The Chi-square gave us the same evidence showing a significant positive relationship 
between the general IT skill and the highest qualification. The sig. value is 0.000 
which is smaller than 0.05 and correlation value is 0.202 which is positive. In brief, 
the results said that people who have higher qualification are more confident with 
their general IT skills. 
 
Figure 6.5 Highest qualification vs. self-assessed IT skills 
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(2) Age 
Age is almost invariably included as an item of data in survey questionnaires directed 
at individuals. In deference to the sensitivity of personal information, particularly age 
related, we set seven ranges of age for respondents to tick.  The figure below shows 
the age distribution of the respondents to the survey.   
 
Figure 6.6 Overview of age 
 
As can be seen from the graph, 60 out of 271 (22.1%) respondents were aged over 71 
years. The respondents from this age group are perhaps more willing to participate 
because they have more spare time than others who more likely to work full time. 
However, their ‘on-line’ level of confidence and general experience of the internet is 
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limited so although they are keen to share their own experiences the amount of fraud 
they have experienced is limited, as is explored in the next section.  
 
(2.1) Age and fraud occurrence or not 
The figure below shows that fraud occurrence spreads across all the age groups, the 
green bars representing fraud occurrence. The age group 41-50 years is modal group – 
ie is most affected by online financial fraud, with fraud occurrence decreasing within 
groups which are older than 41-51 years while decreasing within groups as the age 
decreases below 41-51 years.  The Chi-square test indicates a small but significant 
negative relationship (correlation value = -0.108, significance value 0.036) between 
Age and Fraud occurrence. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Age vs. fraud occurrence or not 
 
However, to show the propensity to fraud within each age group we need to relate the 
incidence of fraud within each group to the number in each group.  This is shown in 
the Table 6.2 below.  
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Table 6.2 Fraud Occurrence in relation to Age group 
AGE 
 
<20 
21 - 
30 
31 - 
40 
41 - 
50 
51 - 
60 
61 - 
70 
>71 
Fraud occurrence 0 4 8 18 12 10 6 
Number of respondents in group 2 22 32 57 48 50 60 
% experiencing fraud 0 18.2 25.0 31.6 25.0 20.0 10.0 
 
The table shows that the greatest propensity to experiencing fraud is in the 41-50 age 
group (31.6%) followed in equal measure by the 31-40 and 51-60 age groups, both at 
25%.  In order to discover whether there is any significant relationship between age 
and fraud occurrence, we look at the results from the Chi-square test (Chi-square 
value = 6.663; Sig. = 0.036; r = -0.108; Sig. = 0.076). Although there is a suggestion 
that younger respondents are more likely to be defrauded on the internet, the 
relationship is weak and not statistically significant.  
 
Further, when we look at the correlation between age and different online activities, 
we found significantly negative associations appeared between age and each online 
activity: online shopping (r = -0.543; Sig. =0.000); internet banking (r = -0.416; Sig. = 
0.000); online education service (r = -0.359; Sig. = 0.000); downloading media (r = -
0.479; Sig. = 0.000). The correlation table suggests that older respondents are less 
likely to be involved in online activities. In particular, one third of the fraud occurred 
to the respondents aged 41-50, who probably have less spare time to familiarise 
themselves with using the latest internet technology.  
 
(2.2) Age and Chip-and-PIN usage 
The figure below showed that the group aged < 21 years only used the Chip-and-PIN 
scheme with debit cards (credit cards are not generally available to this group) and 
that some respondents in the group aged >71 years do not appear to use the Chip-and-
PIN scheme with either credit cards or debit cards.   It is possible that some members 
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of this group might find it difficult to adopt new technology, both in terms of 
remembering the PIN and also in terms of entering the PIN correctly using card 
readers.  
 
 
Figure 6.8 Age vs. Chip-and-PIN usage 
 
As expected, most respondents had adopted Chip and PIN for both credit and debit 
cards.  Where Chip and PIN was only adopted for either a debit card or a credit card, 
the number opting for a debit card was greater.  This is as expected as a debit card is 
the normal means of withdrawing cash (as credit cards incur both a withdrawal fee 
and interest from the time of withdrawal), and in addition some people will always use 
a debit card in preference to a credit card. 
 
(2.3) Age and pay off credit card monthly 
The following figure shows evidence of a lifecycle effect, in that younger people have 
a lower propensity to pay off their credit cards every month whereas older people, 
who have more accumulated assets, tend to do so.  However, there is an interesting 
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blip in that the 41-50 age group has more of a tendency to pay off their cards monthly 
than would be suggested by the trend in the data, suggesting perhaps that they are 
wealthier than expected on the basis of a simple trend. 
 
 
Figure 6.9 Age vs. pay off credit card every month or not 
 
(3) Gender 
The total number of valid responses in the survey conducted in the UK was 271. The 
number of male respondents was 143 (52.8%) and the number of female was 128 
(47.2%).  This difference is not significant at the 5% level (z = -0.92).  
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Figure 6.10 Overview of gender 
 
(3.1) Gender and fraud occurrence 
The figure below suggests that males are more susceptible to financial fraud than 
females, almost in the ratio 2:1 (ie 62.1% male to 37.9% female).    
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Figure 6.11 Gender vs. fraud occurrence or not 
 
This is consistent with the Internet Crime Report 2006, which asserted that male 
customers were more likely to be victims of online fraud than female customers in the 
US4.  In order to be able to assert this for the current study, a Chi-square test was 
carried out but interestingly the difference was not significant at the 5% level.  This is 
because the proportion of individuals experiencing fraud is low, so if the overall mean 
results are applied to the numbers of males and females respectively, the expected 
number of males experiencing fraud would be 30.6 (actual 36) and females 27.4 
(actual 22).  The chi-squared statistic based on these small numbers turns out to be 
low and not significant (sig=0.109).  
 
                                                 
4 Internet Crime Report 2006, http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2006_IC3Report.pdf (accessed 
29-03-2010) 
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(4) Highest qualification 
The respondents were asked to indicate which category described their highest 
qualification (if known). We gave six options for respondents to tick: No formal 
qualification; GCSE/ 0 LEVEL; A level; BSc/ BA/ Prof. Qual5; Further degrees and 
Not known.  
 
The responses showed that 111 out of 271 (41%) respondents held a BSc/ BA/ 
Professional Qualification. 58 (21.4%) of respondents had further degrees, such as an 
MSc and/or a PhD. At the lower end, those for whom GCSE or 0-LEVEL constituted 
the highest qualification amounted to 46 (17%) and A-level holders 25 (9.2%).  
 
 
Figure 6.12 Overview of the qualifications of the respondents 
                                                 
5 Professional qualifications include commercial pilots’ licenses, police inspectors’ examinations and 
attainments of similar standards as well as medical, legal and accountancy qualifications.  
 146 
 
(4.1) Highest qualification and fraud occurrence 
A Chi-square test was used to find out whether there was any significant relationship 
between the highest qualification and fraud occurrence, but no significant relationship 
was found. Although the highest number of incidences of fraud was in the 
BSc/BA/Prof Quali group, this was also the most numerous and the proportions are 
not significantly different. 
 
The Chi-square test indicates a small but not significant relationship (correlation value 
= -0.103, significance value = 0.070) between highest qualification and Fraud 
occurrence. 
 
 
Figure 6.13 Highest qualification vs. fraud occurrence or not 
 
However, to show the propensity to fraud within each qualification group we need to 
relate the incidence of fraud within each group to the number in each group.  This is 
shown in the Table 6.3 below. We found that the most fraudulent cases appeared 
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within the group of respondents holding a further degree (e.g. MSc and PhD) at 31%. 
The second higher fraud rate appeared within the group holding BSC / BA/ Prof. 
Qualification at 23.4%.  
 
Table 6.3 Qualification vs. fraud occurrence or not 
Qualification 
Fraud 
occurrence 
Fraud not 
occurrence 
Fraud rate 
(%) 
No formal quali 1 20 4.8% 
GCSE / 0 level 9 37 19.6% 
A level 4 2 16.0% 
BSC / BA/ Prof. Quali. 26 85 23.4% 
Further degree 18 40 31.0% 
Not known 0 10 0 
Total 58 213 21.4% 
 
(5) Education background: IT related or Finance related? 
The purpose of this question was to investigate whether or not a background in IT or 
finance would make any difference to the incidence of internet fraud experienced.  
 
From the 271 replies, 223 out of 271 (82.3%) respondents had studied neither IT nor 
Finance. 8.5% respondents (23 out of 271) studied Finance and 6.6% (18 out of 271) 
had studied IT. Only 7 out of 271 (2.6%) had an education background related to both 
IT and Finance. 
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Figure 6.14 Overview of education background is IT related or finance related 
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(5.1) Education background is IT related / Finance related and fraud occurrence 
 
 
Figure 6.15 Education background vs. fraud occurrence or not 
 
A Chi-square test to investigate whether a background in finance or IT impacted on 
the propensity to be defrauded suggested that there was no significant relation at the 
5% level (correlation value = 0.012 and sig = 0.882). 
 
Table 6.4 Fraud Occurrence in relation to education background 
Education background 
(IT or Finance related) 
Fraud 
occurrence 
Fraud not 
occurrence 
Fraud rate 
Related to neither of them 47 176 21.1% 
IT related 5 13 27.8% 
Finance related 5 18 21.7% 
Related to both of them 1 6 14.3% 
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(5.2) Education background is IT related / Finance related and age 
Now we are investigating the education background split by age groups. As discussed 
in previous sections, seven age groups covered people aged <21 years to aged >71 
years. The purple bar standing for age group 41-50 years is quite outstanding within 
the respondents whose education backgrounds are related to IT because respondents 
aged 41-50 years currently witnessed the development of IT technology from the very 
early stage and they were advantaged to be educated in IT technology.  
 
Being one of the most popular subjects, Finance has longer history than IT technology 
in colleges and universities in modern society. For the respondents whose educated 
background related to Finance, we can see the red bar covering aged 61-70 years and 
blue bar covering aged >71 years are the first and second highest.  
 
Figure 6.16 Education background vs. age 
 
What is perhaps surprising is that there are a few respondents in the over 71 age group 
who have a background in IT. Within 60 respondents from the age group >71 years 
old, 52 held an education background related to either IT nor finance; 2 held a IT 
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related education background; 5 held a finance related education background and only 
1 held an education background related to both IT and finance.  
 
Table 6.5 Education background in relation to age 
Age Neither IT related 
Finance 
related 
Both Total 
<20 Y 0 2 0 0 2 
21-30 Y 17 0 3 2 22 
31-40 Y 23 3 5 1 32 
41-50 Y 47 6 2 2 57 
51-60 Y 42 3 2 1 48 
61-70 Y 42 2 6 0 50 
>71 Y 52 2 5 1 60 
 
(6) Usage of credit cards 
(6.1) Number of credit cards 
48 out of 271 (17.7%) respondents do not have any credit cards. At the other end of 
the scale, 2 out of 271 (.7%) respondents have 8 credit cards. In the current study the 
average number of credit cards held by respondents in the UK was 1.79.  This 
compares with an average of 2.4 reported in a survey conducted in 2007 (gwade 
17/03/2009). 
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Figure 6.17 Overview of number of credit card owned 
 
(6.2) Number of years of credit card usage 
221 out of 271 replies provided answers giving the number of years of credit card 
usage, ranging from 1 year to 42 years. The average number of years of credit card 
usage in the sample is 19.36 years, this number reflecting the higher than expected 
number of respondents in the 71+ category (who may have held credit cards since 
their inception) and also the fact that at the other end of the distribution only 8.9% 
respondents are younger than 30 years old. The majority of the respondents (91.1%) 
fell into the age groups starting from 31 years, in particular aged from 41 to 70 years 
old. Note that round numbers predominate in the replies, indicating that the 
respondents found it difficult to give an exact number. 
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Figure 6.18 Overview of number of years of credit card usage 
 
(6.3) Customers’ satisfaction with credit card 
We used five scales (from 1 to 5) to measure the customers’ satisfaction with credit 
card services. 223 out of 271 respondents answered this question and the rest 48 
respondents left the question blank. Those 223 valid responses fell into only four 
scales: not satisfied=2; average=3; satisfied=4 and very satisfied=5. None of the 
respondents click the ‘not satisfied at all=1’. 217 of 271 respondents (80.1%) gave 
positive responses to the credit card services as follows: average 17.3%; satisfied, 
37.3%; and very satisfied 25.5%.  
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Figure 6.19 Overview of customers’ satisfaction with credit card 
 
(6.4) Customers’ satisfaction with credit card and fraud occurrence 
The green bars (on the right) representing fraud occurrence appear in each category 
for which there are responses, showing that except in a few cases the respondents 
were satisfied with the credit card services even when they had been subjected to 
fraud. Only 1 customer who had been defrauded gave a negative comment indicated a 
lack of satisfaction with the credit card services.  
 
A Chi-square test to investigate whether customers’ satisfaction with credit card 
impacted on the propensity to be defrauded suggested that there was no significant 
relation at the 5% level (correlation value = 0.034 and sig = 0.109).  
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Figure 6.20 Customers’ satisfaction with credit card vs. fraud occurrence 
 
(7) Usage of debit cards 
(7.1) Number of debit cards 
The range of debit card holdings in the UK survey was 0 to 6, the average being 1.63.  
This is close to the figure of 1.6 in 2007 (gwade 17/03/2009). Only 5 out of the 271 
respondents (1.8%) did not have any debit cards, for reasons discussed in section 6.1.  
However, the modal class was 1, consistent with the fact that most people only have 
one bank account. 
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Figure 6.21 Overview of number of debit card owned 
 
(7.2) History of debit card usage 
264 out of 271 replies provided answers giving the number of years of debit card 
usage, ranging from 1 year to 40 years, the average being 18.1 years.  
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Figure 6.22 Overview of number of years of debit card usage 
 
(7.3) Customers’ satisfaction with debit cards 
We used five scales (from 1 to 5) to measure the customers’ satisfaction with debit 
card services. 266 out of 271 respondents answered this question and the remaining 5 
respondents left the question blank. The 266 responses covered the full five scales: 1 = 
not satisfied at all; 2 = not satisfied; 3 = average; 4 = satisfied, and 5 = very satisfied. 
261 out of 271 respondents (96.3%) gave positive responses to the debit card services, 
i.e. 9.6% average; 43.3% satisfied and 43.5% very satisfied.  
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Figure 6.23 Customers’ satisfaction with debit card usage 
 
(7.4) Customers’ satisfaction with debit cards and fraud occurrence 
The green bars standing for fraud occurrence appear in three categories: average, 
satisfied and very satisfied, showing that most of the respondents who had been 
defrauded felt satisfied with the debit card services. It appears that defrauded 
customers are pleased with how the banks / credit card companies dealt with 
fraudulent cases, and suggests that there might be marketing value in further 
promotion of this aspect of the services provided. 
 
A Chi-square test to investigate whether customers’ satisfaction with debit cards 
impacted on the fraud occurrence suggested that there was no significant relation at 
the 5% level (correlation value = -0.063 and sig = 0.122).  
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Figure 6.24 Customers’ satisfaction with debit card vs. fraud occurrence 
 
(8) Usage of online activities vs. fraud occurrence or not vs. age 
In this section, the connection between experiencing fraud and use of a range of online 
activities is explored, the objective being to investigate if the use of such online 
activities leads to a higher propensity for the individual to be defrauded. 
 
Table 6.6 Usage of online activities  
Use of online activities 
Online activities 
Yes No 
Correlation 
with fraud 
occurrence 
Sig. 
Internet banking 155 (57.2%) 116 (42.8%) 0.215 0.000 
Online shopping 182 (67.2%) 89 (32.8%) 0.212 0.000 
Downloading media 77 (28.4%) 194 (71.6%) 0.210 0.001 
Online education service 73 (26.9%) 198 (71.1%) -0.053 0.381 
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(8.1) Usage of internet banking 
116 (42.8%) of the 271 respondents were not using the internet banking while 155 
(57.2%) were. In relating internet banking to being defrauded, a Chi-square test 
revealed a highly significant positive relationship between the usage of internet 
banking and fraud occurrence (correlation = 0.215, significance value = 0.000). This 
suggests strongly that internet banking users are at higher risk of internet fraud 
occurrence.  
 
(8.2) Usage of online shopping 
89 out of 271 (32.8%) respondents were not using online shopping compared to 182 
(67.2%) who were. A Chi-square test indicated a highly significant positive 
relationship between the usage of online shopping and fraud occurrence (correlation 
value = 0.212, significance value = 0.000), implying that online shoppers are at higher 
risk of internet fraud occurrence. 
 
(8.3) Usage of downloading media 
194 (71.6%) out of 271 respondents were not downloading media from the internet 
and 77 (28.4%) respondents were. A significant positive relationship was found 
between the downloading of media and fraud occurrence (correlation value = 0.210, 
sig. value = 0.001), suggesting that downloading media users are at higher risk of 
internet fraud occurrence. 
 
(8.4) Usage of online education service 
198 (73.1%) out of 271 respondents were not using online education services and 73 
(26.9%) respondents were. A Chi-squared test did not reveal a significant relationship 
between the usage of online education service and fraud occurrence, (correlation value 
= -0.053, sig. value =0.381) suggesting that online education service users are not at 
higher risk of internet fraud occurrence than non-users in the UK.  
 
(8.5) Correlations between online activities vs. age 
Considering the survey data we collected in the UK are mainly categorical, in 
particular the data used to describe variables like online activities and age; we 
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conducted Spearman’s correlation coefficient, a non-parametric statistic to look for 
relationships6.  
 
Table 6.7  indicated that the correlations between selected online activities and age. 
The significantly negative associations appeared between age and each online activity: 
online shopping (r = -0.543; Sig. =0.000); internet banking (r = -0.416; Sig. = 0.000); 
online education service (r = -0.359; Sig. = 0.000); downloading media (r = -0.479; 
Sig. = 0.000). In summary, the correlation table suggested that younger respondents 
are more likely to involve in online activities. On other hand, older respondents are 
less likely to involve in online activities. 
 
The correlations (Spearman Correlation＝ r) between different online activities in 
Table 6.7, showed different strength of the association related to each other. Usage of 
online shopping is positively related to usage of internet banking (r = 0.586, sig.= 
0.000); usage of online education services (r = 0.230, sig.=0.000) and usage of 
downloading media (r = 0.388, sig.= 0.000). Usage of internet banking is positively 
related to usage online education services (r = 0.189, sig.= 0.002) and usage of 
downloading of media (r = 0.330, sig.= 0.000). Usage of online education services is 
positively related to usage of downloading media (r = 0.337, sig.= 0.000).  
                                                 
6 Andy Field, 2009, discovering statistics using SPSS, third edition, pp166-179.  
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Table 6.7 Spearman correlation table (online activities and age) 
   
usage of online 
shopping 
usage of internet 
banking 
usage of online 
education 
services 
usage of 
downloading 
media 
age 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .586
**
 .230
**
 .388
**
 -.543
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) . .000 .000 .000 .000 usage of online shopping 
N 271 271 271 271 271 
Correlation Coefficient .586
**
 1.000 .189
**
 .330
**
 -.416
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 . .001 .000 .000 usage of internet banking 
N 271 271 271 271 271 
Correlation Coefficient .230
**
 .189
**
 1.000 .337
**
 -.359
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .001 . .000 .000 
usage of online education 
services 
N 271 271 271 271 271 
Correlation Coefficient .388
**
 .330
**
 .337
**
 1.000 -.479
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .000 .000 . .000 usage of downloading media 
N 271 271 271 271 271 
Correlation Coefficient -.543
**
 -.416
**
 -.359
**
 -.479
**
 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
Spearman's rho 
age 
N 271 271 271 271 271 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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As stated by A. Field (2009): ‘R2 (coefficient of determination) is a measure of the 
amount of variability in one variable that is shared by the other’. If we look at the 
relationship between age and usage of online shopping, those two variables have a 
correlation of -0.543 and R2=0.295 / 29.5%. It told us that age shared 29.5% of the 
variability in online shopping. Although age was highly correlated with online 
shopping according to Spearman’s correlation (r=-0.543, sig. =0.000), it still could 
only explain 29.5% of variation in online shopping. Differently, age shared 17.3% of 
the variability in internet banking and 12.9% in online education services.  
 
Table 6.8 Summary of Spearman’s correlation (r & R
2
) 
Variables r R2 
age vs. usage of online shopping -0.543 0.295 
age vs. usage of internet banking -0.416 0.173 
age vs. usage of online education services -0.359 0.129 
age vs. usage of downloading media -0.479 0.229 
usage of online shopping vs. usage of internet banking 0.586 0.343 
usage of online shopping vs. usage of online education services 0.230 0.053 
usage of online shopping vs. usage of downloading media 0.388 0.151 
usage of internet banking vs. usage of online education services 0.189 0.036 
usage of internet banking vs. usage of online downloading media 0.330 0.109 
usage of online education services vs. usage of online downloading media 0.337 0.114 
 
6.4 Fraudulent cases 
The last three survey questions in section (3) of the questionnaire concerned personal 
information about actual fraud, attempted fraud and different schemes of attempted 
fraud.  This information is analysed below. 
 
6.4.1 Occurrence of attempted financial fraud (N=271) 
The attempted financial fraud we are referring to is the situation in which criminals 
tried to defraud individuals but have not succeeded in causing monetary loss.  
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Examples of the mechanisms used include: spam emails, internet hijacking and virus 
Trojan attacks. 121 out of 271 (44.6%) respondents admitted that they had 
experienced attempted financial fraud.  
 
The survey instrument contained six measurements to describe the frequency with 
which individuals perceived that fraud attempts were made on them, namely: Never, 
Yearly, Quarterly, Monthly, Weekly and Daily. The following table looks at the 
frequency of occurrence in relation to the seven different but most popular fraud 
schemes:  
 
Table 6.9 Occurrence of attempted fraud using different schemes 
How often do you experience attempted fraud? (N=271) 
Fraudulent schemes 
Never Yearly Quarterly Monthly Weekly Daily 
Card cloned 94.8% 5.2% 0 0 0 0 
ID theft 97.8% 1.5% 0 0.4% 0 0.4% 
Scam post / junk mail 65.3% 4.4% 3.7% 9.2% 11.8% 5.5% 
Phishing emails / spam emails 62.0% 4.8% 7% 4.4% 13.7% 8.1% 
Fake websites / internet hijacking 86.7% 3.3% 3.3% 3.7% 1.5% 1.5% 
Lost / stolen bank cards 93.7% 5.9% 0 0.4% 0 0 
Virus / Trojan attack 80.8% 8.9% 4.1% 3.3% 1.8% 1.1% 
 
This table has some interesting implications.  Looking at the ‘never’ column first, 
97.8% of respondents appear to have never experienced ID theft.  Given all the 
publicity which has been given to this, the incidence of this seems to be surprisingly 
low. As expected, many respondents had been subject to phishing and spam emails as 
well a scam post and junk mail, but the incidence of the more technical frauds of 
virus/Trojan and fake website/internet hijacking seems high (of the order of 20%).  
Looking now at the frequency of occurrence, card cloning and the loss or theft of bank 
cards seem to be rare events whereas phishing and scam emails happen on an almost 
continuous basis.  Some of the other schemes seem to vary in frequency with the 
individual, such as virus/Trojan attacks and fake websites / internet hijacking.  This 
might well be because of the different types of use of the internet by different 
individuals. 
 
 165 
As we look at the correlation between the incidence of virus attack and downloading 
media online, the statistical results indicated that a positive association discovered (r = 
0.203 and Sig. = 0.011). It suggests that certain type of online activities is related to 
various fraud schemes.  
 
6.4.2 Occurrence of actual financial fraud (N=58) 
(1) Summary of real financial fraud 
58 out of 271 respondents had experienced actual financial fraud, giving a ratio of 
fraud occurrence of 21.4%. In monetary terms, the losses suffered from each 
incidence of fraud ranged from £10 to £7500, with an average of £967.38.  As will be 
discussed later, 91.4% of the defrauded customers received compensation for their 
loss. 
 
(2) Time series of occurrence of fraudulent cases 
In this section, we are looking at the way the 58 fraudulent cases in the survey 
occurred over time, as depicted in Figure 6.25. The growth pattern is variable, with a 
small jump in 2000 but a much larger one in 2006.    
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Figure 6.25 Year of fraudulent cases occurrence in the UK 
 
After year 2000, the next turning point is year 2006, in which 11 fraudulent cases 
occurred, followed by 15 cases in year 2007 and 12 in 2008. The latest fraudulent 
cases that have been collected occurred in 2008 because the survey questionnaires 
were sent out in the last quarter of year 2008 and the latest responses have been 
returned in the first quarter of year 2009.  
 
(3) Fraudulent transactions happen in weekday or weekend 
For the 58 cases where fraud had been experienced, 42 replies were received 
concerning the question: ‘when did the fraudulent transaction happen (weekend or 
weekday)?’  In the questionnaire, the day was split into four time periods and then 
further split by weekday and weekend, giving respondents eight alternatives. It was 
expected that most fraudulent transactions would take place at the weekend, on the 
basis that fraudsters would know that the security and vetting systems would be busy 
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and might be less effective.  It turned out that 54.8% fraudulent cases occurred during 
weekdays and 32.7% at the weekend, however, on a per day rate, this is 11% per day 
for the five weekdays and 16% per day for the two weekend days, so the weekend rate 
is higher, although not very much higher as is sometimes presumed. This difference is 
not significant at the 5% level (z=1.04).  
 
 
Figure 6.26 Overview of fraudulent transaction occurrence in weekday or weekend 
 
(4) Where does the fraud take place? 
With 5 missing values, 53 valid replies were collected about the question: where do 
you know / believe the fraud took place? 69.8% of respondents believed that the fraud 
they experienced took place in public places, for example, stations, stores, airports, 
petrol stations and bars. 22.6% of respondents believed that they were defrauded at 
home and 7.5% believed that fraud took place in their work place.  
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Figure 6.27 Where does the fraud take place? 
 
One explanation for the prevalence of fraudulent activity in public places is the lack of 
advanced IT support available or installed security techniques.  Although internet 
access is provided in many stations, airports, cafes / restaurants, there is no guarantee 
of IT security. Even though individuals are aware of the potential risks, the 
importance of getting online access outweighs the risk. In addition, the individual 
might be in a hurry and willing to ‘cut corners’ to get access without ensuring that 
security measures are in place. 
  
The other explanation is that individuals are more easily distracted in the public places 
than a place they are more familiar with, such as work place and home. When 
someone is sitting in the waiting lounge in the airport, he or she has no idea who is 
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sharing internet access; which network security techniques have been applied and 
whether or not there is any updated security support.  
 
(5) How soon after the fraud was discovered? 
With 58 replies in total, 36 replies fell into the three most popular categories, which 
are: within 7 days, within 24 hours and within 12 hours.  The following table gives a 
breakdown across all the categories and the figure shows these in diagrammatic form. 
 
Table 6.10 How soon after the fraud was discovered? 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
within 12 hours 10 17.2 17.2 17.2 
within 24 hours 11 19.0 19.0 36.2 
within 7 days 15 25.9 25.9 62.1 
2 weeks later 9 15.5 15.5 77.6 
4 weeks later 9 15.5 15.5 93.1 
more than 1 month 4 6.9 6.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 58 100.0 100.0  
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Figure 6.28 How soon after the fraud was discovered? 
 
Subsequently (Figure 6.30) it is seen that most of the frauds involve credit cards.  In 
interpreting Figure 6.28, it is therefore likely that the frauds that are discovered 
quickly are likely to be the result of checks by the credit card companies (eg in 
detecting unusual patterns of use), whereas those detected in the medium to long terms 
are more likely to be customer detected as a result of the customer checking his/her 
statement.  Since the statement can arrive anytime up to four weeks after the 
fraudulent transaction, the pattern of customer detection is likely to occur evenly over 
time as appears to be reflected in the diagram.  Also consistent with this 
rationalisation is that the proportion of frauds (7%) detected more than a month after 
occurrence is fairly low.   
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A key factor in early detection of fraud is the increasing sophistication of the 
monitoring of financial transactions by banks and credit card companies – this not 
only helps to reduce financial loss but gives the customers more confidence and 
enhances the reputation of the financial companies, who can use modern technology 
(mobile phones, the internet etc) to contact customers quickly if they note any 
suspicious activity. 
 
(6) Which type of fraud scheme was used? 
In section 6.4.1, attempted fraud was discussed.  Here we concentrate on actual fraud 
as evidenced by the 58 respondents who had experienced it, the alternatives listed in 
the survey being: phishing email / spam emails; fake websites / internet hijacking; 
virus / Trojans; lost / stolen bank cards; card clone and card ID theft.  In addition, we 
provided blank space for respondent to fill in any other information if necessary. 
Surprisingly, none of the 58 respondents was defrauded by phishing emails / spam 
emails which suggests that respondents are wise to this form of deception.  
 
The main fraud schemes encountered by the 58 respondents who have experienced 
actual fraud were: card cloned, card ID theft and lost-and-stolen card. 23 out of 58 
respondents (39.7%) experienced card clone fraud (which is also called counterfeit 
card fraud). 21 out of 58 respondents (36.2%) who experienced actual fraud were 
caught out by card ID theft. 17.2% respondents have been defrauded due to lost-and-
stolen card fraud.  Figure 6.29 below shows the breakdown into these categories. 
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Figure 6.29 Which type of fraud scheme was used? 
 
(7) Which type of payment method was used in this case?  
Five options for payment method were listed for the question asking for the payment 
method used for the fraud.  These were: credit card; debit card; pre-paid card; cheque 
and secure internet payment (e.g. PayPal). Also we offered blank space to respondents 
to add anything they would like to.  There were 2 missing values giving 56 valid 
replies.  
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Figure 6.30 Which type of payment method was used? 
 
The breakdown is shown in the following table. Almost two thirds of the frauds 
involved credit cards, which partly reflects the greater usage of credit cards but also 
their greater vulnerability, as debit cards are directly linked with an individual’s bank 
account and will not allow spending that take the balance of the account beyond preset 
limits.  
 
As stated in the report of ‘card expenditure statistics (The UK Cards Association 
2010)’ in January 2010, the total spending in the UK on all plastic cards was £ 31.1 
billion, of which debit cards spending was £ 21.1 billion and credit cards spending 
was £ 9.9 billion, the remaining £0.1 billion being on pre-pay and charge cards.  
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Table 6.11 Which type of payment methods was used in this case? 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
credit card 36 62.1 64.3 64.3 
debit card 16 27.6 28.6 92.9 
cheque 3 5.2 5.4 98.2 
secure internet payment system 1 1.7 1.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 56 96.6 100.0  
Missing 99 2 3.4   
Total 58 100.0   
 
However, the credit cards (£60-65) beat the debit cards (£40-45) on the average 
transaction values in the UK (The UK Cards Association 2010). On the other hand, 
48% of the card payment on the internet was made by debit card and 52% by credit or 
charge cards (The UK Cards Association 2010). As supported our findings in Table 
6.11, the individuals would prefer credit card to debit card when they make payment 
on the internet. 
 
(8) Did any parties compensate you? 
We received 57 valid replies to the question asking whether or not defrauded 
individuals got any compensation. 53 respondents (91.4%) got compensation from the 
bank / credit card company and two respondents got compensation from the merchant 
instead. The other two respondents did not get any compensation.  
 
On the evidence of the survey questionnaire, in general it is the banks / credit card 
companies that bear the losses of financial fraud. Once the fraudulent cases have been 
reported, the financial organizations deal with it on behalf of defrauded customers. 
Unless the evidence showed that customers were involved into fraudulent cases on 
purpose, refund / compensation will be arranged to individuals, normally by reversal 
of the fraudulent transactions on the financial statements. 
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Figure 6.31 Did any parties compensate you 
 
It is not always the banks / credit card companies that bear the losses in the fraudulent 
cases, particularly where online financial transactions are involved. The credit card 
companies have the right not to pay the merchants if there have been procedural 
irregularities – for example if the requisite checks and authorizations have not been 
carried out. However, it is generally the banks/credit card companies that bear the loss. 
 
Given the increasing level of financial fraud, how can the banks/credit card companies 
afford to bear the cost involved? As discussed in chapter 3, section 3.3, credit card 
operations make their money in approximately equal amounts from the merchant fees 
charged and on the interest earned from customers who do not pay off their balances 
every month.  The rate of interest on credit cards can vary from around 9% to over 
29%, and with money being available on the wholesale markets at around 2%, there is 
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clearly a massive default premium built into the rates charged to customers.  For any 
credit card company, a key driver in the financial model is the number of transactions, 
and it is in the company’s interest to keep customers happy and to keep using the card.  
Settling fraud cases quickly, and in the customer’s favour, helps to achieve this.  This 
issue of satisfaction is measured in (10) below. 
 
(9) Awareness of different type of financial fraud 
We used five scales (from 1 to 5) to measure the degree of awareness of types of 
financial fraud. 26 out of 58 defrauded respondents (44.8%) scored average to 
describe their awareness of types of financial fraud. 36.2% respondents who have 
been defrauded ticked two scales below average to their awareness of types of 
financial fraud and 18.9% ticked two scales beyond average on this question.   This is 
a subjective question as each individual will have different ideas about what 
constitutes, for example, ‘average’ awareness, but it is of interest to see how the 
individuals who have suffered fraud rate their own awareness. 
 
 177 
 
Figure 6.32 Awareness of different type of financial fraud 
 
As suggested by the figure below, most individuals who have experienced actual fraud 
are aware of financial fraud, particularly for online financial transactions. 44.8% 
respondents believed that their awareness of the fraud is average and 18.9% even 
beyond average. But there were still 36.2% respondents who have experienced actual 
fraud admitted that they are not really aware of the different types of fraud. Since the 
banks / credit card companies step in to try to resolve the situations once the 
fraudulent transactions occur, this appears to make some individuals rather 
complacent. As with moral hazard in the insurance industry, business organizations 
have to take certain risks, even pay for the increased costs caused by a small group of 
customers.   Moral hazard arises from asymmetric information, in this instance from 
the fact that the bank does not know which of its customers are lax in terms of security 
and therefore there is no uniformity of risk.  According to Holmström (1979), a first 
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best solution is only provided by the monitoring of the actions of individuals, which 
would be prohibitively expensive, but could be proxied by a contract that contains 
forcing terms that induce better behaviour.  For example, banks will not reimburse 
customers if the fraud is caused by certain types of injudicious actions, such as when a 
customer loses a wallet which contains both a credit card and a note of the associated 
PIN number.  In this case, the bank is likely to refuse to reimburse the customer 
should fraudulent use of the credit card ensue. 
 
(10) How satisfied with bank/ credit card company in dealing with fraud 
Considering the refund / compensation arranged by banks / credit card companies, our 
expectation is that individuals who have experienced fraud are more likely to feel 
satisfied with banks / credit card companies. Not surprisingly, the figures and bar 
chart are compatible with our assumption about the defrauded customers’ satisfaction 
with the financial organizations in dealing with fraud.  
 
With 1 missing value, 57 valid answers were collected. 54 out of 57 respondents 
(94.7%) responded that their satisfaction level was at least average, with 32 of these 
indicating a higher than average level of satisfaction.  There would therefore appear to 
be a general level of satisfaction with banks / credit card companies in dealing with 
fraud.  Possible reasons for this have already been advanced in (8) above.  
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Figure 6.33 How satisfied with bank / credit card company in dealing with fraud 
 
However, three of the 57 respondents (5.3%) were not satisfied at all with the banks / 
credit card companies in dealing with fraud. In the previous section discussing 
whether the defrauded individuals get any refund / compensation, we found that two 
respondents have not got any refund / compensation. On that case, we can understand 
why the respondents gave the lowest score to describe the satisfactions with the banks 
/ credit card companies in dealing with fraud because the individuals had to bear the 
financial losses themselves.  
 
6.5 Fraud occurrence model (N=271) 
In this section, we are trying to build up a model to explain and predict fraud 
occurrence based on the associations and correlations between different variables.  
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6.5.1 Tests for associations and correlations 
We begin our more formal testing by looking at the association between pairs of 
variables to get a better understanding of the responses.  In some cases we are looking 
at the correlation between the explanatory variables to explore the extent to which 
they are multicollinear, but generally we are looking at associations between the 
incidence of fraud (which is the main variable we are trying to explain) and the other 
variables in the survey.  To accomplish this we use a Chi-square (χ2) test to test the 
association, although we could also have used an F-test.    
 
The following table shows the Chi-square test results including Chi-square value, sig. 
value, and explanations based on the results. We use three examples to explain the 
table in details: firstly, we look at the row starting with general IT skills vs. fraud 
occurrence (Chi-square value = 9.024; Sig. = 0.011; r = 0.168 and sig. = 0.004).  This 
suggests that there is a positive and significant relationship between general IT skill 
and fraud occurrence, which is an interesting finding, implying that although one 
would expect those with better IT skills to make more intensive use of the internet, 
their skills do not make them immune from fraud.   
 
The Chi-square test concerning the association between age and fraud occurrence 
(Chi-square value = 6.663; Sig. = 0.036; r = -0.108 and sig. = 0.076) is telling a 
different story. The r value is negative, suggesting that older people are less likely to 
experience fraud, but the correlation is not significant at the 5% level.   
 
We could not discover any significant association between education background (IT / 
Finance related) and fraud occurrence (Sig. = 0.882 / 0.839). It was initially suggested 
that respondents who had an education background in either IT or Finance might have 
an advantage in avoiding financial fraud on the internet, but this was not supported by 
the data.  
 181 
Table 6.12 Chi-square tests 
Variables 
Value*
* 
Sig 
different 
from 
zero 
r 
Sig 
different 
from 
zero 
Implication 
General IT skill* vs. Age 1.015E2 0.000 -.601 0.000 Younger respondents are more likely to have higher general IT skill 
General IT skill vs. Fraud occurrence 9.024 0.011 0.168 0.004 
Respondents with higher general IT skill are more likely to be 
defrauded on the internet 
General IT skill vs. Highest qualification 44.085 0.000 0.202 0.001 
Respondents with higher qualification are more likely to have higher 
IT skills 
Age* vs. Fraud occurrence 6.663 0.036 0.108 0.076 Younger respondents are more likely to be defrauded on the internet 
Usage of internet banking vs. Fraud occurrence 12.532 0.000 0.215 0.000 
Respondents who are using internet banking are more likely to be 
defrauded on the internet 
Usage of online shopping vs. Fraud occurrence 12.140 0.000 0.212 0.000 
Respondents who are using online shopping are more likely to be 
defrauded on the internet 
Usage of downloading media vs. Fraud occurrence 11.936 0.001 0.210 0.001 
Respondents who are using media download are more likely to be 
defrauded on the internet 
Usage of online education vs. Fraud occurrence 0.767 0.381 0.053 0.383 No significant relationship was found  
IT/Finance related background vs. Fraud occurrence 0.661 0.882 0.012 0.839 No significant relationship was found  
General IT skill vs. Gender 8.214 0.223 0.106 0.082 No significant relationship was found  
Gender vs. Fraud occurrence 2.562 0.109 0.097 0.110 No significant relationship was found  
Highest qualification vs. Fraud occurrence 8.284 0.040 0.097 0.109 No significant relationship was found  
*variable has been combined and recoded to avoid inaccurate test result (e.g. Age/IT skill) 
**value is referring Chi-square value.  
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6.5.2 Logistic regression model 
In this section we are trying to build up a model to explain the propensity for 
individuals to be subjected to financial fraud.  The dependent variable is therefore a 
limited dependent variable (LDV) or categorical variable which takes on the values 
zero or one depending on whether fraud has been experienced or not.  According to 
Field, A. (2009, p265), logistic regression is multiple regression but with an outcome 
variable that is a categorical variable and predictor variables that are continuous or 
categorical. Similarly, the outcome variable of the model we are trying to build up is 
to predict fraud occurrence which is a binary variable, e.g. fraud occurrence=1; no 
fraud occurrence=0. Assumed predictor variables might be categorical (e.g. usage of 
gender / age) and numerical data (e.g. history of credit card usage).  
 
Based on the association and correlation table in the previous section, we use 11 
predictors including categorical and numerical variables to run a logistic regression. 
SPSS has more than one approach to test logistic regression. We chose an approach 
referred as ‘Forward LR’ by Field, A. (2009, p283) in which variables are added to the 
logistic equation in the order of the significance of their binary relationship with the 
dependent variable. The following two stages describe the progress of Forward LR 
test in details: 
 
(1) Beginning block 
At this stage, the initial model originates from using only the constant in the 
regression and tells us about the basic model included constant only. -2LL (-2 Log 
likelihood) in the following table represents the fit of the basic model to the data. Field, 
A. (2009, p283) addressed: ‘when including only the constant, the SPSS bases the 
model on assigning every participant to a single category of the outcome variable’. In 
our study, SPSS can decide either to predict that the fraud occurrence or fraud not 
occurrence.  
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Table 6.13 Iteration history 
Iteration History
a,b,c
 
Coefficients 
Iteration -2 Log likelihood 
Constant 
1 241.731 -1.023 
2 241.269 -1.127 
3 241.268 -1.130 
Step 0 
4 241.268 -1.130 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 241.268 
c. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
Indicated by Field, A. (2009, p283), SPSS will predict every case into the category 
into which most observed cases fell. In the Classification table below, there are 164 
cases representing no occurrence of fraud and 53 cases representing occurrence.  The 
chance of fraud occurrence is 53/164+53=24.4% and the chance of fraud not 
occurrence is 164/164+53=75.6%.  In this simple model, with only a constant, SPSS 
predicts that all cases are representing the non-occurrence of fraud as this gives a 
higher percentage of correct classifications (100 / 0). As expected, this initial model 
correctly classified 75.6% cases.  
 
Table 6.14 Classification table 
Classification Table
a,b
 
 Predicted 
 fraud occurrence or not 
 
Observed 
not occurrence occurrence 
Percentage 
Correct 
not occurrence 164 0 100.0 
occurrence 53 0 .0 Step 0 fraud occurrence or not 
Overall Percentage   75.6 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
 
The ‘variables in the equation’ table below summarizes the model and shows the 
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value of the constant (b0 ), which is equal to -1.130. 
 
Table 6.15 Variables in the equation 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -1.130 .158 51.108 1 .000 .323 
 
Where B is the coefficient of the predictor variable, S.E (standard error), the standard 
deviation of the sampling distribution of a statistic (in this case the coefficient B), 
Wald is a test statistic with a known probability distribution that is used to test 
whether the B coefficient for a predictor in a logistic regression model is significantly 
different from zero, df is the degrees of freedom (essentially, the number of ‘entities’ 
that are free to vary when estimating some kind of statistical parameter), Sig is the 
significance value expressed as a tail probability, and Exp(B) is the odds ratio, which 
is an indicator of the change in odds resulting from a unit change in the predictor in 
logistic regression; if the value is greater than 1 then it indicates that as the predictor 
increases, the odds of the outcome occurring increase. Conversely, a value less than 1 
indicates that as the predictor increases, the odds of the outcome occurring decrease. 
 
Before proceeding, we present a table of variable definitions for variables used in the 
next stage of the analysis. 
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Table 6.16 Full name of the variables 
 
In the ‘variables not in the equation’ table, we need to focus on column sig and 
column score. For example, UOOADM (usage of online downloading media) has the 
sig. value as 0.003, which suggested variable UOOADM would make a significant 
affect to the model if it is included in the test. UOOADM also has the highest score 
value as 8.724, which would make a potential contribution to the model. Considering 
a significant score value, variable UOOADM is likely to be a good predictor. In the 
next iteration, this variable is added to the logistic equation. 
NEWITSKILL IT skills 
NEWAGE Age 
NEWHIQUALI Highest qualification 
GENDER Gender 
UOOAOS Usage of online shopping 
UOOAIB Usage of internet banking 
UOOAOES Usage of online education services 
UOOADM Usage of online media downloading 
EBG Education background 
HUCC History of usage of credit card 
HUDC History of usage of debit card 
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Table 6.17 Variables not in the equation 
Variables not in the Equation 
   Score df Sig. 
NEWITSKILL 6.921 1 .009 
NEWAGE 1.777 1 .183 
NEWHIQUALI .981 1 .322 
GENDER 2.187 1 .139 
UOOAOS 8.089 1 .004 
UOOAIB 8.458 1 .004 
UOOAOES 1.878 1 .171 
UOOADM 8.724 1 .003 
EBG .067 1 .796 
HUCC .054 1 .816 
HUDC 8.245 1 .004 
Step 0 Variables 
Overall Statistics 33.719 11 .000 
 
 
(2) Forward LR Procedure 
Now we are looking at an improved model which is different from the basic model we 
were discussing in previous section. This procedure is repeated, with SPSS adding 
variables into the logistic regression one by one, on the basis of the strength of their 
statistical association with the dependent variable, in order to create an improved 
model. This is continued until the point where adding additional variables does not 
add statistical significance to the model.  
 
Continuing with our example, the model summary table below shows the overall fit of 
the new model through four iterations. The -2LL value of this new model has 
decreased from 232.927 at step 1 to 209.158 at step 4, this being less than 241.268 
which was the value of -2LL in the previous basic model, showing that the model is 
predicting the outcome variable more accurately.    
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Table 6.18 Model summary (forward LR) 
Model Summary 
Step (iteration) -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 232.927
a
 .038 .056 
2 221.902
b
 .085 .127 
3 216.284
b
 .109 .162 
4 209.158
b
 .138 .205 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
b. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
Also, when we look at the Chi-square test table originated from the new model, we 
noticed that all the sig. values are less than 0.05. It suggests that the overall model 
predicts fraud occurrence or non-occurrence significantly better than when only the 
constant was included.  
 
Table 6.19 Tests of model coefficients (forward LR) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
  Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 7.126 1 .008 
Block 32.111 4 .000 Step 4 
Model 32.111 4 .000 
 
Similarly to the basic model in previous section, the classification table describes how 
well the model classifies the cases overall. The basic model with only a constant could 
classify 75.6% cases but with other predictors included in this new model, we can 
classify more cases raised to 78.3%.  
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Table 6.20 Classification table (forward LR) 
Classification Table
a
 
 Predicted 
 fraud occurrence or not 
 
Observed 
not occurrence occurrence 
Percentage 
Correct 
not occurrence 158 6 96.3 
occurrence 41 12 22.6 Step 4 fraud occurrence or not 
Overall Percentage   78.3 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Now we are focusing on the table of variables in the equation. In this table, we can get 
the estimates for the coefficients for the predictors included in the model. For example, 
at the step 1, variable UOOADM is added into the model to predict fraud occurrence 
or not. The coefficient of UOOADM is 0.953 and its sig. value is 0.004 which is 
significant. It suggested that variable UOOADM is a good predictor in the model. 
With the coefficient of the constant is -1.472 at step 1, we can format the equation of 
the step 1 model. 
 
Finally, we need to explain the last crucial value in the table of variables in the 
equation. Exp (B), generally speaking, it suggests a positive relationship between 
predictor and outcome if the value is greater than 1. On the other hand, a negative 
relationship occurs when the value is less than 1. One of the predictors at the step 4, 
UOOAOES (usage of online education service), has the value of Exp (B) =0.327 
which is less than 1. Also, the coefficient of UOOAOES is -1.117 suggesting a 
negative relationship between UOOAOES and fraud occurrence.  
 
Based on the best model selected by SPSS using logistic regression test, we have four 
predictors with significant performance: UOOAIB (usage of internet banking), 
UOOAOES (usage of online education service), UOOADM (usage of online 
downloading media) and HUDC (history of debit card usage). Except for a negative 
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relationship shown by UOOAOES, the other three predictors have a positive 
relationship with fraud occurrence.  
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Table 6.21 Variables in the equation (forward LR) 
Variables in the Equation 
  95.0% C.I.for EXP(B) 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
UOOADM .953 .328 8.432 1 .004 2.594 1.363 4.935 Step 1
a
 
Constant -1.472 .210 49.333 1 .000 .230   
UOOADM 1.152 .347 11.036 1 .001 3.163 1.603 6.240 
HUDC .063 .020 10.479 1 .001 1.065 1.025 1.107 
Step 2
b
 
Constant -2.772 .479 33.457 1 .000 .063   
UOOAIB .918 .405 5.145 1 .023 2.505 1.133 5.539 
UOOADM 1.005 .355 8.010 1 .005 2.733 1.362 5.484 
HUDC .064 .020 10.245 1 .001 1.066 1.025 1.109 
Step 3
c
 
Constant -3.401 .589 33.338 1 .000 .033   
UOOAIB 1.069 .418 6.548 1 .010 2.911 1.284 6.600 
UOOAOES -1.117 .441 6.423 1 .011 .327 .138 .776 
UOOADM 1.345 .389 11.943 1 .001 3.839 1.790 8.232 
HUDC .063 .020 9.687 1 .002 1.065 1.024 1.109 
Step 4
d
 
Constant -3.327 .603 30.465 1 .000 .036   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: UOOADM. b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: HUDC.  
c. Variable(s) entered on step 3: UOOAIB. d. Variable(s) entered on step 4: UOOAOES. 
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The implications of the results are as follows.  They suggest that usage of internet 
banking, the extent of downloading media from the internet and history of usage of 
debit cards are all positively associated with the incidence of fraud occurrence, 
whereas interestingly the usage of online educational services is negatively related to 
the occurrence of internet fraud. This last finding might reflect the possibility that 
educational websites are ‘safer’, or possibility that those who are interested in 
education are more knowledgeable and have a tendency to avoid situations in which 
fraud might occur.  Interestingly, this result might not appear to sit easily with the 
finding in section 6.3-(4)-4.1 that individuals with higher degrees were more 
susceptible to fraud, but an explanation is that frauds experienced by those with higher 
qualifications were not incurred as the result of downloading educational material. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have undertaken a progressive analysis of the UK survey data 
obtained, starting first with a descriptive approach, then looking at binary associations 
of the variables and then using logistic regression to try to explain and classify the 
occurrence of fraud.  The results from the logistic regression suggest that certain 
internet related activities, such as internet banking, downloading of media and history 
of debit card usage are all positively associated with the occurrence of fraud, whereas 
the use of online educational services is negatively related. Interestingly, on-line 
shopping, which was significant in the univariate analysis as evidenced by the chi-
square test, was not significant in the logistic regression. 
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Chapter 7 Financial Payments Systems in China 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the credit card, debit card 
and online transactions environment in China as a prelude to analyse the results of the 
China survey in chapter 8.   
 
7.2 Credit cards / debit cards service in China 
7.2.1 Overview of credit / debit card in China  
From the invention of money (allegedly by the Phoenicians), there have been a 
number of significant milestones in the form it takes, eg in the transition from 
precious metals to base metals to paper notes.  In the mid-20 century, some merchants 
and restaurants started to issue store cards to trustworthy customers to provide them 
with an alternative method of payment, subject to terms agreed between the customer 
and the merchant. Periodically, customers would be provided with a statement in the 
form of a note or list posted by each merchant. No interest would be charged if 
customers paid off the amount due on time, otherwise interest would be charged at an 
agreed rate. These store cards not only brought additional convenience to customers 
but also helped merchants to promote their businesses.  
 
This practice led to the next major evolution in the development of money.  In 19507, 
Diners’ Club cards were launched as the very first credit card (Liu 2008). Card 
holders became club members first and agreed to pay an annual fee / service charge to 
the club as well as paying for the transactions. More advanced than the store card 
mentioned above, Diners’ Club cards could be accepted by other merchants outside 
the club. This advantageous payment method attracted the attention of many financial 
                                                 
7The Diners Club Card was the first ever Charge Card. In 1950, businessman Frank McNamara entertained a group 
of dinner guests in a New York restaurant, only to discover that he'd forgotten his wallet. Luckily, the restaurant owner 
knew him and let him leave his business card as an IOU. This inspired McNamara to devise a card to prove the 
holder's identity and ability to pay. He launched the Diners Club Card that year and the initial membership was 200 
with the card being accepted in 27 restaurants. In 2008, there are 8 million Diners Club Cardholders in over 200 
countries, and the card is accepted in 6 million establishments worldwide.(Diners Club website). 
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organizations. Two years later, T&E (Travel and Entertainment Inc.) entered the 
market and rapidly built up its business. In 1966, the bank card system arrived in 
Europe with the introduction of Barclaycard in the UK (Liu 2008).   
 
A bank card service is still a new concept for Chinese people who have been used to 
cash transactions for generations. The development of bank cards has been through 
three identifiable stages in China: 
 
(1) From 1978 to 1993 
Since the reform and open policies were launched in 1978, China was committed to 
seeking more international connections. In 1979, the Bank of China, Guangdong 
branch, entered into the bank card industry by cooperating with the Bank of East Asia. 
In the following 15 years, the big four state-owned banks in China consisting of the 
Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction 
Bank and the Agricultural Bank of China started to build up their own bank card 
programme and each joined one or both of the two major credit-card clearing 
operations – either Visa International or MasterCard.  
 
At this early stage, each bank set up its own bank-card standards and policies. With 
little experience to draw on, banks were unable to provide a quality service or 
properly functioning products and in addition bank-cards were only valid within a 
given geographical area, not even nationwide. With these inconveniences, the demand 
for bank-cards was limited and cash was still the prime payment method in China.  
 
(2) From 1994 to 2001 
Having gone through a 15 year period of preparation, the bank-card industry in China 
was ready for the next stage of development. In 1994, the central bank (the People’s 
bank of China) started to standardize the Bank-card industry by introducing a standard 
practice code, a nationwide network, POS/ATM equipment, information exchange and 
other services. From the end of 1998, bank cards became usable on a nationwide basis.  
 
With these improvements, bank-cards, particular debit cards, started to attract two 
groups of individuals in China: professionals and students. Debit cards reduce the risk 
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of cash carry and allow individuals to withdraw or deposit cash 24/7 using an ATM. 
As more ATMs were installed and self-service bank branches opened, more customers 
were willing to use debit cards.  
 
(3) From 2002 to the present 
In March 2002, China Unionpay (CUP) was established in Shanghai under the 
approval of the People’s Bank of China as the sole bank card association. Playing the 
role of the regulator of the bank-card industry in China, CUP takes responsibilities for 
development of the bank-card industry and the improvement of operating systems. 
Using standards and regulations, CUP helps to manage cross-border transactions and 
data processing. 
 
Through these three development stages, the bank-card system has been established in 
China to international standards. Consumers have started to accept and to get used to 
modern financial products and services, but Chinese consumers have been more 
willing to subscribe for debit cards than credit cards, reflecting Chinese tradition and 
culture lasting for thousands of years.  
 
7.2.2 Credit card vs. debit card in China 
Following the three development stages of the bank-cards industry in China, by June 
2006 the sum of issued bank cards reached twice the figure in 2001 (Liu 2008). Of all 
the bank cards issued in 2001, 95% are debit cards (People's Bank of China).  
 
Table 7.1 Debit cards and Credit cards issued in China 2007-2009
8
 (m = million) 
 Year 2007 Year 2008 Year 2009 
Debit cards 752.3 m 1003 m 1180 m 
Credit cards 126.2m 140.2 m 187 m 
 
The Table 7.1 shows clearly that credit cards constitute an increasing but still small 
proportion (about 12-14%) of the bank-cards issued in China from 2007-2009. The 
tradition of paying by cash and an aversion to borrowing money appear to the main 
                                                 
8 Source: from a professional working in the financial industry in China, 2010. 
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reasons for this, rather than any institutional or regulatory factors (such as, for 
example, restrictions on the granting of credit). Overspending and living on debt are 
regarded as shameful behaviour, even crimes in Chinese traditional culture, which 
sings high praise for being moderate and exercising self-discipline. One of the very 
important lectures to children is ‘spend less and save more’. Individuals are supposed 
to be proud of how much they have saved not spent. Overspending is considered bad 
behaviour which would compromise an individual’s reputation and family standing.  
 
As well as the influences of Chinese traditional culture, in the more recent history of 
China, in particular the last 100 years, Chinese people have struggled for generations 
against invasions, wars and natural disasters which almost proved to be catastrophic. 
Having been through these tough periods, Chinese people try to prepare for the future 
by saving and not spending.  
 
7.2.3 Credit card / debit card fraud in China 
It is easy to find out that any innovations in human history always come along with 
risks and compromises in consequence. Mobile phones make communication easier 
and quicker but at the cost of privacy. In replacing cash as a popular payment solution, 
bank cards bring convenience to consumers but create a new type of financial fraud: 
bank card fraud.  
 
Card fraud is just starting to be a significant development in China. Based on the 
Chinese survey results we obtained, 7 out of 142 respondents (4.9%) experienced 
actual fraud compared to 58 out of 271 in the UK (21.4%). The explanation of the low 
fraud rate in China comes from two aspects: firstly, the card holders in China are very 
well educated, as we can see from the survey results, with 86% holding a degree. In 
consequence, 87.3% of respondents had IT skills of average or better. Secondly, the 
bank-card is still new to China and criminals are still learning to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of the system.  
 
 196 
According to the findings based on the fraudulent cases in the recent three years 
(Zhang, Luo 2009), 87.2% are lost-and-stolen card fraud. In contrast to the UK, credit 
card holders are allowed to choose either a signature or a PIN number to verify 
transactions in China. Criminals can forge a signature to purchase products in person 
from retailers until the original card holder reports that the credit card is lost. Debit 
cards are not affected in this way because only PIN usage is allowed to verify debit 
card transactions in China. Lost-and-stolen card fraud cannot be conducted online in 
China because online shopping is limited to settlement by online banking transactions 
only.  
 
Except for lost-and-stolen credit card fraud, which accounts for 87.2% of fraudulent 
credit card transactions, there are three other main types of credit card fraud in China 
currently: 
 
(1) ID theft (Zhang, Luo 2009), which is in essence the same as it is in the UK, 
whereby criminals apply for credit cards using someone’s ID illegally. With this type 
of fraud, criminals can even can set PIN numbers and withdraw cash from an ATM 
instead of making purchases. 
 
(2) Card cloning, which is again essentially the same activity as experienced in the 
UK, whereby criminals make a copy of the authentic credit / debit cards illegally. All 
bank cards currently in usage in China, just like the old version of bank cards in the 
UK, only have a magnet strip on the back. It is easy to have bank cards cloned without 
a chip embedded providing further security protection. In particular, some malicious 
cashiers even steal and sell customers’ bank cards information using an illegal card 
reader. 
 
(3) Collusion (Zhang, Luo 2009), either original card holders or fake card holders can 
collude with merchants to make false transactions and split the cash obtained. It is not 
difficult for merchants to purchase the POS equipment which is used to make card 
transactions.  
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Debit card fraud is very rare in China because PIN usage is the only way to verify 
transactions and identify card holders since the first debit card launched into Chinese 
market. For online shopping, all bank cards have to be operated using online banking 
procedures to make payments on the internet. As was established in the interviews 
with banking officials, normally banks do not take any responsibility for debit card 
fraud / loss in China – this in itself is likely to make individuals more cautious. 
 
7.2.4 Credit card / debit fraud cases in China  
In this section, we paraphrase some cases of credit card fraud from examples given in 
the Chinese banking literature. 
 
Case 1 (Wang 2004, p90): 
25th, January 1997, Mr. H applied for a credit card from a local bank providing a false 
employment letter and a false income certificate. Within one week, H made several 
purchases in shopping malls and obtained cash by faking transactions in collusion 
with illegal merchants. The total loss incurred was 38,000 RMB (about £3,800) up to 
the time when H was traced and arrested in Luo Yang city.  
 
This case (and other similar ones that are not discussed here) exposed that how weak 
the personal credit checking system was in China in 1997. Bank staff failed to do an 
adequate check on this applicant and to check the authenticity of the personal 
information provided. As we learnt from the interviews, the personal credit checking 
system is still facing problems caused by the combination of having a big population 
and limited records. In the big cities, like Beijing, Shanghai and Xi’an, personal credit 
checking systems have been established recently and have started to provide a 
reference service for the financial organizations.  
 
Case 2 (Wang 2004, p90): 
24th, February 1999, a credit card centre was alerted in a couple of hours by a 
suspicious transaction amounting to 40,000 RMB (about £4,000) in Hotel A. The 
following day, three more transactions, each amounting to 18,720 RMB (about £1,872) 
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were made in the same hotel. The local bank branch contacted the hotel manager and 
cashiers immediately. Within couple of hours, two suspects were arrested when they 
were trying to make a purchase at a local shopping mall using a cloned credit card.  
 
This case showed that the cashiers and merchants were lacking in experience when 
dealing with credit card transactions, but the financial organizations and the police 
cooperated quickly to combat the fraud. 
 
Case 3 (Wang 2004, p90): 
On 8th July 2002, a credit card centre found some suspicious transactions during a 
routine system check. Following further investigation, the credit card centre focused 
on 54 customers who applied for credit cards in April, May and June. The total 
expense involved in was 986,430 RMB (about £98,643). Those transactions were 
made in two stores in the same shopping mall. One was a fashion and accessories 
store and the other was an electronic goods retailer. The local branch suspended all 
these credit cards immediately and reported the incidents to the local Police station. 
Within two months, five suspects were arrested.  
 
The case displayed collusion between criminals and malicious merchants / agencies. 
First, criminals bought individuals’ personal details from a local car dealer. Those 
personal details were used to apply for credit cards. The criminals then found a like-
minded merchant to process the transactions and to share the monetary value with 
them. 
 
These cases illustrate weaknesses in the credit card system. The first concerns the use 
of fake identity in order to obtain a credit card, the second illustrates how card cloning 
can allow fraudulent transactions to be made over a limited period of time, and the 
third shows how collusion between customers and merchants can allow fraudulent 
transactions to be made.  In all cases, detection occurred fairly quickly. One problem 
that the system in China does circumvent is ‘card-not-present’ fraud, because of the 
requirement for payment to be made through internet banking channels rather than 
over the phone. 
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7.3 Online banking service in China 
7.3.1 Overview of online banking in China 
The Security First National Bank, launched in America in 1995, was the first virtual 
bank (Zeng 2006) that was set up specifically to provide financial services through the 
internet. Other virtual banking operations, like Egg, First Direct soon followed.  Many 
major traditional banks such as HSBC, Barclays and RBS also offer online services in 
addition to their branch banking activities. 
 
Online banking / financial services in China started in early 1997 (Guo 2004, p17) on 
a small scale as several industry leaders experimented with building up online 
payment systems.  There are two characteristics of online banking / financial services 
in China (Lei 2002, p22) worth noting: firstly, there is no purely virtual bank in China 
so far. All online service providers are traditional banks including the big four state 
owned banks and several commercial banks. Those banks provide services through 
both local branches and the internet.  
 
Secondly, there was no protracted development period for online banking / financial 
services in China. Chinese banks realized the benefits of low cost and 24/7 real time 
service offered by online banking over other retail channels and over a fairly short 
time period adopted the models and procedures operating internationally. The 
following two diagrams (Zhang 2007, p37) show the low cost of financial services 
provided through the internet in comparison to other service channels for both the 
USA and China. 
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Figure 7.1 Transaction costs of different banking channels in USA 
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Figure 7.2 Transaction costs of different banking channels in China 
 
Online banking / financial services in China (Lei 2002, p21; Zhang 2007, p37) have 
been through the following phases of development: 
 
(1) From 1996 to 2000, most banks in China were investing heavily to build up home 
websites as a new channel for brand promotion, image improvement and information 
delivery.  
 
(2) From 2000 to 2005 was the initial marketing period for online banking / financial 
services in China. Banks started to promote basic online functions to individuals (B to 
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C) and business customers (B to B). Attracted by the low cost of online services, 
banks were competing with each other to recruit customers. In 2002 (Lei 2002, p21), 
there were 50 banks providing basic online services in China.  
 
(3) From 2005 till today, a booming period started in China for online banking / 
financial services, which have shifted from basic functions to advanced services for 
both individuals and business customers, such as foreign currencies exchange, stock 
trading and personal investment.  
 
The prosperous development of the internet in China has resulted in China moving 
ahead of America in 2007 (XinHua News) in terms of having the largest number of 
internet users in the world.  There were over 120 million internet users in China in 
2006 (CFCA), 19.4% of whom were also online banking users in 2005 and 33.6% in 
2006 (Wang 2007). According to the survey conducted by CFCA (Wang 2007), China 
Financial Certificate Authority in 2005, online banking users in China have some 
characteristics in common, for example, a significant number were well educated 
young professionals aged around 30 years old.  
 
7.3.2 Differences of online banking in China  
Compared to western countries, online banking in China is not only a new service 
channel for customers to manage personal finances but also, or more importantly, it is 
the critical precondition for shopping online in China. Interestingly, when someone 
comes to the stage of online payment in China, he or she will be asked to choose a 
credit / debit card and will be diverted to the website of the online banking service of 
the relevant bank. Then online shoppers need to log on their online banking accounts 
and make the payment either using bank cards or making money transfer directly. In 
brief, if someone wants to make purchase online, he or she must apply for online 
banking service first in order to make payment online later. 
 
The common way we make online payment in the UK is to submit bank cards details, 
like card holder’s name, card number, expiry date, issue number / security code, postal 
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address etc to online merchants directly at the merchants’ website. Customers in the 
UK can make a purchase online without using online banking services. Banks are not 
normally involved in the transaction, although this is changing and with certain credit 
cards the purchaser is directed to the card-issuer’s site and required to provide a 
‘secure’ code for the transaction to proceed (examples of this service include 
‘NatWest Secure’, ‘Sainsburys Secure’ and ‘MBNA Secure’).   
 
Online shopping in China seems a little complicated because of the involvement of 
online banking at the start of the transaction. But that process does increase the 
security level for online users. Further solutions to secure online transactions in China 
are various depending on different financial organizations. The top three solutions are 
One-time PIN generator, Instant Text Message confirmation service and virtual 
keyboard as we learnt from the interviews with people who work inside financial 
industry in China.  
 
(1) One-time PIN generator 
A one-time PIN generator looks exactly like a mini U drive we use for data storage. 
Customers will get this small piece of equipment when their applications to online 
banking service are successful. Different from U drive, there is small screen 
embedded in the one-time PIN generator showing six-digit code which is used to 
identify online customers. More interesting, that six-digit code keeps changing every 
60 seconds which means that code customers typing to log on personal account online 
would be different every time. Except for username, password in general use for 
online banking service, one-time PIN works as an extra security check to protect 
customers.  
 
The one-time PIN generator is very small with long lasting battery and easy to be 
carried around, like to attach it on the key ring. With the promotions organized by 
different banks, customers usually get the one-time PIN generator as a complimentary 
gift when they apply for the online banking / financial service.  
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(2) Instant Text Message confirmation service 
Even bigger than the population of internet users, by the end of 2008 (XinHua News), 
the mobile users in China were 64 million of which about 18%, (ie 11.7 million) are 
accessing the internet using mobile networks. The leading mobile service providers in 
China (NetEase) estimate that the mobile phone will replace the computer as the 
primary means of internet access within 3 years in China.   
 
Not surprisingly, more and more banks have started to integrate mobile phone use 
with the provision of personal financial services. On 1st June 2006 (Guo 2008), the 
China Construction Bank, one of the big four state owned banks in China, launched an 
instant financial message service for all customers including account alert, service 
reminder, transaction confirmation etc. On 12th November 2006 (Guo 2008), the 
leading mobile service provider, China Mobile was the first to start a campaign for 
instant financial message service.   
 
Through the interviews with people who work in the financial industry in China, we 
learnt more details about the instant financial message service. For example, 
customers can pick different functions, such getting an instant message if there is any 
balance change; or if there is any purchase online / in person; if there is any attempt to 
log on the online banking account. More specific, customers can set their own limits / 
standards for the amount of purchase, withdraw, overdraft etc. For instance, someone 
will get an instant message when any transaction beyond 5000 RMB (about £500) has 
occurred; another person might be more careful and he wants to be informed if there is 
any transaction beyond 500 RMB (about £50). The instant financial message service 
can be tailored very well to satisfy individuals’ requirements.  
 
(3) Virtual keyboard 
As virus / Trojans can copy / record characters and numbers when someone tries to 
log on the online banking account using the computer keyboard to type username / 
password, a virtual keyboard works as the extra protection for customers. One of the 
interviewees, a senior manager in a leading bank in China, expected that the virtual 
keyboard will replace the traditional computer keyboard for online banking service in 
the future.  
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When individuals open the logon web page of an online banking service, a small 
screen showing a keyboard appears and customers can enter log on information using 
this virtual keyboard provided by banks instead of the hardware keyboard attached to 
the computer. More advanced than the fixed hardware keyboard, the settings and 
orders of the characters and numbers of the virtual keyboard keep changing every time, 
which means customers don’t follow the same typing route every time.  
 
7.3.3 Online banking fraud in China 
In comparison to financial organizations, individuals are more vulnerable to 
fraudulent criminals than companies. There are mainly two types of online banking 
fraud in China (Yu, Gong 2004) targeting internet users: Phishing attacks and Virus / 
Trojan attacks: 
 
(1) Phishing attack 
Similar to phishing attacks in the UK discussed in chapters 2 and 3, phishing attacks 
in China also involving sending out millions of emails randomly asking for 
individuals’ banking information. Those malicious emails usually fake as authentic 
message from leading financial organizations and require sensitive information using 
the excuses like system update, security alert, and customer service etc. Some of the 
phishing emails look authentic, even containing links which are used to divert 
consumers directly to fake websites which look exactly like the authentic websites of 
financial organizations.  
 
(2) Virus / Trojan attack 
Working with a few leading anti-virus software companies in China, Police have 
arrested groups of suspects who are IT professionals working for criminals to create 
virus and trojans. These virus and trojans can be embedded into servers, web pages 
and free downloading documents. When internet users browse a malicious website, 
virus and trojans will be installed on users’ computers automatically. Once 
individuals’ computers have been infected, this malicious software can steal and send 
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back sensitive information to criminals instantly. They can even record the numbers 
and characters that individuals type online using the keyboard, capturing for example, 
usernames, passwords, PIN numbers, account numbers etc.  
 
For internet users who are careless or lack IT skills, vulnerable computers and servers 
are easily targeted by criminals on the internet. It is essential that individuals who 
invest in anti-virus software keep it up to date in order to protect the integrity of their 
systems.  
 
CNCERT / CC (CNCERT), the National Computer Network Emergency Response 
Technical Team / Coordination Center of China, was founded in 2000 under the 
supervision of Ministry of Information Industry of China. CNCERT is responsible for 
public network security nationwide. Also, it cooperates with international police force 
to against high-tech crimes.  
 
According to the 2007 annual report published by CNCERT on April 2008 
(Huanqiu.com), the incidents of website hijacking have been increasing alarmingly 
from 2003 to 2007 in the China mainland:  
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Figure 7.3 Accidents of website hijack in China 
 
In 2007, 61,228 incidents were detected by CNCERT which exposed the vulnerability 
of websites in China mainland. Among those websites which have been hijacked in 
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2007, 3407 out of 61,228 targeted local government websites (CNCERT). Some 
websites even have been attacked repeatedly, causing both financial loss and 
reputation damage.  
 
The hackers conducting those attacks in China are from different countries worldwide. 
Among the top ten hackers / hacker groups discovered by CNCERT in 2007 
(CNCERT), three are from China mainland while the other seven are organized 
hackers with strong religious motivations from Turkey. 
 
In 2007 (CNCERT), 1,326 incidents of fake websites were reported to CNCERT 
worldwide, with 394 complaints being resolved successfully. Most of those attacks 
targeted the leading financial organizations, such as banks and online payment 
associations. For example, someone set up a fake website of HSBC using a server 
located in China to send out millions of phishing emails to bank customers in the UK. 
It is easy for criminals to commit crime cross border but very hard for any legal 
authorities to start an investigation overseas efficiently.  
 
With the support from the central government in China (CNCERT), CNCERT 
established an online community for information collection and security backup in 
2005 inviting different organizations from different industries, such as universities, IT 
companies, retailers etc. Till December 2007(CNCERT), the total 60 organizations 
have registered and become the members of CNCERT community.  
 
7.3.4 Online banking fraud cases in China 
In this section, we paraphrase some cases of fraud involving online banking from 
examples given in the Chinese banking literature. 
 
Case 1 (Guo 2008, p61): 
1st, August 2005 in Yi Zhou, Northern China, Mr. X found out that 23,000 RMB 
(about £2,300) was stolen from his online banking account. One month later, the 
suspect was arrested in Guang Zhou, Southern China. The suspect had hijacked 
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hundreds of bank accounts and stolen 400,000 RMB (about £40,000) in total within 
seven months.  
  
Case 2 (Guo 2008): 
9th, December 2004, a malicious website (www.1cbc.com.cn) which was designed to 
look like the authentic website of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(www.icbc.com.cn) was set up overnight.  This bank, which is one of the big four 
state owned banks in China, is spread throughout the whole country and the false 
website caused serious damage to the bank both financially and in terms of loss of 
confidence. On the fake website www.1cbc.com.cn, customers were asked to type in 
their account number and password. Then an online notice appeared announcing that 
the system has been suspended due to security reason but would come back to normal 
in 24 hours. During this period considerable amounts of money were taken out of 
customers’ accounts and extracted from the bank. 
 
Case 3 (Yu, Gong 2004): 
May 2005 in Nan Jin, one suspect was arrested by local Police. After further 
investigation, three more suspects were arrested in two other cities in different 
provinces in China. These four criminals were in their thirties and had expertise in 
computer systems and networks. They created and sent out Trojan and virus software 
on the internet, in particular targeting the servers and websites of financial 
organizations. At the first attack conducted on 7th, April 2005, they gained account 
information and passwords illegally within hours after the attack and stole 48000 
RMB (about £4800) using online transfer / online banking services. 
 
These cases illustrate some major potential weaknesses in online banking systems, 
particularly the use of fake websites and Trojan or virus attacks. Clearly customers 
need to exercise extreme vigilance when making online banking transactions. 
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7.4 Similarities and Contrasts between the transactions 
environment in China and the UK.  
7.4.1 Fixed interest rate or not  
According to the interviews we did in China, the profit that banks or credit card 
companies in China make from credit card interest amounts to around one third of 
total profits, whereas in the UK it amounts to approximately half of the profits.  The 
rest of the profits are generated by the merchants’ fee, the cardholders’ annual fees 
and other administration fees. In contrast to western countries, in China the APR 
(annual percentage rate of charge), which varies from credit card to credit card, is 
fixed by the authority of central government. In other words, all financial 
organizations in China are carrying the same interest rate of credit card for individuals. 
The current interest rate on credit cards in China is 0.05%9 per day, which amounts to 
around 20% per year on a compound basis.  
 
In contrast to the financial markets in China, financial organizations in the UK enjoy 
more flexibility about the price and rate of credit card services. The average APR in 
America is around 10.84% which has been decreased from 14% in the recent two 
years (52xyk.com.cn).  In the UK, credit card offers vary from card type, such as 
classic, gold, platinum etc, each with a different customer profile.  The tables below 
show the APR borrowing rates offered by financial organizations such as Natwest, 
HSBC and Barclays.   
 
Table 7.2 Barclays credit cards 
(source: (Barclaycard)) 
Type of credit card APR (purchase) APR (cash withdraw) 
Platinum 12.4% 27.9% 
Flexi-rate 14.9% 27.9% 
Classic 19.9% 27.9% 
Initial 27.9% 27.9% 
 
                                                 
9 http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/42398279.html?fr=ala0  (accessed on 18/05/2010) 
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Table 7.3 HSBC credit cards 
(source: (HSBC)) 
Type of credit card APR (purchase) APR (cash withdraw) 
HSBC 16.9-19.9% 23.9-24.7% 
Premium 11.9% 11.9% 
Student 18.9% 23.6% 
 
Table 7.4 Natwest credit cards 
(source: (Natwest)) 
Type of credit card APR (purchase) APR (cash withdraw) 
Classic 16.95% 27.95% 
Gold 16.95% 27.95% 
Platinum 16.95% 27.95% 
Student 18.95% 27.95% 
Black 13.15% 16.56% 
Saving accelerator 16.95% 27.95% 
Advantage gold 15.94% 27.95% 
 
Through the tables above, it is easy to find out that the low annual interest rates apply 
to low risk customers who must reach certain levels of financial standing to be eligible. 
Banks can use a range of measures to decide on an appropriate credit limit, whereas 
the APR is a published rate for the type of credit card the individual holds. For 
individuals who have bad credit history, they would only be eligible to apply for cards 
with an extremely high interest rate to get credit card services and to repair their credit 
records. There are several financial organizations that target individuals who have 
poor credit history. For example, Vanquis Visa Credit Card (Vanquis) claims that they 
aim to help people who have a history of bad credit, a bad credit rating (including 
CCJ’s—County Court Judgments) and a low income by offering an annual interest 
rate of 39.94% for purchases and 49.94% for cash withdrawals.  
 
As the interest rates are fixed for the whole credit card market in China, there is no 
possibility of there being a spectrum of rates aimed at individuals with varying 
degrees of credit-worthiness. Inevitably, a fixed interest rate reduces the flexibilities 
of the financial market and the competitiveness of financial organizations in China. 
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But it helps to keep a relative stable market environment for both financial 
organizations and individuals in China. Considering the immature financial market 
and inexperienced consumers, a fixed interest rate works on a positive way to prevent 
potential risks and vicious competition. This might change in the future as the market 
becomes more mature. 
 
On the other hand, banks have to take customers seriously to make more profits due to 
the fixed interest rate in China. Without any possible leverage of prices and rates, 
banks have to make full use of any opportunity to maintain current customers and to 
recruit new customers. They offer customers a bewildering choice of tailored financial 
products and services.  At the website of the China Merchants Bank, we found out 12 
different categories of credit card, under each of 12 categories, offering different 
benefits. For instance, one category is designed for female customers only and 
contains eight different credit card deals combined with membership of shopping 
malls, fashion magazines, leisure centres etc. As introduced proudly by one of the 
interviewees, there are more than 100 credit card deals with varied benefits and 
appearances available for individuals in different age groups, gender, occupations, 
hobbies and lifestyles. There is professional advice both online and in branches to help 
individuals to choose suitable credit card deals.  
 
7.4.2 Selection of customers for credit card application 
Customer selection, also referred to as customer assessment, is the first priority of risk 
control of a credit card service – something which was emphasized again and again 
during the interviews in China. Having observed the development of modern finance 
in Western countries for decades, Chinese financial organizations have learnt from 
international competitors and started their own journey carefully.  Alerted by the 
global credit crunch, risk control and customer selection have become the most 
important strategies for every financial service provider in China.  
 
One key problem, however, is that China did not have a personal credit record system. 
Challenged by the increase of financial crimes mainly targeting the credit card market 
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in 200410, the central financial administration department in Beijing of the People’s 
Bank of China started to compile a database of personal credit records in a few big 
cities in China. With the support of all the big four state-owned banks and leading 
domestic merchants, the personal credit records system has been building up rapidly 
across the nation since 2005.  By the end of 200611, it had accumulated personal 
financial information on 530 million people.  
 
There are three types of the information provided by the personal credit record system 
in China 12 : (1) Personal identity (e.g. name, ID number, residential address, 
occupation address etc.). (2) Personal loans / mortgage (e.g. loans / mortgage history, 
banking details etc.). (3) Credit cards record (e.g. issue banks, credit limit, payment 
records etc.). After those three main types of information have been established, the 
system will work on information collection about personal bills, e.g. utility bills, 
phone bills, income tax, etc. Although personal credit record system has had a good 
start, it will probably take decades to complete in view of the big population and 
uneven levels of development across China.  
 
With limited support from the still developing personal credit system, financial 
organizations have had to adopt extra measures to minimize financial risks associated 
with individuals. Credit scoring models are still in their infancy in China, and weight 
tends to be given to individual factors rather than combining them in a comprehensive 
model.  For example, ‘age’ has become an important factor along with occupation and 
of course income and asset levels. Interestingly, students’ credit card services have 
been temporarily suspended by all the leading banks because they do not have a stable 
income.  This contrasts to some extent with initiatives in the UK where university 
students have been targeted by banks, presumably on the basis that students will 
eventually move into well paid jobs and be good customers in the future.   
 
                                                 
10  http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/roll/20061208/11271088472.shtml (accessed on 18/05/2010) 
11 http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/lczx/20061120/05463091395.shtml (accessed on 18/05/2010) 
12 http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/lczx/20061120/05463091395.shtml (accessed on 18/05/2010) 
 212 
7.4.3 Risk management 
For any transactions made by internet banking or bank cards, risks could come from 
any party involved. All other things being equal, the more parties involved, the more 
the risks increase. Based on the interviews in China, we found that three strategies 
about risk control have been adopted by most financial organizations that provide 
internet banking and bank card services.  
 
(1) Insurance in bulk  
Insurance is an efficient and popular way to minimum the risks and losses for any 
individuals or organizations. As introduced by one of the senior manager who is in 
charge of one of the credit card centers in China, they opt for insurance to mitigate 
potential risks and losses caused by individuals. The price banks pay for insurance is 
much lower than any price in the high street because of the bulk purchase effect, so 
insurance costs less than one pound per credit card in China per year. According to the 
discussion with people who work within the financial industry, purchasing insurance 
is a good solution which benefits both financial organizations and insurance 
companies. It helps to control the banks’ potential liabilities while bringing profits to 
the insurance companies. Of course, as with any insurance contract, there are potential 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, and from the point of view of the 
insurance company, it is necessary that the bank does not lower its vigilance on 
customers just because it is insured (moral hazard), and that the banks that seek 
insurance are not those which have specific (undisclosed) risks (adverse selection). 
 
(2) Cost increases 
In contrast to the emerging banks that adopt the insurance solution, the big four state-
owned banks in China usually set aside an amount of profit (ie a reserve or 
contingency) just in case unexpected situations arise, such as the losses caused by a 
financial fraud scheme. This strategy has been confirmed by a senior employee who 
has been working within the financial industry in China for about 15 years. 
Considering the rather low fraud rate in China, a reserve is very convenient for 
keeping any problems quietly within the organization. The high interest rates charged 
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on credit cards are in effect a default premium, so in the normal course of business it 
is possible to cover any fraudulent losses and still make decent profits.  
 
From the perspective of financial organizations, any damage to their reputations or 
brands is usually more serious than the financial losses caused by the fraud. That 
explains why banks would usually help customers to deal with fraudulent cases and 
sort out everything confidentially. At the fist glance, the banks are trying to help 
customers to get justice by dealing with malicious merchants or criminals and by 
refunding customers. In fact, it could be argued that the financial organizations are 
trying to help themselves to save their own reputations.  
 
During the process of this study, we found it difficult to get accurate figures on 
financial fraud both in the UK and China. Although we can hear the stories about 
credit card fraud and read lots of tips and advice about bank card protection in 
newspapers, magazines, TV programmes, even booklets from the local banks, there is 
so little information about how bad the losses and damage caused by financial fraud 
have been. The information available from the newspapers might be just the tip of the 
iceberg, because the financial organizations involved would never be willing to share 
or release such information.  
 
That also explains why we must target individuals instead of the financial 
organizations for data collection. Generally speaking, people are more willing to share 
and spread the bad experiences than good ones they have had, such as purchases, 
accommodation, restaurants etc. As it has been proved by the data collection we have 
done, the respondents who have experienced financial fraud showed their interests in 
this study by providing detailed information and good quality replies.  
 
(3) Spread loss to other parties involving in the transaction process 
Whether a transaction takes place on the internet or in the physical world, it is very 
likely to have more than one financial organization involved, for example, payment 
systems and equipments installed in the shopping area might be managed and operated 
by different financial service providers. The cooperation among the financial 
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organizations brings convenience and efficiency to the individuals but it makes any 
case complicated if problems arise.  
 
In China, the losses usually are split to each related parties involved in any fraudulent 
transactions. For example, suppose a criminal used a stolen credit card and faked the 
signature to make a purchase in a shopping mall. When the original card holder who is 
innocent and has nothing to do with the fraud alerted his bank and reported the stolen 
credit card, credit card issuing bank, the merchants and the shopping mall and the 
clearance bank would work together to determine how to share the responsibilities and 
liabilities. For the merchants or shopping mall, they also have to share part of the loss 
because their employees who worked at the check out counter didn’t recognize the 
fake signature and authorized the fraudulent transaction.  
 
If the fraudulent transaction had been authorized by a PIN number instead of a 
signature, it means that the merchants would take very little, even no responsibilities 
for this fraudulent case. The share of losses among each parties involved would be 
different depending on the specific cases. In general, the original credit card holder 
would get a full refund if he / she obeys the credit card policies and is not implicated 
in the fraud.  
 
In contrast to the western countries, any online purchase in China must be connected 
with a valid online banking account whether using credit cards, debit cards or money 
transfers. Many banks are working together with reputable merchants to fight credit 
card fraud and online banking fraud. Individuals can find a detailed list and links to 
reputable merchants recommended by banks on the banks’ websites. The biggest 
advantage for individuals to make purchase with those recommended merchants is 
that there is an unconditional guarantee for product / service quality and transaction 
security.  
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7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has provided some detailed insights into the transactions systems and 
banking environment in China, and the differences with the systems and procedures in 
the UK. This provides a useful background as we now proceed to discuss the 
construction and analysis of the survey carried out in China. 
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Chapter 8 China Data Analysis and Summary 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we focus on the credit / debit card and electronic banking / payment 
services in China, the biggest emerging financial market worldwide. Compared to 
western countries, which have been developing financial framework for centuries, the 
financial industry and organizations in China are at the beginning of their evolution. 
However, unlike some of the Islamic countries, they have adopted the popular 
financial products used by western consumers, such as credit / debit cards, online 
banking, personal loans etc despite the fact that some of these products have security 
problems as discussed in the last chapter. It is therefore of particular interest to see 
how these products perform in a Chinese context and how they are perceived by those 
who use them. It is this question that is tackled in this chapter, in which a survey 
similar to the one conducted in the UK is conducted in China and the results analyzed. 
A comparison of the results together with a discussion of the difference of customers’ 
behaviour and attitudes to the online financial transactions and internet fraud is then 
presented in chapter 9. 
8.2 Data collection in China 
8.2.1 Sample Selection 
Confidentiality (‘customer protection’) laws in China meant that the survey had to be 
approached somewhat differently to that in the UK.  Help was solicited from a local 
bank in Xi’an, which was where the survey was conducted. Xi’an is a large city 
located in the central part of China and famous for its education resources and 
outstanding history (including the famous Terracotta Army).  The bank, which wishes 
not to be named for confidentiality reasons, assisted with the selection of bank 
customers for the survey, the sample consisting of a random selection of the bank’s 
customers who had experience of using credit / debit cards. The bank undertook the 
tasks of delivery and collection of the questionnaires, something that was necessary 
because of the rules on customer confidentiality. 500 questionnaires were sent out and 
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189 replies were received. Of these, 142 were fully completed, giving a valid response 
rate of 28.4%.  
 
In addition to the survey questionnaire, to provide context and to corroborate the 
results of the survey, three face-to-face interviews with senior officials working in the 
financial industry were conducted in different cities in China: one in Beijing (Bank A), 
one in Shanghai (Bank B) and one in Xi’an (Bank C). Opinions extracted from the 
interviews are generally corroborated with the analysis. 
 
8.2.2 Data collection bias 
As discussed in section 6.2.2 of chapter 6 (UK data analysis & summary), there are 
two types of data collection bias might appear in our study: selection bias and 
response bias. Compared to the national statistical figures in China, we noticed the 
differences when we look at the data of the respondents’ highest qualification and age 
distribution.  
 
The data showed that 64.8% of respondents had a BSc/ BA/ Prof. Qualification. 
However, the population in China has a much lower education level than developed 
countries as indicated in the report about the structure of the population in China 
(wltzq.gov.cn 2004), which showed that the highest qualification in terms of 
proportions of the population were: BSc/ BA degree, 5.42%; high A-level equivalent, 
12.59%; O-level equivalent, 36.93 and GCSE equivalent, 30.44%.  
 
Also, the age distribution of the respondents of the survey was: 52.11% from 21-30 
age group, 37.32% from 31-40 age group, 7.04% from 41-50 age group and 3.52% 
from 51-60 age group. The population structure of similar age groups in China (PR 
China 2009) was: 15.93% from 21-30 age group, 16.68% from 31-40 age group, 
15.50% from 41-50 age group and 11.98% from 51-60 age group. It suggests that the 
users / customers of bank card / internet banking in China as a whole are likely to be 
relatively young.  
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The two differences we discussed above are acceptable because the purpose of the 
survey was to target people who had experiences about financial transactions on the 
internet, either been defrauded or not. Supported by the associations found in later 
sections, younger / better educated individuals are more likely to access to the internet 
/ use bank cards and online banking services in China.  
 
8.3 Data analysis-summary (N=142) 
In this section we select a key variable and then look at its relationship with other 
variables in the same grouping, these groupings being IT skills, age, gender, highest 
qualification, education background, and usage of credit cards, usage of debit cards 
and usage of online activities. For example, in the section below, ‘IT skills’ is selected 
as the main variable. After looking at its distribution amongst the respondents, its 
relationship to age, then gender, being defrauded and highest qualification is 
investigated. 
 
As an initial step, we show below descriptive statistics of two variables: age and 
gender. 
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Table 8.1 Age * gender Crosstabulation (CHINA) 
 
   gender 
   male female Total 
Count 29 45 74 
% within age 39.2% 60.8% 100.0% 
% within gender 39.2% 66.2% 52.1% 
21-30years 
% of Total 20.4% 31.7% 52.1% 
Count 34 19 53 
% within age 64.2% 35.8% 100.0% 
% within gender 45.9% 27.9% 37.3% 
31-40years 
% of Total 23.9% 13.4% 37.3% 
Count 8 2 10 
% within age 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
% within gender 10.8% 2.9% 7.0% 
41-50years 
% of Total 5.6% 1.4% 7.0% 
Count 3 2 5 
% within age 60.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
% within gender 4.1% 2.9% 3.5% 
51-60years 
% of Total 2.1% 1.4% 3.5% 
Count 74 68 142 
% within age 52.1% 47.9% 100.0% 
% within gender 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
age 
Total 
% of Total 52.1% 47.9% 100.0% 
 
 
(1) Score of the general IT skill 
According to the report published by CNNIC (CNNIC) on December 2009, the 
number of internet users in China has increased rapidly from 59.1 million in 2002 to 
384 million by 2010. Internet has become an irreplaceable activity for people either 
for work or leisure in China. 
 
51.4% of respondents scored their general IT skills ‘average’. 22.5% and 9.2% scored 
‘good’ and ‘very good’. Only 12.7% admitted that the score of their IT skills was 
below the ‘average’ including ‘very poor’, ‘poor’ and ‘not good’.  
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Figure 8.1 Overview of the score of general IT skill 
 
(1.1) Score of the general IT skills and different age groups 
We split the variable ‘general IT skills’ into the different age groups, which have been 
categorized in the survey question as: <20 year; 21-30 years; 31-40 years; 41-50 years; 
51-60 years; 61-70 years and >71 years. The result is shown in Figure 8.2, in which 
the responses in each group are shown as a percentage of the total number of 
respondents (rather than as a percentage of the total in each age group) to show in 
addition how the numbers vary across each age group.  
 
As with the UK, the responses indicate that the older respondents are less confident 
with their IT skills. Chi-square analysis supported the hypothesis that the older people 
in China are more likely to have less IT skills because the correlation value is negative 
(-0.316) and significant (0.001).  
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Figure 8.2 Age vs. scores of IT skills 
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Table 8.2 Cross table of age and score of general IT skill 
   score of general IT skill 
   very poor poor not good average good very good excellent Total 
Count 1 1 2 34 24 7 5 74 
% within age 1.4% 1.4% 2.7% 45.9% 32.4% 9.5% 6.8% 100.0% 
21-30years 
% within score of general IT 
skill 
16.7% 50.0% 20.0% 46.6% 75.0% 53.8% 83.3% 52.1% 
Count 3 0 6 32 7 4 1 53 
% within age 5.7% .0% 11.3% 60.4% 13.2% 7.5% 1.9% 100.0% 
31-40years 
% within score of general IT 
skill 
50.0% .0% 60.0% 43.8% 21.9% 30.8% 16.7% 37.3% 
Count 1 0 1 5 1 2 0 10 
% within age 10.0% .0% 10.0% 50.0% 10.0% 20.0% .0% 100.0% 
41-50years 
% within score of general IT 
skill 
16.7% .0% 10.0% 6.8% 3.1% 15.4% .0% 7.0% 
Count 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 5 
% within age 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 40.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
51-60years 
% within score of general IT 
skill 
16.7% 50.0% 10.0% 2.7% .0% .0% .0% 3.5% 
Count 6 2 10 73 32 13 6 142 
% within age 4.2% 1.4% 7.0% 51.4% 22.5% 9.2% 4.2% 100.0% 
age 
Total 
% within score of general IT 
skill 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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(1.2) Score of the general IT skills and gender groups 
Figure 8.3 shows IT skill assessment split by gender.  There could be a bias if one 
gender is more modest about its self assessment than the other, but taking the 
responses at face value, a chi-square test did not find any significant relationship 
between gender and general IT skills (sig. value = 0.221 and correlation = -0.094).  
Probably the best way of assessing these responses is to look at them cumulatively 
from the right – ie to look at the proportions of each gender that assess their abilities at 
some threshold level or better.  If we take the range average or better, 86.5% of males 
see themselves as being in this range and 88.2% of females – ie very little difference. 
If we narrow this to good or better, there is a slightly larger difference, with 48.4% of 
males putting themselves in this category and 33.3% of females, the reason being that 
some males see their ability very much at the top end of the scale. 
 
Figure 8.3 Gender vs. score of IT skills 
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Table 8.3 Crosstable of gender and score of general IT skill 
   gender 
   male female Total 
Count 2 4 6 
% within score of general IT 
skill 
33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
very poor 
% within gender 2.7% 5.9% 4.2% 
Count 2 0 2 
% within score of general IT 
skill 
100.0% .0% 100.0% 
poor 
% within gender 2.7% .0% 1.4% 
Count 6 4 10 
% within score of general IT 
skill 
60.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
not good 
% within gender 8.1% 5.9% 7.0% 
Count 33 40 73 
% within score of general IT 
skill 
45.2% 54.8% 100.0% 
average 
% within gender 44.6% 58.8% 51.4% 
Count 16 16 32 
% within score of general IT 
skill 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
good 
% within gender 21.6% 23.5% 22.5% 
Count 9 4 13 
% within score of general IT 
skill 
69.2% 30.8% 100.0% 
very good 
% within gender 12.2% 5.9% 9.2% 
Count 6 0 6 
% within score of general IT 
skill 
100.0% .0% 100.0% 
excellent 
% within gender 8.1% .0% 4.2% 
Count 74 68 142 
score of general IT skill 
Total 
% within score of general IT 
skill 
52.1% 47.9% 100.0% 
 
(1.3) Score of general IT skills and fraud occurrence 
Most instances of fraud in the sample occurred to the respondents who were confident 
with their general IT skills. The most prominent green bars in the graph below fell into 
the categories to describe the general IT skills as ‘average (2 out of 7)’ and ‘good (4 
out of 7)’. A Chi-square test did not support this contention, the correlation being 
0.076 with a significance value of 0.430, indicating that there is no significant 
relationship between IT skill and fraud occurrence. The problem is that with so few 
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cases of fraud in the China sample, the likelihood of getting a significant test result is 
low as there are so few degrees of freedom. 
 
 
Figure 8.4 Fraud occurrence or not vs. score of IT skills 
 
 
(1.4) Score of the general IT skills and the highest qualification 
When we look at the purple and yellow bars which stand for BSc / BA and further 
degrees (e.g. MSc / PhD) in the figure below, the top three purple and yellow bars fell 
into the categories ‘average’, ‘good’ and ‘very good’. It indicated that respondents 
who have higher qualification are more confident with their general IT skills.  
 
The Chi-square test gave us the same evidence showing a significant positive 
relationship between the general IT skill and the highest qualification. The correlation 
value is 0.210 with a significance value of 0.017, suggesting that people who have 
higher qualifications are more confident with their general IT skills in China. 
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Figure 8.5 Highest qualifications vs. score of IT skills 
 
(2) Age 
Because of sensitivity to personal information, we set seven ranges of age for 
respondents to tick. For the age group <20 years and >71 years, they are less 
financially active than other 5 groups aged from 21 to 70 years. The following figure 
showed the age distribution of the survey data collected in China.  
 
In contrast to the age range in the UK data, no respondent in the China survey was 
aged over 60 years old. 74 (52.1%) respondents were younger than 31 years old. 53 
(37.3%) fell into the age group 31-40 years old. Only 10 respondents were from the 
41-50 year age group and the remaining 5 respondents were from the 51-60 year age 
group.  
 
 227 
 
Figure 8.6 Overview of age 
 
The figure suggests that the majority of the users of online financial transactions in 
China are young (21-30 years) and early middle-aged (31-40 years) individuals. As 
we would discuss in next chapter, the customers groups of modern finance products in 
China are college / university students, young and senior professionals. The age group 
21-30 years covers the students who are attending higher education and young 
professionals who have just started their careers after graduation. The individuals from 
the other group aged 31-40 years are experienced professionals with higher incomes 
than the 21-30 year group.  
 
(2.1) Age and fraud occurrence 
The figure below shows that fraud occurrence (green bars) is spread across different 
age groups. For the 142 valid responses in total, only seven respondents (4.9%) have 
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experienced actual financial fraud, two being from the ‘21-30 age group’ and the 
remaining five from the ‘31-40 age group’.  
 
 
Figure 8.7 Age vs. fraud occurrence or not 
 
However, using a chi-square test we didn't find any significant relationship between 
age difference and fraud occurrence based on the survey in China (correlation 0.107, 
sig. value is 0.201), again probably due to the low degrees of freedom in the test.  
 
Looking at the correlation between age and different online activities, we found 
significantly negative associations appeared between age and online shopping (r = -
0.296; Sig. = 0.000); internet banking (r = -0.257; Sig. = 0.002); downloading media 
(r = -0.174; Sig. = 0.038). The correlation table suggested that younger respondents 
are more likely to be involved in online activities, as one might expect.  
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(2.2) Age and Chip-and-PIN usage 
The Chip-and-PIN programme has not been introduced to the financial market in 
China yet, but the use of PIN numbers is widespread and has been for some time. The 
PIN number works with the card’s magnetic strip instead of an embedded chip as in 
the UK.  The difference is not discernible by the cardholder, but the magnetic strip is 
less secure than a chip and is potentially open to modification by fraudsters.  Any 
transaction made by a debit card requires the input of a six-digit PIN / password to get 
authorisation (as opposed to four digits with Chip and PIN systems).  For credit card 
payments, normally either a PIN / password or a signature is acceptable – clearly in 
the latter case the level of security is much lower.  
 
The respondents were not familiar with Chip-and-PIN programme by selecting the 
‘neither credit nor debit cards’ response to the use of Chip and PIN. In contrast, senior 
professionals within the financial industry in China are well aware of this new 
approach that was pioneered in France to improve the security level of card 
transactions. At one of the interviews in China, the interviewee mentioned that the 
Chip-and-PIN would be launched into China soon and the industry experts are 
working on a system tailored for the Chinese market.  
 
(2.3) Age and pay off credit card monthly 
The following table showed the distribution of whether or not individuals in the 
survey paid off their credit card balanced each month. 
 
Table 8.4 indicates that younger credit card holders might have a propensity not to pay 
off their credit card on a monthly basis. Whereas this is consistent with the lifecycle 
hypothesis, the numbers are too small to draw any general conclusions in this instance. 
The vast majority of respondents, ie 117 (84.8%), indicated that they would pay off 
the credit cards every month. 18 respondents (13%) said that sometimes they would 
pay off monthly and only three respondents (2.2%) said that they would not pay off 
the credit cards monthly.  
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Table 8.4 Pay off credit card or not monthly 
Whether pay off credit card or not monthly 
Age group 
No Sometimes Yes Total 
21-30 2 10 60 72 
31-40 1 7 44 52 
41-50 0 0 9 9 
51-60 0 1 4 5 
Total 3 18 117 138 
 
(3) Gender 
The total number of valid responses in the survey conducted in China was 142, of 
whom 74 (52.1%) respondents were male and 68 (47.9%) are female. The national 
statistical figure of gender difference in China was 51.5% (male) and 48.5% (female) 
in 2008 (CPDRC 2008). The difference in proportions between the census data and 
the survey sample is not significant at the 5% level (based on a binomial test, z = 
0.143) 
 
(3.1) Gender and fraud occurrence 
The figure below shows that four female and three male respondents experienced 
actual financial fraud. For the remaining 135 respondents who did not experience 
actual financial fraud, 71 were male and 64 were female. As expected given these 
small numbers, a chi-square test did not indicate any statistical significance in the 
gender difference.   
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Figure 8.8 Gender vs. fraud occurrence or not 
 
(4) Highest qualification 
The respondents were required to describe their highest qualification (if known) using 
the six categories provided. As previously reported, 92 (64.8%) respondents held BSc/ 
BA/ Prof. Quali; 29 (20.4%) respondents held further degrees; three (2.1%) 
respondents held a GCSE/ 0 LEVEL and 12 (8.5%) respondents held an A-level.  
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Figure 8.9 Overview of the qualifications of the respondents 
 
(4.1) Highest qualification and fraud occurrence 
The table below shows that the seven respondents who were defrauded were well 
educated, holding a degree like BSc/ BA or higher qualifications.   
 
Table 8.5 Qualification vs. fraud occurrence or not 
Qualification Fraud occurrence Fraud not occurrence Fraud rate 
No formal qualification 0 4 0 
GCSE / 0 level 0 3 0 
A level 0 12 0 
BSc / BA/ Prof. Quali. 5 87 5.4% 
Further degree 2 27 6.9% 
Not known 0 2 0 
Total 7 135 4.9% 
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Despite the apparently association between higher level qualifications and suffering 
fraud indicated in the table, no significant relationship is indicated by a chi-square test.  
 
 
Figure 8.10 Highest qualification vs. fraud occurrence or not 
 
(5) Education background is IT related or finance related 
This question was designed for the purpose of investigating whether or not a 
background in IT or finance would make any difference to the incidence of internet 
fraud experienced. 142 valid replies were collected: 56 (39.4%) respondents studied 
neither IT nor Finance; 61 (43%) respondents studied Finance; nine (6.3%) studied IT 
and 16 (11.3%) had an education background related to both IT and Finance. 
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Figure 8.11 Overview of Education background related to IT or finance 
 
(5.1) Education background is IT related / Finance related and fraud occurrence 
Of the seven individuals in the China survey who had experienced fraud, five (71.4%) 
studied finance; one had an education background related to both finance and IT and 
the other held an education background related to neither finance nor IT. Although not 
statistically significant because of the small number who had experienced fraud, there 
is a suggestion that those with a finance background might be more susceptible. 
 
(5.2) Relationship between IT / Finance background and age group 
The following diagram shows the relationship between IT / Finance background and 
age group. Given that both IT and Finance are modern disciplines the diagram shows 
the expected trend with no-one above the age of 51 having a background in these 
areas.  
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Figure 8.12 Education vs. age 
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Table 8.6 Cross table of age and education background 
   IT related or finance related 
   neither of them IT related Finance related both of them Total 
Count 27 6 34 7 74 
% within age(3.1) 36.5% 8.1% 45.9% 9.5% 100.0% 
21-30years 
% within IT related or finance 
related(3.4) 
48.2% 66.7% 55.7% 43.8% 52.1% 
Count 19 2 25 7 53 
% within age(3.1) 35.8% 3.8% 47.2% 13.2% 100.0% 
31-40years 
% within IT related or finance 
related(3.4) 
33.9% 22.2% 41.0% 43.8% 37.3% 
Count 5 1 2 2 10 
% within age(3.1) 50.0% 10.0% 20.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
41-50years 
% within IT related or finance 
related(3.4) 
8.9% 11.1% 3.3% 12.5% 7.0% 
Count 5 0 0 0 5 
% within age(3.1) 100.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
51-60years 
% within IT related or finance 
related(3.4) 
8.9% .0% .0% .0% 3.5% 
Count 56 9 61 16 142 
% within age(3.1) 39.4% 6.3% 43.0% 11.3% 100.0% 
age 
Total 
% within IT related or finance 
related(3.4) 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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(6) Usage of credit card 
(6.1) Number of credit card 
In the survey data, seven (4.9%) the Chinese respondents did not have any credit cards, 
the smallest number being zero and the highest was the surprisingly large number of 
20, the average being 2.68 credit cards per person.  In the Chinese economy as a 
whole, the average number of credit card held is the not dissimilar figure of 2.813. 
Returning to the survey data, approximately 10% of respondents had five or more 
credit cards, possibly reflecting the fact that different cards qualify for discounts in 
different outlets. 
 
 
Figure 8.13 Overview of number of credit cards owned 
 
                                                 
13 Source from a professional within the financial industry in China in 2009.  
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(6.2) Number of years of credit card usage 
135 out of 142 replies from China provided a figure for the number of years of credit 
card usage, ranging from one year to 15 years. The average length of credit card usage 
is 4.13 years, which is much lower than the average derived from the respondents in 
the UK (19.4 years) mainly because the credit cards usage have been popular for 
decades in western countries.  
 
Figure 8.14 Overview of number of years of credit card usage 
 
(6.3) Customers’ satisfaction with credit cards 
We used five scales (from 1 to 5) in both China and UK to measure the customers’ 
satisfaction with credit card services. 135 out of 142 respondents in China answered 
this question and the rest 7 respondents left the question blank. Those 135 valid data 
covered all five scales: not satisfied at all =1; not satisfied =2; average =3; satisfied =4 
and very satisfied =5.  
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117 (86.7%) gave positive responses to the credit card services as the following: 
39.3% average; 36.3% satisfied and 11.1% very satisfied.  This leaves over 13% who 
were not satisfied compared to only 3% in the UK survey. A possible explanation as 
learnt in one of the interviews in China, is that most complaints about credit card 
services were due to misunderstanding between customers and banks in such areas as 
interest calculations, the payment period and the service fee charge. As discussed in 
chapter 3 (section 3.3.4) many of the published ‘terms and conditions’ are vague about 
these and other important matters.   
 
Figure 8.15 Overview of customers’ satisfaction with credit card 
 
(6.4) Customers’ satisfaction in relation to fraud occurrence 
The green bars standing for the fraud appeared into the categories: average, satisfied 
and very satisfied. An interesting question is whether the satisfaction levels of those 
who had been defrauded differed from those who had not. Of the seven respondents 
who had been defrauded, three ticked ‘average’ to describe their satisfaction level 
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with the credit card service in China; three were satisfied with the credit card services 
and only one of these customers indicated that he or she was very satisfied with the 
credit card service in China. It does not seem therefore as though there is any 
systematic relation between satisfaction levels and whether or not a respondent had 
been defrauded, a fact that was supported by a formal chi-square test (sig value = 
0.884, r = 0.068).  
 
Figure 8.16 Customers’ satisfaction with credit card vs. fraud occurrence 
 
(7) Usage of debit cards 
(7.1) Number of debit cards 
142 of the respondents indicated their possession of debit cards, the lowest number 
being zero and the highest 10, which is rather more than the highest number for the 
UK of 6. The average number of debit cards held per person is 3.32 based on the 
survey data while 2.614 is the official number of debit card held per person in China.  
                                                 
14 Source from a professional within the financial industry in China in 2009. 
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These averages are again higher than those for the UK, which were 1.63 for the survey 
sample and an ‘official’ average of 1.6.  The implication is that the respondents to the 
China survey had more bank accounts, which might be explained by the tendency for 
people changing jobs to open a new bank account for salary payments by their new 
employer, rather than to use existing bank accounts. 
 
In comparison to the finding in the previous section that only 7 (4.9%) of the Chinese 
respondents did not have any credit cards, only one individual (0.7%) did not have any 
debit cards. In the survey sample, the average number of debit cards held, which was 
3.32, exceeded the average number of credit cards, 2.68, suggesting that debit cards 
are more popular than credit cards in China. This contrasts with the position in the UK, 
where very few people hold more than two debit cards. 
 
Figure 8.17 Overview of number of debit card owned 
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(7.2) History of debit card use 
141 respondents provided the number of years of debit card usage, the lowest being 
one year and the highest 30 years. The average length of debit card usage in the China 
sample is 8.13 years, which is much shorter than in the UK sample where the average 
length of debit card usage was about 18.1. This partly reflects that fact that debit cards 
are comparatively new in China, but also is a consequence of the age distribution of 
the UK sample, where there were relatively more respondents in the higher age 
categories. 
 
 
Figure 8.18 Overview of number of years of debit card usage 
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(7.3) Customers’ satisfaction with debit cards 
We used five scales (from 1 to 5) to measure the customers’ satisfaction with debit 
card services. 141 respondents in China answered this question and only 1 respondent 
left the question blank. The 141 valid responses were spread over five scales (not 
satisfied at all=1; not satisfied=2; average=3; satisfied=4 and very satisfied=5). 130 
respondents (92.2%) gave positive responses as follows: 43.3% average; 39.0% 
satisfied and 9.9% very satisfied. This leaves 7% who were not satisfied compared to 
about 2% in the UK sample. As reported by ‘Morning Shanghai (Netease 2008)’ on 
04 Oct. 2008, one of the leading newspapers in China, debit cards service is not free 
any more. Banks started to announce that service charge of debit card usage will be 
adjusted in the following week in order to encourage individuals’ usage of debit cards. 
Similar comments given by an interviewee in China, banks were trying to make 
customers to usage debit card more frequently by increasing the service / 
administration charge, in particular targeting the individuals who only make card 
transaction occasionally.  
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Figure 8.19 Customers’ satisfaction with debit card usage 
 
(7.4) Customers’ satisfaction with debit cards relative to fraud occurrence 
The question of interest is whether those who had been defrauded had similar or 
altered levels of satisfaction compared to those who had not.  In the diagram below, 
the green bars representing those who had been defrauded appeared were in the three 
categories: average, satisfied and very satisfied. In other words, individuals who have 
been defrauded gave out more positive comments about the satisfaction with the debit 
card service in China than those who had not, suggesting that defrauded customers are 
generally pleased with how the banks / credit card companies dealt with fraudulent 
incidents. Again, because of the low number of defrauded customers, the statistical 
test for association did not register a significant result. 
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Figure 8.20 Customers’ satisfaction with debit card vs. fraud occurrence 
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Table 8.7 Cross table of customers satisfaction and fraud occurrence 
   fraud occurrence 
   not occurrence occurrence Total 
Count 2 0 2 
% within satisfied or not with debit 
card 
100.0% .0% 100.0% 
not satisfied at all 
% within fraud occurrence 1.5% .0% 1.4% 
Count 9 0 9 
% within satisfied or not with debit 
card 
100.0% .0% 100.0% 
not satisfied 
% within fraud occurrence 6.7% .0% 6.4% 
Count 57 4 61 
% within satisfied or not with debit 
card 
93.4% 6.6% 100.0% 
average 
% within fraud occurrence 42.5% 57.1% 43.3% 
Count 53 2 55 
% within satisfied or not with debit 
card 
96.4% 3.6% 100.0% 
satisfied 
% within fraud occurrence 39.6% 28.6% 39.0% 
Count 13 1 14 
% within satisfied or not with debit 
card 
92.9% 7.1% 100.0% 
very satisfied 
% within fraud occurrence 9.7% 14.3% 9.9% 
Count 134 7 141 
satisfied or not with debit card 
Total 
% within satisfied or not with debit 
card 
95.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
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(8) Usage of online activities 
In this section, the connection between experiencing fraud and use of a range of online 
activities is explored, to explore the extent to which the use of online services is 
associated with the propensity to be defrauded.  
 
Table 8.8 Usage of online activities in relation to fraud occurrence 
Usage of online activities 
Online activities 
Yes No 
Correlation with 
being defrauded 
Sig. 
Internet banking 98 (69%) 44 (31%) -0.058 0.490 
Online shopping 93 (65.5%) 49 (34.5%) 0.165 0.049* 
Downloading media 119 (83.8%) 23 (16.2%) 0.080 0.889 
Online education service 80 (56.3%) 62 (43.7%) 0.004 0.965 
*significant at the 5% level 
 
(8.1) Usage of internet banking 
Within the 142 respondents, 44 (31%) did not using internet banking while 98 (69%) 
were using the internet banking. The Chi-square test showed that there is no 
significant relationship between the usage of internet banking and fraud occurrence in 
China because the sig. value is 0.486 and suggests that internet banking users are not 
at higher risk of internet fraud occurrence than non-users in China. 
 
(8.2) Usage of online shopping / frequency of usage of online shopping 
49 out of 142 (34.5%) respondents were not using online shopping and 93 (65.5%) 
respondents were using online shopping. Also, the Chi-square test suggested that a 
significant positive relationship at the 5% level between the usage of online shopping 
and fraud occurrence (sig. value is 0.049, correlation value is 0.165). It suggests that 
online shopping users are at higher risk of internet fraud occurrence in China. 
 
(8.3) Usage of downloading media 
23 (16.2%) out of 142 respondents are not downloading media from the internet and 
119 (83.8%) respondents are downloading media online. No significant relationship 
was found between the usage of downloading media and fraud occurrence because the 
sig. value is 0.888 and suggests that downloading media users are not at higher risk of 
internet fraud occurrence than non-users in China. 
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(8.4) Usage of online education service 
62 (43.7%) out of 142 respondents are not using online education services and 80 
(56.3%) respondents are using online education services in China. We did not find a 
significant relationship between the usage of online education service and fraud 
occurrence, suggesting that online education service users are not at higher risk of 
internet fraud occurrence than non-users in China. 
 
(8.5) Correlations between online activities vs. age 
Table 8.9 shows the correlations between selected online activities and age. The 
significantly negative associations appear between age and three out of four listed 
online activities, these being: online shopping (r = -0.296; Sig. =0.000); internet 
banking (r = -0.257; Sig. = 0.002) and downloading media (r = -0.174; Sig. = 0.038). 
However, the use of online education services was not correlated to age (r = 0.024; 
Sig. = 0.776). In summary, the correlation table suggested that younger respondents 
are more likely to be involved in online shopping, internet banking and downloading 
media.  
 
Table 8.9 also shows correlations between different online activities. Usage of online 
shopping is positively related to usage of internet banking (r = 0.443, sig. = 0.000); 
usage of online education services (r = 0.227, sig. =0.007) and also usage of 
downloading media (r = 0.204, sig. = 0.015). The usage of internet banking is 
positively related to usage online education services (r = 0.178, sig. = 0.034) and 
usage of downloading of media (r = 0.160, sig. = 0.057). Usage of online education 
services is positively related to usage of downloading media (r = 0.307, sig. = 0.000). 
These results are much as expected, with use of all the online activities being 
inversely correlated with age, which is the main driver.  
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Table 8.9 Spearman correlation table (online activities and age) 
   
usage of online 
shopping 
usage of internet 
banking 
usage of online 
education 
services 
usage of 
downloading 
media 
age 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .443
**
 .227
**
 .204
*
 -.296
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .007 .015 .000 
usage of online shopping 
N 142 142 142 142 142 
Correlation Coefficient .443
**
 1.000 .178
*
 .160 -.257
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .034 .057 .002 usage of internet banking 
N 142 142 142 142 142 
Correlation Coefficient .227
**
 .178
*
 1.000 .307
**
 .024 
Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .034 . .000 .776 
usage of online education 
services 
N 142 142 142 142 142 
Correlation Coefficient .204
*
 .160 .307
**
 1.000 -.174
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .015 .057 .000 . .038 usage of downloading media 
N 142 142 142 142 142 
Correlation Coefficient -.296
**
 -.257
**
 .024 -.174
*
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002 .776 .038 . 
Spearman's rho 
age 
N 142 142 142 142 142 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).      
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).      
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8.4 Fraudulent cases 
The last three survey questions in the section (3) of the questionnaire concerned 
personal information about actual fraud, attempted fraud and different schemes of the 
attempted fraud. 7 of the 142 respondents had experienced actual financial fraud and 
61 respondents had experienced attempted fraud. This information is analyzed below.  
 
8.4.1 Occurrence of attempted financial fraud  
The attempted financial fraud we are referring to is the situation in which criminals 
tried to defraud anyone or any organization but do not succeed in causing money 
losses. Techniques used include spam emails, internet hijacking and virus Trojan 
attacks. 61 out of 142 (43%) respondents admitted that they had experienced 
attempted financial fraud. 
 
The questionnaire contained six measurements to capture the frequency with which 
the respondent was confronted with attempts at particular types of fraud, ie Never, 
Yearly, Quarterly, Monthly, Weekly and Daily. Seven different types of fraud were 
listed.  
 
Table 8.10 Occurrence of attempted fraud using different schemes 
How often do you experience attempted fraud? (N=142) 
Fraudulent schemes 
Never Yearly Quarterly Monthly Weekly Daily 
Card cloned 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
ID theft 97.2% 1.4% 0 1.4% 0 0 
Scam post / junk mail 62% 7.7% 10.6% 8.5% 9.2% 2.1% 
Phishing emails / spam emails 71.1% 5.6% 6.3% 5.6% 6.3% 4.9% 
Fake websites / internet hijacking 88% 6.3% 1.4% 3.5% 0.7% 0 
Lost / stolen bank cards 95.1% 4.2% 0.7% 0 0 0 
Virus / Trojan attack 64.8% 4.2% 7.7% 9.2% 9.2% 4.9% 
 
Table 8.10 showed that in China the least occurring attempted fraud is card cloning 
(0%) and the most frequent is scam post / junk mail (38%), whereas in the UK 
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phishing is the most frequent. The second most frequent attempted fraud is a virus / 
Trojan attack (35.2%), with phishing / spam emails in third place (29.9%), followed 
by fake websites / internet hijacking (12%). The percentages of lost / stolen card and 
ID theft are very close at 4.9% and 3.8%. More detailed comparison with the UK 
findings is left to the next chapter. 
 
As we look at the Table 8.11, showing the correlation between the incidence of virus 
attack and various online activities, the statistical results indicated that in China online 
shopping and online education service were correlated to attempted virus / Trojan 
attacks.  
 
Table 8.11 Correlation table of online activities and attempted virus / Trojan attack 
Attempted virus / Trojan attack 
Online activities 
Correlation (r) Sig. value 
Usage of internet banking 0.103 0.224 
Usage of online shopping 0.211 0.012 
Usage of downloading media 0.124 0.142 
Usage of online education 
service 
0.220 0.009 
 
8.4.2 Occurrence of actual financial fraud (N=7) 
(1) Summary of real financial fraud 
7 out of 142 respondents in China had experienced actual financial fraud, ie 4.9% of 
the respondents. In monetary terms, the losses suffered from each incidence of fraud 
ranged from RMB 10 (£1) to RMB 7800 (£780), with an average of RMB 1240 
(£124). As will be discussed later, 57.2% of the defrauded customers received 
compensation for their loss.  
 
(2) Time series of occurrence of fraudulent cases 
The earliest fraud reported by the respondents to the survey occurred in 2004; 
followed by two in 2005, one in 2006, one in 2007 and two in 2008. Compared to the 
proportion of respondents in the UK sample that had experienced fraud, ie 21.4%, the 
incidence of online financial fraud in China seems not to be that serious. However, as 
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was made clear in the face-to-face interviews, senior professionals in the financial 
industry in China are concerned about the potential growth of financial fraud, 
particularly in relation to online transactions. Considering the big population and large 
market in China, event a slight increase in the occurrence of fraud could involve large 
monetary losses.  
 
(3) Weekday versus weekend incidence of fraudulent transactions 
For the 7 fraudulent cases collected using the survey questionnaire in China, 2 of the 7 
instances (28.6%) occurred at the weekend (8am-1pm). The remaining 5 cases were 
spread over the other five days. Although it has not been possible to obtain any hard 
data on this, the opinion given in the interviews in China is that the weekend (8am-
1pm) is usually the most popular time for individuals to make financial transactions 
including shopping and banking activities.  
 
5 of 7 fraudulent cases involved physical presentation of bank cards / ID.  It appears, 
from the interview discussions, that currently the majority of card fraud in China, 
unlike in the UK, is ‘card present’ fraud, particularly involving lost-and-stolen cards.  
Criminals obtain victim’s banks card / ID illegally to start further fraud so the 
weekend time period tends to be targeted by criminals due to the overcrowded 
situation in public places, e.g. shopping malls and public transportation. 
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Figure 8.21 Fraudulent transactions occurrence in weekdays or weekends 
 
(4) Where does the fraud take place? 
In response to the question asking ‘where do you know / believe the fraud took place’, 
five out of the seven respondents (71.4%) believed that the fraud they experienced 
took place in a public place, for example, stations, stores, airports, petrol stations and 
bars. One respondent believed that they were defrauded at home and one believed that 
the fraud took place in their work place. 
 
(5) How soon after the event was the fraud was discovered?  
The table and figure below showed that 3 (42.9%) fraudulent cases were discovered 
within 12 hours; 1 (14.3%) was within 24 hours; 2 (28.6%) within 7 days and 1 
(14.3%) within 4 weeks.  Thus 4 out 7 (57.1%) fraud cases were discovered within 24 
hours, the UK comparator being 36.2%. However, given the low number of actual 
fraud cases in China it is not possible to draw any relative conclusions about the speed 
of detection in the UK and China from these figures. 
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Table 8.12 How soon after the fraud was discovered? 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
within 12 hours 3 42.9 42.9 42.9 
within 24 hours 1 14.3 14.3 57.1 
within 7 days 2 28.6 28.6 85.7 
4 weeks later 1 14.3 14.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 7 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
Figure 8.22 How soon after the event was the fraud was discovered? 
 
As discussed in chapter 7, in which financial systems in China are discussed, the 
widespread use of mobile phone messages from the bank to the individual helps 
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individuals to be aware of any suspicious transactions almost in real time. In addition, 
local branches with staff service are open 7 days a week from 8-8 on weekdays and 9-
6 on weekends, so assistance is available on a face-to-face basis.  Also, self-service 
(no bank staff service) bank branches open 24/7 and customers can gain access to the 
building by swiping their bank cards. In the UK, card security services are available 
on a 24/7 basis by telephone but bank opening hours are more limited.  
 
(6) Which type of fraud scheme was used?  
Six most popular fraud schemes were listed: phishing email / spam emails; fake 
websites / internet hijacking; virus / Trojans; lost / stolen bank cards; card clone and 
card ID theft. Also, we provided blank space for respondent to fill in any other 
information if necessary. None of the seven replies was defrauded by phishing emails 
/ spam emails which suggested that the respondents in the China survey were aware of 
this type of fraud scheme.  
 
The top three fraud schemes suggested by seven respondents who had experienced 
actual fraud are web hijacking, lost-and-stolen card and ID theft. Two respondents 
(28.6%) experienced web hijacking fraud; two (28.6%) suffered from lost-and-stolen 
scheme and two (28.6%) were caught by card ID theft. Only one (14.3%) case 
occurred as the result of a card clone scheme. 
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Figure 8.23 Which type of fraud scheme was used? 
 
(7) Which type of payment method was used in this case 
Five options for payment method were listed for the question asking for the payment 
method used for the fraud. These were: credit card; debit card; pre-paid card; cheque 
and secure internet payment (e.g. PayPal). Also we offered blank space to respondents 
to add any additional comments, but this was not used.  The responses indicated that 
in three cases credit cards were involved and in one case a debit card. 
 
At the end of 2009, card payments (Sohu News) constituted 25% of the volume of 
personal transactions in China, while in the UK the plastic card payment share reached 
66.5% of total retail sales (The UK Cards Association 2010, March 2010).  
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Figure 8.24 Which type of payment method was used? 
 
(8) Did any parties compensate you? 
We received 7 valid replies to the question asking whether defrauded individuals got 
any compensation or not. Three respondents (42.9%) got compensation from the bank 
or credit-card company and one respondent (14.3%) got compensation from the 
merchant instead. The other three respondents, whose losses were RMB 70, 30 and 
120 (approximately £7, £3 and £12), did not get any compensation.  
 
Although there is variation in practice as noted in section 3.3.4, most financial 
organizations in China apply a fraud claim policy which strictly limits the claim 
period. For example, some banks apply a 48-hour claim period starting from the time 
of the fraud occurrence. If customers report the fraudulent cases within this period, the 
banks will refund the amount immediately unless the evidence shows that customers 
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were involved into the fraud or acted irresponsibly. After 48 hours, refund / 
compensation is decided after further discussions between the individual and the bank. 
 
Figure 8.25 Did any party compensate you? 
 
The professionals within the financial industry in China strongly supported the fraud 
refund policies currently applied. Also, they were very confident that with the latest 
technology, staff training and customers’ education programmes, they had invested 
sufficiently to safeguard against widespread financial fraud in China.  
 
(9) Awareness of different type of financial fraud 
We used five scales (from 1 to 5) to measure the degree of awareness of types of 
financial fraud. Three out of seven defrauded respondents (42.9%) scored ‘not really’ 
to describe their awareness of types of financial fraud. two (28.6%) respondents ticked 
‘average’ to describe their awareness of types of financial fraud.  
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Figure 8.26 Awareness of different type of fraud 
 
As suggested by the figure above, 57.1% of respondents in China who experienced 
actual fraud were still not aware of the mechanism by which they were defrauded. 
One explanation is that fraudulent cases rarely occur and do not get noticed by most 
people. Another explanation is that banks do not want to share detailed information 
about fraud cases with anyone, including their customers, to preserve confidentiality 
and business reputation. As long as customers get a fully refund, that works as a 
happy ending for everyone and the fraud case can be closed quietly.  
 
(10) Satisfaction with the bank / credit card company in dealing with fraud 
Considering the refund / compensation arranged by banks / credit card companies, it 
would be reasonable to assume that individuals who had experienced fraud should be 
more likely to feel satisfied with the banks / credit card companies. Although, as 
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before, generalizations from such as small sample could be misleading, the responses 
from the survey do not seem to support this view.  
 
Five out of seven fraud cases (71.4%) scored their satisfaction with the bank / credit 
card company response as being below average, the other responses being just 
‘average’.  Interestingly, two of the defrauded customers who did get compensation 
were nevertheless not satisfied with the way that the bank / credit card company 
handled the situation, possibly because of the effort they had to go through to get the 
compensation. 
 
This contrasts with the responses in the UK survey, where respondents who had 
suffered fraud seemed very satisfied with the response of the bank / credit card 
company. 
 
Figure 8.27 How satisfied with banks / credit card companies / in dealing with fraud 
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8.5 Fraud occurrence model (N=142) 
In this section, we are trying to build up a model to explain and predict fraud 
occurrence based on the associations and correlations between different variables. 
 
8.5.1 Tests for associations and correlations (chi-square test) 
We being our more formal testing by looking at the association between pairs of 
variables to get a better understanding of the responses. In some cases we are looking 
at the correlation between the explanatory variables to explore the extent to which 
they are multicollinear, but generally we are looking at associations between the 
incidence of fraud (which is the main variable we are trying to explain) and the other 
variables in the survey. To accomplish this we use a Chi-square (χ2) test to test the 
association, although we could also have used an F-test.    
 
The following table shows the Chi-square test results including Chi-square value, 
significance value, and explanations based on the results. We use three examples to 
explain the table in details: firstly, we look at the row starting with general IT skills vs. 
age (Chi-square value = 14.317; Sig. = 0.001; r = -0.316 and sig. = 0.000). This 
suggests that there is a negative and significant relationship between general IT skill 
and age, implying that younger individuals are more likely to have better IT skills. 
 
The Chi-square test concerning the association between usage of online shopping and 
fraud occurrence (Chi-square value = 3.879; Sig. = 0.049; r = 0.165 and sig. = 0.0496) 
is telling a different story. The r value is positive, suggesting that people who make 
purchase on the internet are more likely to experience fraud and the correlation is 
significant at the 5% level.  
 
We could not discover any significant association between education background (IT / 
Finance related) and fraud occurrence (Sig. = 0.221 / 0.268). It was initially suggested 
that respondents who had an education background in either IT or Finance might have 
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an advantage in avoiding financial fraud on the internet, but this was not supported by 
the data. 
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Table 8.13 Chi-square test 
Variable Pearson Sig. Correlation Sig. Implication 
General IT skill* vs. Age 14.317 0.001 -0.316 0.000 
Younger respondents are more likely to have higher general 
IT skill 
General IT skill vs. Fraud occurrence 1.686 0.430 0.076 0.366 No significant relationship was found  
General IT skill vs. Highest qualification* 15.487 0.017 0.210 0.012 
Respondents with higher qualification are more likely to 
have higher IT skills 
Age* vs. Fraud occurrence 1.635 0.201 0.107 0.204 No significant relationship was found  
Usage of internet banking vs. Fraud occurrence 0.485 0.486 -0.058 0.490 No significant relationship was found  
Usage of online shopping vs. Fraud occurrence 3.879 0.049 0.165 0.049 
Respondents who are using online shopping are more likely 
to be defrauded on the internet 
Usage of downloading media vs. Fraud occurrence 0.020 0.888 0.012 0.889 No significant relationship was found  
Usage of online education vs. Fraud occurrence 3.097 0.377 0.122 0.148 No significant relationship was found  
IT/Finance related background vs. Fraud occurrence 3.018 0.221 -0.094 0.268 No significant relationship was found  
General IT skill vs. Gender 0.253 0.615 0.042 0.50 No significant relationship was found  
Gender vs. Fraud occurrence 1.378 0.711 0.074 0.381 No significant relationship was found  
Highest qualification vs. Fraud occurrence 0.002 0.965 0.004 0.965 No significant relationship was found  
*variable has been combined and recoded to avoid inaccurate test result (e.g. Age/IT skill) 
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8.5.2 Logistic regression model 
In this section we are trying to build up a model to explain the propensity for 
individuals to be subjected to financial fraud.  The dependent variable is therefore a 
limited dependent variable (LDV) or categorical variable which takes on the values 
zero or one depending on whether fraud has been experienced or not.  According to  
Field, A. (2009, p265), logistic regression is multiple regression but with an outcome 
variable that is categorical and with predictor variables that are continuous or 
categorical. Similarly, the outcome variable of the model we are trying to build up is 
to predict fraud occurrence which is a binary variable, e.g. fraud occurrence=1; no 
fraud occurrence=0. Assumed predictor variables might be categorical (e.g. usage of 
gender / age) and numerical data (e.g. history of credit card usage).  
 
Based on the association and correlation table in the previous section, we use 11 
predictors including categorical and numerical variables to run a logistic regression. 
SPSS has more than one approach to test logistic regression. We chose an approach 
referred as ‘Forward LR’ by Field, A. (2009, p265) in which variables are added to the 
logistic equation in the order of the significance of their binary relationship with the 
dependent variable. The following two stages describe the progress of Forward LR 
test in details: 
 
(2) Beginning block 
At this stage, the initial model originates from using only the constant in the 
regression and tells us about the basic model included constant only. -2LL (-2 Log 
likelihood) in the following table represents the fit of the basic model to the data, the 
best fit being achieved when -2LL is minimised. As indicated by Field, A. (2009, 
p265), ‘when including only the constant, SPSS bases the model on assigning every 
participant to a single category of the outcome variable’. In our study, SPSS can 
decide either to predict fraud occurrence or no fraud occurrence. 
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Table 8.14 Iteration history 
Iteration History
a,b,c
 
Coefficients 
Iteration -2 Log likelihood 
Constant 
1 68.572 -1.803 
2 56.975 -2.562 
3 55.814 -2.898 
4 55.788 -2.958 
5 55.788 -2.959 
Step 0 
6 55.788 -2.959 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 55.788 
c. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
With just the constant, SPSS will predict every case into the category into which most 
observed cases fall. In the classification table below, there are 135 cases representing 
no occurrence of fraud and 7 cases representing occurrence. The chance of fraud 
occurrence is 7/135+7= 4.9% and the chance of fraud not occurrence is 135/135+7= 
95.1%. In this simple model, with only a constant, SPSS predicts that all cases are 
representing the non-occurrence of fraud as this gives a higher percentage of correct 
classifications (100/0). As expected, this initial model correctly classified 95.1% cases.  
 
Table 8.15 Classification table 
Classification Table
a,b
 
 Predicted 
 fraud occurrence 
 
Observed 
not occurrence occurrence Percentage Correct 
not occurrence 135 0 100.0 
occurrence 7 0 .0 Step 0 fraud occurrence 
Overall Percentage   95.1 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
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The ‘variables in the equation table’ summarized the model and showed the value of 
the constant (b0 ), which is equal to -2.959. 
 
Table 8.16 Variables in the equation 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -2.959 .388 58.283 1 .000 .052 
 
In the variables not in the equation table, we need to focus on column sig and column 
score. For example, FOOAOS (frequency of usage of online shopping) has a sig. 
value as .013, which suggested variable FOOAOS would make a significant effect to 
the model if it is included in the test. FOOAOS also has the highest score value as 
6.233, which would make a potential contribution to the model. Considering a 
significant score value, variable FOOAOS is likely to be a good predictor. In the next 
iteration, this variable is added to the logistic equation.  
 
 
Table 8.17 Variables not in the equation 
Variables not in the Equation 
   Score df Sig. 
FOOAOS 6.233 1 .013 
NODC 4.745 1 .029 
Step 0 Variables 
Overall Statistics 10.479 2 .005 
 
 
(2) Method = Forward LR 
Now we are looking for an improved model which gives a better fit to the data and has 
better classification accuracy.  The procedure is repeated, with SPSS adding variables 
into the logistic regression one by one, on the basis of the strength of their statistical 
association with the dependent variable, in order to create an improved model. This is 
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continued until the point where adding additional variables does not add statistical 
significance to the model. 
 
Continuing with our example, the model summary table below shows the overall fit of 
the new model through four iterations. The -2LL value of this new model has 
decreased from 49.575 at step 1 to 45.711 at step 2, this being less than 55.788 which 
was the value of -2LL in the previous basic model, showing that the model is 
predicting the outcome variable more accurately. 
 
Table 8.18 Model summary (forward LR) 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R Square 
1 49.557
a
 .043 .132 
2 45.711
a
 .069 .211 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
Also, when we look at the Chi-square test table from the new model, we noticed that 
all the sig. values are less than 0.05. It suggests that overall the model predicts fraud 
occurrence or non-occurrence significantly better than when only the constant was 
included.  
 
Table 8.19 Tests of model coefficients (forward LR) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
  Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 6.231 1 .013 
Block 6.231 1 .013 Step 1 
Model 6.231 1 .013 
Step 3.847 1 .050 
Block 10.077 2 .006 Step 2 
Model 10.077 2 .006 
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Similarly to the basic model in previous section, the classification table describes how 
well the model classifies the cases overall. The basic model with only a constant 
correctly classifies 95.1% cases by classifying all outcomes as a non-occurrence of 
fraud. The revised model unfortunately does not fare any better, as all the cases of 
occurrence of fraud are predicted as being non-occurrences. 
 
Table 8.20 Classification table (forward LR) 
Classification Table
a
 
 Predicted 
 fraud occurrence 
 
Observed 
non occurrence occurrence 
Percentage 
Correct 
not occurrence 135 0 100.0 
occurrence 7 0 .0 Step 1 fraud occurrence 
Overall Percentage   95.1 
not occurrence 135 0 100.0 
occurrence 7 0 .0 Step 2 fraud occurrence 
Overall Percentage   95.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Now we are focusing on the table of variables in the equation. In this table, we can get 
the estimates for the coefficients for the predictors included in the model. For example, 
at the step 1, variable FOOAOS is added into the model to predict fraud occurrence or 
not. The coefficient of FOOAOS is .598 and sig. value is .024 which is significant. It 
suggested that variable FOOAOS is a good predictor in the model. With the 
coefficient of the constant is -4.538 at step 1, we can format the equation of the step 1 
model.  
 
Finally, we need to explain the last crucial value in the table of variables in the 
equation. Exp(B), generally speaking, it suggests a positive relationship between 
predictor and outcome if the value is greater than 1. On the other hand, a negative 
relationship occurs when the value is less than 1. Two predictors at the step 2, 
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FOOAOS (frequency of usage of online shopping) and NODC (number of debit cards) 
have the values of Exp(B) bigger than 1, suggesting positive relationships between 
FOOAOS vs. fraud occurrence and NODC vs. fraud occurrence.  
 
Table 8.21 Variables in the equation (forward LR) 
Variables in the Equation 
  95.0% C.I.for EXP(B) 
  
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Lower Upper 
FOOAOS .598 .266 5.073 1 .024 1.819 1.081 3.062 Step 1
a
 
Constant -4.538 .973 21.769 1 .000 .011   
FOOAOS .615 .273 5.072 1 .024 1.850 1.083 3.159 
NODC .356 .177 4.072 1 .044 1.428 1.010 2.018 
Step 2
b
 
Constant -6.012 1.358 19.601 1 .000 .002   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: FOOAOS. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: NODC. 
 
Based on the best model selected by SPSS using logistic regression test, we have two 
predictors with significant performance: FOOAOS (frequency of usage of online 
shopping) and NODC (number of debit cards). Both of them have positive 
relationships with model outcome. However, as stated earlier, the inclusion of these 
variable might improve model fit but it does not improve classification accuracy, so 
the results should be treated with care.  
8.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have undertaken a progressive analysis of China survey data 
obtained, starting first with a descriptive approach, then looking at binary associations 
of the variables and then using logistic regression to try to explain and classify the 
occurrence of fraud. A number of both similarities and differences have been found in 
comparison with the comparable UK survey.  These are explored in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 9 Comparison of UK and China Surveys 
 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we compare the data analysis results from the data collected in the UK 
and China to emphasise the difference of customers’ behaviour and attitudes to the 
online financial transactions and internet fraud.   
 
9.2 Comparison of the results of data analysis between the UK 
and China 
As the same approach when we discussed SPSS results in previous chapters (chapter 6 
and chapter 8), the following sections show the contrast of SPSS results from the data 
collected in the UK and China.  
 
9.2.1 Data summary (UK and China) 
In this section, we focus on the contrast of data summary of both UK and China, using 
tables to show the comparison in details and following the order as the score of 
general IT skills; age; usage of bank cards; customers’ satisfaction; usage of online 
activities and attempted fraud occurrence. 
 
(1) Score of general IT skills 
The table of responses for self assessment of IT skills for the UK and China was as 
shown in Table 9.1 below. 
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Table 9.1 Score of general IT skills (UK and China) 
Score of general IT skill UK China 
Very poor 13.65% 4.23% 
Poor 4.06% 1.41% 
Not good 7.38% 7.04% 
Average 28.78% 51.41% 
Good 20.66% 22.54% 
Very good 19.56% 9.15% 
Excellent 5.90% 4.23% 
Total  271 (100%) 142 (100%) 
 
 
One can use this table to infer that 87.32% of respondents from China scored their 
general IT skills as average to excellent (good, very good and excellent), the 
corresponding figure for the UK being 74.91%.  To test whether or not this difference 
is significant, we conduct a paired t-test under the null hypotheses (a) that the 
difference is significant, and (b) that the self assessment of the IT skills in the range 
Average to Excellent in the population from which the China sample is drawn is 
higher than the corresponding proportion in the UK.  This test will be shown in detail 
in this instance.  For subsequent paired t-tests the results will be shown but, given the 
similarity of the structure of the test, the detail as shown below will not be repeated. 
 
 (a) H0 : pchina  = puk  (b) H0 :pchina  >  puk 
      H1 : pchina  ≠ puk ,     α = 0.05 (ie 5% significance) 
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 where 1 = China and 2 = UK. 
 
 
The sample data were: 
 n1 = 142, n2 = 271, p1 = 0.8732, p2 = 0.7491 
from which 
 s.e. = 0.384, and t = 3.23 
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The critical t statistics with n1 + n2 – 2 = 311 degrees of freedom are, to two decimal 
places, the same as for the normal distribution with the high value of degrees of 
freedom in this test, the critical values being | tsample | >  1.96 for a two tailed test (ie 
against null hypothesis (a)) and tsample > 1.64 for a one tailed test (ie against null 
hypothesis (b), where we are testing that the self assessment of IT skills from Average 
to Excellent is higher in China than in the UK). 
 
The conclusion is therefore that both for the two-tailed and the one-tailed test H0 
should be rejected – ie the self assessment of IT skills in China and the UK from 
Average to Excellent are different (two tailed test, hypothesis (a)), and also that the 
self assessment of IT skills in China from Average to Excellent is higher than the 
comparable proportion in the UK (one tailed test, hypothesis (b)).   
 
This test has only looked at the scores of Average to Excellent.  However, it would 
have been possible to have combined other categories (for example Good to Excellent) 
and to have conducted a similar test.  Had this been done, the proportions of Average 
to Excellent from both samples turns out to be pchina = 0.3952 and for puk = 0.4612, ie 
the proportion in the UK sample is actually higher and significant from the China 
proportion at the 5% level (t = 1.961).  The reason for this apparent anomaly is that 
the proportion of the respondents from China scoring their skills as Average is almost 
twice that of the UK. Once you take this out by only looking at Good to Excellent you 
get a different story.  This example shows that it is important not to over-generalise 
the conclusions – for example not to conclude, from the first test that ‘IT skills in 
general are higher in China’.  There is also the problem that what one group might 
consider as average is not necessary the same as for the other group.  Thus any 
pairwise comparison must be treated with care.  It does not mean that comparisons are 
invalid – it means that the implications need to be looked at critically.  
 
An alternative way of testing the difference in self-assessed IT skills is to use a chi-
square test on all the categories. Using the UK proportions to calculate the expected 
frequencies for the China sample, the χ2 statistic is 45.8 against a critical value at the 
5% level of significance of 11.07. Therefore, there is good reason to reject the 
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hypothesis that the levels of self-assessed IT skills in China and the UK are same. The 
key differences, looking at the table, are that the UK results are more spread out, with 
the UK ‘Very poor’ category being 9.4% higher than the Chinese on, the China 
‘Average’ being 22.6% higher and the UK ‘Very good’ category being 10.41% higher. 
The suggestion is that the China sample is more homogenous.  
 
One factor which might be driving the differences in self assessment of IT skills is the 
difference in ages, which is discussed in the next section.  
(2) Age  
The age distribution of the two samples is shown in Table 9.2 below. 
Table 9.2  Age (UK and China) 
Age  UK China 
<20 Years 0.74% 0 
21-30 Years 8.12% 52.11% 
31-40 Years 11.81% 37.32% 
41-50 Years 21.03% 7.04% 
51-60 Years 17.71% 3.52% 
61-70 Years 18.45% 0 
>71 Years 22.14% 0 
Total  271 (100%) 142 (100%) 
 
As can be seen from Table 9.2, 52.11% of respondents from China were at 21-30 age 
range compared to 8.12% for the UK, while 40.59% of individuals in the UK were 
aged at 61-70 and >71 years, there being no respondents from China in these last two 
age categories. A chi-square test showed that the difference in ages was highly 
significant, the age distribution of the respondents from China being younger than that 
of the respondents in the UK. Therefore, it explains that the higher confidence of 
general IT skills shown in the data collected in China instead of the UK because 
younger individuals are more likely to have higher IT skills.  
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In looking at the responses from the countries individually, in both cases there was a 
highly significantly negative correlation between self-assessed IT skills and age 
(sections 6.3-(1)-(1.1) and 8.3-(1)-(1.1)).  It might have been expected therefore that 
the younger China sample would have rated their IT skills more highly in comparison 
to the UK sample, but this did not seem to be the case (although as mentioned earlier 
it is not obvious that they would have used, implicitly, the same reference group in 
making their assessments).  This might suggest that, in China, IT skills as a whole are 
at an earlier stage of development. 
 
Other age related factors that were significant in the individual correlations were, for 
the UK, online shopping, internet banking, online education service and downloading 
media (all negative). The results for China were similar except that online education 
services were not significant, presumably because they are at an earlier stage of 
development.  There is clearly an inverse relationship between the use of online 
services and age in both countries, as one might expect. 
(3) Usage of credit card and debit card 
The average number of cards and years of card usage were appreciably different in the 
UK and China as can be seen in Table 9.3 below.  
 
Table 9.3 Usage of bank cards (UK and China) 
UK China 
Usage of bank cards 
Credit card Debit card Credit card Debit card 
Average number of cards  1.79 1.63 2.68 3.32 
Years of card usage 19.36 18.1 4.13 8.13 
 
Both in terms of credit cards and debit cards, the average number per person in China 
is almost twice that of the UK, perhaps surprisingly so as the years of card usage show 
the UK to be much higher than China.  As was mentioned briefly in chapter 8 (8.3-(6)-
(6.1)), in China, often specific cards qualify for discounts in specific outlets, and 
therefore to maximise their total discounts people carry more cards. 
 
 
 
275 
(4) Satisfaction with credit card and debit card services 
Table 9.4 shows the levels of satisfaction with credit and debit cards in the UK and 
China. 
Table 9.4 satisfaction of bank cards (UK and China) 
UK China 
Customers’ satisfaction 
Credit card Debit card Credit card Debit card 
Not satisfied at all 0% 0.75% 2.96% 1.42% 
Not satisfied 2.69% 1.13% 10.37% 6.38% 
average 21.08% 9.77% 39.26% 43.26% 
satisfied 45.29% 43.98% 36.30% 39.01% 
Very satisfied 30.94% 44.36% 11.11% 9.93% 
 
For both credit cards and debit cards, the respondents from the UK seemed more 
satisfied than the respondents from China, with the ‘satisfied’ and ‘very satisfied’ 
responses in the UK being 76% for credit cards and 88% for debit cards, the 
corresponding figures for China being only 47% and 49%.  Looking at the two not 
satisfied categories, the ‘not satisfied’ and ‘not satisfied at all’ categories for the UK 
amounted to less than 3% for credit cards and less than 2% for debit cards, the 
corresponding figures for China being 13% and 8%.  As mentioned in chapter 8, in 
China a defrauded customer cannot count on being reimbursed by the bank or credit 
card company.  However, this might only be part of the explanation, because in China 
the incidence of fraud is much lower than in the UK, so the reason is more likely to be 
related to charges for interest, fees etc (chapter 8, section 8.3-(6)/(7)). 
 
(5) Usage of online activities 
Table 9.5 shows a similar profile for the UK and China in respect to internet banking 
and online shopping (although internet banking seems to be more popular amongst the 
China respondents).   
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Table 9.5 Usage of online activities (UK and China) 
UK China 
Online activities 
Yes No Yes No 
Internet banking 57.2% 42.8% 69% 31% 
Online shopping 67.2% 32.8% 65.5% 34.5% 
Downloading media 28.4% 71.6% 83.8% 16.2% 
Online education services 26.9% 73.1% 56.3% 43.7% 
 
There are significant differences, however, in the downloading of media (where China 
is very high) and the use of online educations services (where the UK is appreciably 
higher).  The downloading of media effect in China is probably age related (the 
Chinese respondents being younger) although the evidence in chapter 8 (8.3-(8)-(8.3)), 
on the relation between age and downloading is not significant at the 5% level, 
although it is of the expected negative sign. The use of online education facilities 
reflects the fact that in China this is in its infancy.   
 
(6) Incidence of attempted fraud  
Table 9.6 below gives an analysis of the frequency of various methods of attempted 
fraud in the UK and China. 
 
Table 9.6 Attempted fraud occurrence (UK % / China %) 
How often do you experience attempted fraud (%)? (UK/ China) 
Fraudulent schemes 
Never Yearly Quarterly Monthly Weekly Daily 
Card cloned 94.8 / 100 5.2 / 0 0 /  0 0 /  0 0 /  0 0 /  0 
ID theft 97.8 / 97.2 1.5 / 1.4 0 /  0 0.4 / 1.4 0 /  0 0.4 / 0 
Scam post / junk mail 65.3 / 62 4.4 / 7.7 3.7 / 10.6 9.2 / 8.5 11.8/ 9.2  5.5 / 2.1 
Phishing emails / spam emails 62.0 / 71.1 4.8 / 5.6 7  / 6.3 4.4 / 5.6 13.7/ 6.3 8.1 / 4.9 
Fake websites / internet hijacking 86.7 / 88 3.3 / 6.3 3.3 / 1.4 3.7 / 3.5 1.5  / 0.7 1.5 / 0 
Lost / stolen bank cards 93.7 / 95.1 5.9 / 4.2 0 /  0.7 0.4 / 0 0 /  0 0 /  0 
Virus / Trojan attacks 80.8 / 64.8 8.9 / 4.2 4.1 / 7.7 3.3 / 9.2 1.8 / 9.2 1.1 / 4.9 
 
The main features of Table 9.6 are (i) the percentages in the ‘never’ column are 
similar for the UK and China, except for ‘virus / Trojan attacks’, which seem to be 
 
 
 
277 
more prevalent in China, (ii) the frequency of most of the problems seems to be a little 
lower in China, as a rule, except again for virus and Trojan attacks, and (iii) the 
incidence of ‘phishing emails’ tends to be a little lower in China, possibly because the 
language abilities of the Eastern European sources from which many phishing attacks 
emanate does not stretch to Mandarin. 
9.2.2 Correlation table (UK and China) 
Only three significant correlations were found for China: general IT skill vs. age (-ve); 
general IT skill vs. highest qualification (+ve) and usage of online shopping vs. fraud 
occurrence (+ve).  For the UK, these correlations were also found to be significant, 
but in addition, the following correlations were also significant: general IT skill vs. 
fraud occurrence (+ve) ; general IT skill vs. highest qualification (+ve); usage of 
internet banking vs. fraud occurrence (+ve); and usage of downloading media vs. 
fraud occurrence (+ve). These are relationships are unsurprising with the possible 
exception of the significant positive correlation, in the UK only, between IT skill and 
fraud occurrence, where the maintained hypothesis might be that those people with 
high IT skills might be less susceptible to fraud. For China, the relationship is also 
positive but not significant.  For the China data, the incidence of actual fraud (7 cases) 
was too low for correlations with fraud occurrence to be statistically significant, with 
the possible exception of the positive association between online shopping and fraud 
occurrence if viewed as a one-tailed test (ie the null being that the correlation was 
greater than zero, as opposed to non equal to zero). 
 
Although the same survey questionnaire (apart from the language difference) was 
used in both the UK and China, delivery and collection methods were slightly 
different due to the local rules and culture. We received 271 valid replies (58 
fraudulent cases included) in the UK and 142 valid replies in China. One reason 
behind the less significant associations in the China data is therefore due to the lower 
number of responses driving up the standard errors in the hypothesis tests. A second 
factor, which is particularly important when looking at correlations with incidents of 
fraud, is the low number of fraud cases in China. 
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Table 9.7 Table of the correlation and sig value (UK and China) 
UK China 
Variable 
Correlation Sig. Correlation Sig. 
General IT skill* vs. Age -0.601 0.000** -0.316 0.000** 
General IT skill vs. Fraud occurrence 0.168 0.004** 0.076 0.366 
General IT skill vs. Highest qualification* 0.202 0.001** 0.210 0.012** 
Age* vs. Fraud occurrence -0.108 0.076 0.107 0.204 
Usage of internet banking vs. Fraud occurrence 0.215 0.000** -0.058 0.490*** 
Usage of online shopping vs. Fraud occurrence 0.212 0.000** 0.165 0.049 
Usage of downloading media vs. Fraud occurrence 0.210 0.001** 0.012 0.889 
Usage of online education vs. Fraud occurrence -0.053 0.383 0.122 0.148 
IT/Finance related background vs. Fraud occurrence 0.012 0.839 -0.094 0.268 
General IT skill vs. Gender 0.106 0.082 0.042 0.50 
Gender vs. Fraud occurrence -0.097 0.110 0.074 0.381 
Highest qualification vs. Fraud occurrence 0.097 0.109 0.004 0.965 
*variable has been combined and recoded to avoid inaccurate test result (e.g. Age/IT skill) 
** significant at the 5% level (2 tailed-test against the null hypothesis that the correlation is zero) 
*** significant at the 5% level (1 tailed-test against the null hypothesis that the correlation is greater than zero) 
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9.2.3 Logistic regression model (UK and China) 
Based on the associations discovered in previous sections, we now attempt to find out 
if there is any further relationship that can be established to predict fraud occurrence 
using logistic regression. Table 9.8 summarizes the results obtained in chapters 6 and 
8 from the logistic regressions on the UK and China data respectively.  This shows 
that four predictors (UOOAIB, UOOAOES, UOOADM and HUDC) performed 
significantly in the UK model and only two (FOOAOS and NODC) in China model.  
 
Table 9.8 Table of the significant predictor variables in the logistic equations (UK and China) 
Variables UK (4) China (2) 
UOOAIB 
(usage of internet banking) 
Y N 
UOOAOES 
(usage of online education service) 
Y N 
UOOADM 
(usage of downloading media online) 
Y N 
HUDC 
(history of usage of debit card) 
Y N 
FOOAOS 
(frequency of usage of online shopping) 
N Y 
NODC 
(number of debit cards owned) 
N Y 
 
The conclusion from the table is that there is no obvious consistency between the 
logistic regressions to predict the occurrence of fraud between the UK and China.  
This is not particularly surprising.  With only seven cases of fraud in the China sample, 
any logistic regression to capture the determining factors is likely to be unstable as 
there is likely to be a strong random element to these (rare) incidents.  On the other 
hand, with 58 incidents of fraud in the UK sample, the logistic regression is more 
robust, even if the Nagelkirke r2 is still modest at 0.205. 
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9.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we provided a comparison of the findings from the UK and China 
samples based on the statistical results obtained from SPSS.  In the next chapter, we 
draw together the main findings to conclude our study and provide further approaches 
for future research related to this topic.  
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Chapter 10 Conclusions 
 
10.1 Introduction 
In this final chapter in the thesis, we summarise and reflect on the main findings of 
this study and suggest research directions for future research.  
 
10.2 Summary of this study 
This thesis is entitled ‘an investigation of Financial Fraud in Online Banking and Card 
Payment Systems in the UK and China’. This is an important question because, at the 
present point in time, there is an uneasy equilibrium between the increasing 
sophistication and cunning of the fraudsters versus the attempts by programmers, 
systems experts, database designers and others to tackle this increasing menace.  It is 
no exaggeration to say that the future of online financial transactions is in the balance.  
There are systems experts who refuse to have an online bank account because, in their 
judgement, there is currently an insufficient level of security to provide them with the 
level of trust necessary for them to be confident that their money is not at risk. 
 
The central question at the heart of this dissertation, as outlined in chapter 1 (section 
1.3) and chapter 2 (section 2.7) is to explore both the susceptibilities and the attitudes 
of individuals to electronic fraud in relation the statistical data, the surveys undertaken 
in this study, the robustness of the electronic systems and the responsiveness and ‘user 
friendliness’ of the financial institutions in matters such as compensation and 
willingness to help. As discussed in chapter 2 (particularly section 2.6), there are few 
academic studies in this area, with most of the attention being directed at the attitudes 
of consumers to internet banking rather than to fraud, and no studies dealing directly 
with actual cases of fraud.  It was to this gap in the literature that the study was 
addressed.   
 
The main findings from the UK survey were: younger respondents are more likely to 
have higher general IT skill; respondents with higher IT skill are more likely to be 
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defrauded on the internet; respondents with higher qualifications are more likely to 
have higher IT skill; younger respondents are more likely to be defrauded on the 
internet. Also, certain types of online activities present higher risks of fraud to the 
respondents who are using internet banking; online shopping and media downloading. 
Furthermore, four predictors (usage of internet banking, usage of online education 
services, and usage of downloading media and length of debit card usage) were 
significant factors in the logistic regressions used to classify fraud occurrence / non-
occurrence in the UK.  Most of these are in line with expectations, although it might 
be expected that those with higher IT skills would be less susceptible to fraud rather 
than more susceptible. Of particular interest was the generally high degree of 
customer satisfaction with the banks / card companies from those who had been 
defrauded.  This is important: it points to there being a strong commitment on behalf 
of these companies to maintain consumer confidence rather than try to avoid 
providing assistance and/or compensation when things go wrong.   
 
From the China survey, statistically significant findings, much in line with 
expectations, were that younger respondents are more likely to have higher general IT 
skill; and respondents with higher qualifications are more likely to have higher IT skill. 
However, online shopping was the only online activity which was significantly 
correlated to fraud occurrence. Finally, the two significant explanatory variables in the 
logistic regression to categorize fraud occurrence / non-occurrence were frequency of 
usage of online shopping and number of debit cards.  Neither of these was selected in 
the UK logistic regression, although it is interesting that there is a variable related to 
debit cards in each final model. In analysing the actual cases of fraud, one finding of 
interest was a lower level of satisfaction with the banks when actual fraud had 
occurred in comparison to the UK, although the incidence of fraud in the sample was 
lower. 
 
In looking at cases of attempted fraud, the main comparisons were that virus and 
Trojan attacks seem to be more prevalent in China, but the incidence of phishing 
attacks were lower, possibly (as explained in chapter 8) because the Eastern European 
exponents of phishing, who provide much of the phishing email in the UK, have more 
of a language barrier when it comes to directing such attacks at China. 
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10.3 The Future of Electronic Transactions 
The banks and credit card companies have considerable financial gains to be made out 
of electronic transactions. Operating in a virtual medium, with low infrastructure costs, 
means that there are very significant savings to be made.  High street branches and the 
associated staffing levels are costly to maintain: online transactions reduce the 
transactions costs considerably. Even if online transactions are more susceptible to 
fraud, it is in the banks’ interests to reimburse customers to maintain confidence in 
this transactions medium, provided the costs of fraud are kept to an acceptable level.  
This is also true of credit cards.  The losses from ‘card-not-present’ transactions, as 
discussed in chapter 4, are high, but credit card operations are highly profitable and 
provided the companies can recover their losses through charging high merchant fees 
and high rates of interest on unpaid balances, they will continue to be profitable.  It is 
therefore in their interests, at least at current fraud levels, to reimburse customers for 
actual occurrences of fraud. This was evidently the situation evidenced by the UK 
survey, where customer satisfaction levels with the banks responses to dealing with 
fraud were high, but this was less evident in China, although actual fraud levels were 
lower. 
 
From time to time there is a technological breakthrough which shifts the balance of 
power between the banks and the fraudsters.  Sophisticated viruses, worms and 
Trojans have given power to the fraudsters, whereas the introduction of Chip-and-PIN 
technology in 2004 greatly reduced the number of fraudulent POS transactions in UK 
retail outlets. However, not all countries have adopted Chip-and-PIN, so cross-border 
transactions are still vulnerable, and many cloned credit cards end up being used in 
non Chip-and-PIN environments such as Australia or the United States.   
 
Some vulnerabilities however are difficult to eliminate; card-not-present transactions 
in particular fall into this category.  The response of credit card companies to online 
transactions of this nature is to profile customers to try to detect transactions that are 
out of character. For example, if an individual tends to make online shopping 
purchases during normal daytime hours, an internet gaming transaction at 3am will be 
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picked up immediately and the chances are the transaction will be refused.  A second 
line of defence is the increasing use of ‘secure’ systems discussed in chapter 2, where 
the bank or credit card company requires an additional layer of authorization before 
the transaction is processed (eg NatWest Secure, MBNA Secure etc). 
 
However, with card-not-present transactions over the telephone or by mail order, the 
situation is not so reassuring as the policing systems described above are not 
employed. Providing the banks / credit card companies can recover the costs of 
reimbursing fraudulent transactions, these forms of payment will probably continue to 
operate. However, any material shift in the ability of the fraudsters to exploit the 
weaknesses may result in these means of payment being discontinued.  It is still the 
case that the simplest fraud schemes net the most profits overall, and as seen from 
both the survey data and the APACS statistics in chapter 4, simple card cloning is still 
high on the list as a major source of fraudulent transactions, even though Chip-and-
PIN has helped to control this domestically although it is understood that fraudsters 
now have the technology to clone the chips embedded in the cards. 
 
Finally, what about the security of internet banking?  Careful use of this transactions 
medium over a private encrypted network should provide good security, but it is still 
vulnerable, particularly where individuals write down their passwords and these could 
then be stolen. With the recent tendency to require individuals to have ever more 
complex passwords, the capacity for them to be remembered easily diminishes.  In 
addition, more technical vulnerabilities to worms, Trojans etc mean that 100% 
security cannot be guaranteed, at least not with current technology.  However, the cost 
savings to the banks will ensure that every effort is made to make online banking 
secure. 
 
10.4 Future research 
The research experiences gained from this study suggest a number of areas for future 
research, particularly into the under-researched area of fraud.  Rather than approach 
the research questions through individuals, there would be much value in working 
with merchants and financial organizations that are dealing with financial transactions 
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and fraud on daily basis. In conducting this study, we approached a number of banks 
in the UK including HSBC, NatWest and American Express, but they were reluctant 
to give out any information or agree to meetings because of its commercial and 
technical sensitivity. However, we succeeded in getting three interviews with banks in 
China, although they asked to remain anonymous.  If a researcher could get around 
this veil of secrecy, there would be much interesting information and data to analyze.  
It is hoped that the author of this thesis will be able to conduct research of this nature 
in the future. If this could be done internationally, the study would be particularly 
interesting. 
 
One other area of interest would be to investigate the financial models of the banks 
and credit card companies to see what assumptions and allowances they factor in for 
fraud. Again, this information is likely to be highly commercially sensitive and the 
likelihood of being able to study this area in detail is remote. 
 
10.5 Conclusions 
The key features of this study are that it has focused on the issues of actual and 
attempted fraud, not just in the UK but also with a parallel survey in China.  The 
China survey was the more difficult to conduct, because for confidentiality reasons it 
had to be conducted through the medium of a bank.  Other international surveys might 
experience similar problems due to differing social environments and systems for mail 
delivery.  However, despite electronic transactions being a more recent innovation in 
China, the problems in terms of actual and attempted fraud were broadly similar.  
However, the incidence in the China survey was lower, which might suggest that 
some lessons had been learned and that Western systems of electronic payment had 
not just been copied without modification. China is at an earlier stage of development 
but the growth in electronic transactions is massive, so the potential for fraudsters is 
also huge. It will be interesting to see how the balance of power between the 
technologist and systems designers on the one hand and the fraudsters on the other 
evolves as this electronic market grows. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire in both English 
and Chinese 
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